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ABSTRACT
"THE MAGIC OF THE MANY THAT SETS THE WORLD ON FIRE":
BOSTON ELITES AND URBAN POLITICAL INSURGENTS
DURING THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY
SEPTEMBER 1997
MATTHEW H. CROCKER, B.A., MACALESTER COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jack Tager
"The Magic of the Many Which Sets the World on Fire":
Boston Elites and Urban Political Insurgents During the
Early Nineteenth Century is a broad analysis on social
class and political culture in Boston and Massachusetts
between 1800 and 1830. I have consciously focused on the
political odyssey of congressman, Massachusetts legislator,
and Boston's second mayor, Josiah Quincy, to investigate
the political and cultural evolution of Boston during these
three crucial decades. Quincy's political career—though
central to the story--is utilized as a narrative hook that
helps unveil the dramatic changes in the political and
social culture that Massachusetts faced in between the
first and second party systems.
During the first three decades of the nineteenth
century, Massachusetts and Boston, in particular, faced a
dramatic period of political, cultural, and economic
transformation. At the beginning of the century, the
transformation. At the beginning of the century, the
politics, economy, and culture of the state were controlled
almost exclusively by a close-knit elite which ran
roughshod over the ordinary citizenry. By the mid-1820s
this elite faced an onslaught of serious challenges to its
hegemony in Massachusetts. By 1823 the political arm of
the elite, the Federalist Party, was gutted by a united
lower-to-middling class electorate led by ex-Federalist and
Brahmin, Josiah Quincy; This newly charged electorate
refused to abide by the political standards of the past,
resulting in the passing of the first party system.
This study investigates the emergence of a
dramatically new sort of political culture while also
providing an analysis of a highly popular caesarist who
helped destroy the first party system in Massachusetts, but
could not survive the advent of the second.
v
PREFACE
Historians of nineteenth-century Boston have
consistently viewed the city as a static fortress of elite
conservativism—truly a protected "city upon the hill."
Those interested in elite-class studies invariably turn to
Boston's patricians as a premier example of an economic,
cultural and political hegemonic class that ruled over a
region with oligarchical power. Only the historiography on
Southern slaveholding elites can compete in sheer volume
with the work done on Boston's "Brahmins" and their class
structure. 1
Though mostly interested in economic and/or cultural
dominance, Frederic Cople Jaher, Edward Pessen, Ronald
Story, and Betty G. Farrell among others, assert that
Boston's nineteenth-century cultural and economic elite
held sway over the politics of Massachusetts. Established
cultural and economic institutions intertwined with the
political structures of the state, giving a unified Boston
patriciate nearly complete control over the Bay State.
Inextricably bound together not only by cultural, political
and economic institutional ties, but reinforced by direct
familial allegiances, Boston's elite posed a sustained and
unified front against the various forces of democratization
that threatened its hegemony. Much like the slaveholding
elite, Boston's Brahmins embraced a unigue brand of
paternalism as the philosophical justification for their
vi
dominance. Built by "many of our wealthiest and most
liberal merchants," Massachusetts General Hospital cured
Boston's sick. The director of the privately funded
Perkins Institution for the Blind claimed he could teach
"an oyster" to read. 2 Armed with a sense of noblesse
oblige, Boston's nineteenth-century patricians consolidated
and reinforced their economic, cultural and political
power--unif ied in their common purpose and right to lead as
a class. As Frederic Cople Jaher argues, "between 1800-
1860, [a] multi-functional upper-class, by dominating the
foremost local business establishments, political
organizations and cultural and philanthropic institutions,
assumed the role of a ruling elite." In the political
realm, it is argued that despite nineteenth-century party
mutations and restructuring, Boston's ruling elite
maintained unremitting political solidarity in the face of
growing political turbulence during the first half of the
nineteenth-century
.
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In this sense, students of Boston's elite class
structure have formed an incomplete and static model that
neglects the complexity of antebellum Boston politics
while
ignoring how political disruptions affected the
solidarity
of the elite class structure in Boston. The
limited
geographic space imposed by the Shawmut peninsula,
despite
the city's nineteenth-century fill-in projects,
compelled
the commingling of Boston's various classes.
As much as
Vll
they may have wanted to, the city's elite did not live in
social isolation.'1 The effects of urban life during the /
early nineteenth-century bred counter-hegemonic thought
that directly affected the political culture of Boston.
Ronald Formisano, John Brooke, Paul Goodman, John R.
Mulkern, and others interested in popular political
confrontations with this economic, cultural and political
elite focus on challenges to the Bay State's established
order. Tracing the successes and failures of antebellum
Massachusetts political insurgents, these historians
concentrate on popular forays into the state's political
culture. s Despite heated historiographical debate over
ethnocultural vs. sectional/ local vs. national causation
for the break-up of established party systems, these
studies greatly expand our understanding of how nineteenth-
century party systems changed in Massachusetts over time.
Yet they too often fall victim to the static model of
Boston elite hegemony—all too easily associating
Federalist/Whig/Republican political interests with the
interests of Boston's upper class. Massachusetts' most
adroit political historian, Ronald Formisano, concedes
"[t]he nerve center of maritime Massachusetts, Boston, was
Federal [ ist] . Its upper classes were predominantly so...."
Demonstrating the alliance between elite economic interests
and Federalist party affiliation, Formisano resolves that
the Bay State's coastal region "boasted 'many families of
viii
wealth and culture,' including the Cabots, Lees and
Thorndikes, who sat in the highest Federal [ist] councils.
Its social hierarchy was well marked and highly cohesive."
Despite an analysis demonstrating Massachusetts Whiggery's
broad social construction, in the end, Formisano succumbs:
"The Whig Party, it is not farfetched to say, was the
instrument of this [Brahmin] elite." 6
Drawing from both these historiographical approaches,
I hope to expand dominant notions of elite-class hegemony,
while also broadening our understanding of popular
political urban insurgency movements. In studying the
political career of patrician Josiah Quincy, it became
apparent that many assumptions historians placed on elites
and particularly the "Brahmins," do not hold together after
a close reading of the primary material. In particular,
the presumption of a static and unified nineteenth-century
Boston elite is vitiated by the evidence in the rich papers
and manuscripts of the Massachusetts Historical Society and
the American Antiguarian Society. Perhaps, Boston's
historians had too easily accepted the mythology of Brahmin
apologists such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Henry Adams,
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Cleveland Amory, Samuel Eliot Morison
and a myriad of other upper-class Bostonians. The
alternative newspapers of Boston—the New England Galaxy,
the Bostonian and Mechanics Journal , the Debtor's Journal,
the Independent Bostonian and many others, as well as the
ix
diaries and correspondence of elites, demonstrates
political solidarity among Boston patricians proved
difficult to maintain when it came to local and state
politics. At times, any form of cohesion was impossible.
Illustrative of the fragility and frailties in elite-
class solidarity was the turbulent relationship between
Brahmins Harrison Gray Otis and Josiah Quincy. Both men
are usually viewed by historians as political and class
allies, yet their political relationship was at best uneasy
and often broke apart, reflecting larger social divisions
within Boston's elite class structure. Otis and Quincy
also were not connected financially. In fact, during the
early-nineteenth-century, while Otis became heavily
invested in Massachusetts 1 s early manufacturing industry,
Josiah Quincy strongly railed against New England money
being funneled away from merchant trade and into
manufacturing in the factory towns of Waltham and Lowell.
This is not to say that in the eyes of ordinary
citizens there was not obvious class divisions between the
Quincy family and the vast majority of Bostonians. Without
question the Quincy' s were viewed as wealthy gentry.
Nevertheless the political support they garnered among
Bostonians who had shed traditional notions of deference,
indicated that the electorate had formed significant
distinctions between elites like the Quincy family and
those epitomized by Harrison Gray Otis. By making such
x
distinctions and then articulating them through the
electoral process, early nineteenth-century Bostonians
claimed a significant role in controlling their destinies.
Although the established elite in Boston was perhaps
more entrenched socially, economically, institutionally,
and politically than in other northern cities, by 1820
popular challenges to its authority emerged.
Paradoxically, one of Boston's oldest and most respectable
elite families accelerated this political challenge. Under
such circumstances it is difficult to abide by the
provincial mythology of Boston as the Brahmin's cocoon-like
"city upon the hill." By 1820, those who could claim
stewardship of the hub were not only composed of the town's
"first families," but also contained people from the lower-
to-middling orders. For these "other Bostonians,"
allegiance with politically astute Brahmins like Josiah
Quincy succeeded in destroying the traditional shackles of
class deference, exposing the ignorance and weakness of the
established "standing order." Boston became a much more
democratic city because of these innovative intra-class
relationships
.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION:
THE SETTING FOR INSURGENCY
"...nothing is so unequal as equality."
— Samuel Lyman, 1800
"...the duped and deluded mob whose hosannas and
execrations are as much mechanical and responsive as
the pipes of an organ."
— Harrison Gray Otis, 1801
No other political organization more overtly
epitomized and championed Massachusetts ' s patrician class
than the Federalist party. Unlike its structure elsewhere,
Boston Federalism developed a highly sophisticated and
effective machine that promoted, reinforced and maintained
what Ronald Formisano identifies as "deferential-
participant politics." While in other states the party
atrophied after the "treason" of the Hartford Convention,
Federalism' s political infrastructure in Massachusetts
forestalled its demise and provided the party an unusually
long and somewhat anachronistic life. Until the early
1820s, ordinary voters continued to participate in a
variety of elections, following the lead of their cultural
and economic "betters"—voting, often, against their own
interests. Although as early as 1814, Federalism on the
national level was dead and buried, in the Massachusetts
the party continued to enjoy significant appeal and
experienced a rebirth of sorts in its opposition to the
Missouri Compromise. Yet the party's "Indian Summer," as
historian Samuel Eliot Morison once described it, was short
lived. 1 By 1822 Federalism had lost the city of Boston,
and with it the party's last bastion. The decisive blow,
ironically, occurred not only in the party's most loyal
stronghold of Boston, but was delivered by ranking members
of both the party leadership and the Boston patriciate.
During the city's first mayoral race in 1822, a
curious nonpartisan coalition formed between estranged
members of the Boston Federalist elite and a diverse urban
electorate, containing a majority membership of poor-to-
middling Bostonians. This unconventional fusion mustered
the energy to cause the collapse of Federalism in Boston,
thereby signaling the party's final demise. 2 The party
disloyalty shown by some of the Boston elite in 1822 also
indicated that the normative socio-political precepts in
Boston had changed. No longer could Federalism bank on
Boston's elite to follow in lock-step. In this sense, the
political events that began in the early 1820s transcends
conventional political history and illuminates a cultural
crisis among Boston's once homogenous elite. These
activities expose the precariousness of an elite class
structure that has traditionally been seen as one of the
most durable and unified political and economic structures
of its kind in America. 3
The most visible member of this insurgency in Boston
was patrician Josiah Quincy. Quincy was a scion of Boston
wealth and lineage. John Adams once described him as "a
rare instance of hereditary eloquence and ingenuity in the
fourth generation.
.. .He comes into life with every
advantage of family, fortune and education." A graduate of
Andover and Harvard, and buttressed with a hefty
inheritance in real estate, he chose a life in politics,
serving in the U.S. House as a reactionary Federalist for
most of his early adulthood. 4 Yet, in his first run for
mayor Quincy dramatically broke with his party and led an
insurgent campaign that resulted in the uprooting of
Federalist hegemony in Boston. This was hardly the
presumed role of a man whom Boston patrician and diplomat,
John Lothrop Motley hailed as "the head of the Brahmins of
America.
"
5
As the popular mayor of Boston for six years between
1823 and 1829, Quincy ushered in a new form of politics
that centered almost solely around himself. Operating much
like future Boston political impresario and mayor James
Michael Curley, Quincy remained unfailingly confident in
his right and ability to consolidate municipal power within
the Mayor's office. He presided over a rambunctious
assortment of bristling political factions, while promoting
a wide array of public service activities that consistently
satisfied a general electorate that annually re-elected
him. Ever the individualist, and seemingly above the
narrowness of party and class loyalty, Quincy manipulated,
3
cajoled and appeased Boston's variegated political forces
into acceptance of his ambitious agenda of urban growth.
More than any other factor, Quincy «s appeal in Boston
rested upon a cult of personality. The Quincy mayoralty
was dictatorial as some have accused. Nevertheless, his
rise to political power in Boston and his mayoralties
should be viewed as a transitional phase that positively
imbued ordinary Bostonians with a new sense of political
empowerment and stability during a turbulent period of
change and political dissent. 6 Many factors combined to
produce this moment of political transformation. Besides
the men and their motivations, the historical setting was
all-important.
Three years before Quincy made his first bid for the
Mayor's office, depression hit the nation. What began in
the cotton export markets of New Orleans and Charleston in
the beginning of 1819 quickly spread east, causing
financial panic and chaos in virtually every sector of the
American economy. No region of the country was immune.
Not even the strong economy of Boston, some two thousand
miles away, withstood the tremors. 7
Cotton prices steadily rose after the War of 1812.
British textile manufacturers, deprived of American cotton
during the war, hankered for product and were willing to
pay for it. Between 1815 and 1818 the price per pound of
raw cotton in the export markets of the South nearly
4
doubled from 16.5 cents to 32.5. Running parallel to the
remarkable increase in cotton prices, Northern controlled
shipping rates guadrupled between 1817 and 1818. The
cotton boom of the post-war years not only benefited
established Southern cotton planters and Northern
merchants, but also sparked the greed of speculators who
gobbled up virgin cotton lands in the Southwest for resale
at inflationary prices. Those who bought the speculator's
land happily mortgaged themselves to the hilt to Northern
bankers betting on the continued rise of the cotton
market. 8
By 1818, English cotton importers found their market
could no longer withstand the high price of American cotton
and began tapping other sources for the staple crop.
British manufacturers began importing East Indian cotton,
nearly doubling its Far East importation between 1817 and
1818. The price of cotton in the South plummeted, taking
with it the value of newly bought, underdeveloped producing
land in the Southwest. The ambitious farmer who had
recently bought land in the Southwest, saw property values
plunge by 50 to 75% within one year. The same pound of
cotton that had sold in foreign markets for 32.5 cents in
1818 went for less than 14.5 cents in 1819; and after the
New Orleans or Charleston trading house got done with him,
the actual planter only took home 9 cents per pound of
cotton. Just as commercial shipping rates had followed
5
cotton's upward trend during the boom years, so did they
fall during the panic. The maritime interest of New
England had lost its primary customers on both sides of the
Atlantic
.
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The sea-board towns of Massachusetts were not the only
areas hit by the depression. Fledgling manufacturers also
felt the sting. The strict trade restrictions on British
importation into the United States during the War of 1812
had served as a air-tight protective tariff for youthful
American industries. Boston-financed industry developed
during the war from an embryonic state into a viable and
largely healthy toddler. With peace, Great Britain's
burgeoning warehouses opened and flooded the American
market, undercutting Massachusetts manufacturers. The
protective tariffs imposed on British goods in 1816 proved
ineffective against unscrupulous exporters with falsified
documents. Custom agents were easily fooled or bought,
rendering the tariffs ineffectual in defending home
industry. A steady stream of British imports continued to
deluge American ports. 10
More close to home and directly affecting Boston's
small merchants, jobbers, and importers was an ingenious
new method of retailing conjured-up in the boardrooms of
England's manufacturing headguarters . Not only would
Britain manufacture finished products, it would now sell
them directly to American consumers in open auction. A
full bellied ship would anchor in Boston harbor stock-piled
with goods; word would spread on the street and its cargo
would sell at the highest bidder to Boston's consumers.
All local importers, jobbers and retailers were undercut by
the public open bidding of the auctions. Although this
clearly benefited Boston consumers, the system drained
money out of American coastal cities and into the coffers
of British industry. 11 The auction system only further
intensified the economic pressure Boston already faced due
to the national depression.
During a three month period in 1822, one hundred
businesses in Boston failed. Shipping rates fell and dock
workers were laid off in unprecedented numbers. Credit was
frozen and banks, reported Boston's Evening Gazette
r
began
to "demand immediate repayment of the debtors." Between
1819 and 1820, prices for goods tumbled, yet, as one
observer explained, money was "tighter than the skin on a
cats back." So who could pay? "[T]he industrious
mechanic," revealed the Boston Patriot . "may not be able to
earn enough money by his labor to supply the natural wants"
of himself or his family. Between 1820 and 1822, more than
3,500 Bostonians were imprisoned for debt. Governor John
Brooks declared the state was in "times of peril and
extreme pressure." In 1819 alone Massachusetts lost
twenty-five percent of it commercial capital. According to
the Boston Patriot , the city had become "a dull and
oom
uncheery spectacle—silence reigns in the streets and gl
and despondency" rules. "[M]oney is so scarce,"
sardonically reported the Boston Castiaatnr
r "that a
gentleman has offered his character for sale." 12
For many Bostonians, the Castiaator ' * report directly
illustrated the problem. Boston's leaders did nothing to
ease the burdens of depression and, as a result, fell under
suspicion of selling their "character" to maintain economic
and political supremacy. For the city's established
leadership, such charges to its benevolence and honor had
devastating consequences. Before the insurgent challenges
of the 1820s, the elite's strongest grip on the "lower
orders" depended upon Boston's collective reverence for
patrician "character." As historian Ronald Formisano
explains the pre-depression culture of the city: "Boston
was once an oligarchy .... It was a world in which deference
to one's social betters did not necessarily imply servility
or obsequiousness, and in which respect for social rank was
quite compatible with integrity, self-respect, and one's
own sense of importance." Such a social order depended on
traditional arrangements of reciprocal obligations between
the classes. During the panic of 1819, this arrangement
fell into disrepair and community leaders quickly became
viewed as uncaring, aristocratic, and corrupt. 1 " Old party
alliances fell by the wayside as the character and honor of
Boston's leadership faced blistering attacks.
8
In the one-party town of Boston, such a new political
consciousness could mean only one thing: an attack on the
Federalist establishment. The Massachusetts Federalist
Central Committee was controlled at the time by Harrison
Gray Otis, William Sullivan and Thomas Handasyd Perkins.
These men ruled their party with a dictatorial iron hand.
Having total control over the party's purse-strings, its
caucuses and its press, the perception grew that the
committee used such resources to implement its class
interests at the great expense of the people. 14
All three of these men were seasoned and wily
politicians. Although Sullivan tended to stay in the
shadows, preferring to avoid public office, his devoted and
active administration of the central committee proved
essential to the day-to-day operations of the party. His
low-profile status was hardly the result of a lack of
personal political ambition. Instead, his shadowy role
within the party was probably due more to the fact that his
father, James, had allied with the state's Jef fersonians
who elected him governor in 1808. Also, Sullivan had been
raised in the far-away Maine district. Thus, in Boston, he
seemed quite a strange commodity. Perkins, on the other
hand, had served either in the House or the Senate of the
Massachusetts General Court pretty much non-stop between
1805 and 1822. Without question, Otis's record proved the
most impressive of the trio and made him its natural
leader. in 1796, his political career began with a boom.
In that year alone, he received an appointment by John
Adams to head the U.S. District Attorney's office in
Massachusetts; he was appointed to the director's seat of
the U.S. Bank in Boston; and without already enough to do,
he ran for and won a position in the lower house of the
General Court where he stayed for a year before taking over
Fisher Ames's coveted spot in the U.S. House of
Representatives. Leaving Washington in 1802, he returned
to his seat on the Massachusetts General Court, serving as
House Speaker between 1803 and 1804. In 1805, Otis rose to
the state Senate where he stayed, despite a one year foray
in the House, until 1817. In the state's upper-house, he
wielded immense power as its president for four of his
eleven years there before returning to the U.S. Senate and
making a failed bid for the governorship of Massachusetts
in 1823. 15
Each of these men epitomized what Boston's
oppositional press began in 1820 to identify as an
undemocratic "monied aristocracy" that subverted the
authority of the electorate. 16 The central committee's key
leadership was politically dominant and fabulously wealthy.
Unlike most Bostonians, Perkins, Sullivan, and Otis
maintained sufficient capital to easily weather the
depression. In fact, both Otis and Perkins significantly
expanded their business ventures during height of the
10
financial panic. Taking advantage of a falling market,
Otis expanded his Boston real estate holdings during the
panic and continued to extract high rents from his tenants.
In 1819, Perkins took advantage of the economic chaos and
his large cash reserves to invest $765,000 in a shipping
venture to the Far East while his competition's ships
languished in their slips. 17 These facts did not go
unnoticed by the ordinary citizens of Boston whose
financial affairs were thrown into a state of chaos by the
depression.
Before the depression, Otis had acguired a real estate
empire by successfully speculating (often with the aid of
inside information) in Boston and Maine lands. By 1822, he
had branched-out into manufacturing. With Otis's
encouragement, Sullivan became his partner in the lucrative
real estate syndicate, the Mount Vernon Proprietors which
developed Beacon Hill. Sullivan also had inherited stock
in the Middlesex Canal which had languished until the
creation of the Lowell mills in 1813 reinvigorated its
profits, adding to his personal wealth. Perkins was the
richest of the group—a merchant prince who had made a
fortune in the illegal opium trade. Receiving an estimated
profit of $50,000 on each shipload of opium sold in Canton,
China, Perkins accumulated massive sums which he
successfully reinvested in manufacturing and, later,
railroads
.
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These men controlled huge amounts of capital and were
members of a intricate network of interlocking financiers
that virtually commanded the wealth of the state. Meeting
each Saturday night with various others of their ilk, Otis,
Sullivan and Perkins established the Saturday Fish Club, a
highly secretive social fraternity estimated to have a
total membership of six. Here these powerful men enjoyed
madeira together and schemed over politics and business.
As historian Peter Dobkin Hall argues, by the first two
decades of the nineteenth-century, this elite, "had been
thoroughly transformed. Its power was no longer based on
public authority, formal or informal . . . . Its power now
derived explicitly from.
.. possession of wealth...." 19
Heightening public awareness to the inequality of
Boston's class structure, the depression of 1819 fostered a
rebellious spirit in the electorate that rejected this new
foundation for elite Federalist authority and dramatically
altered Boston's traditional power structure. Overstating
the situation, yet betraying a common anxiety among many
upper-echelon Massachusetts Federalists, Harrison Gray Otis
described the new political temper of Boston as
"revolutionary." 20 And in many ways it was.
After the Revolution, "the Boston political and
economic elites merged," explains historian Frederic Cople
Jaher, "and government service advanced class power as well
as class ... honor .
"
21 Business and the politics that
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Federalism bred went hand-in-hand in defining the Boston
elite to itself. To challenge the validity of one, was to
denigrate the status of the whole. As one historian of
Massachusetts explains, a Federalist "was expected to
adhere to the Federal standard and the acceptable
conservative creed. To renounce one's past political
behavior, if one was a Federalist, was tantamount to
admitting a serious character flaw." 22 Besides this
particular aspect of the Federalist party culture, there
was a practical side to blending political and economic
interests—of fusing Federalist policy with the affairs of
elite enterprise. Not only could such a combination be
easily justified by following the pragmatic logic of
Alexander Hamilton that trumpeted the benefits of binding
capitalism with government, but in a much more utilitarian
sense, it ensured Federalist oversight of economic policy
in the state. As Oscar and Mary Handlin have demonstrated,
Federalist command of the Massachusetts General Court
advanced enterprise and capital accumulation. 23 Clearly,
those who benefited most from the legislature's patronage
were those with established wealth. Thus, the Federalist
policy-makers and the Massachusetts economic elite worked
in tandem, advanced the same agenda, and, as the Federalist
Central Committee's membership suggests, were often one-
and-the-same
.
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By 1822, Federalism, with its firm directive requiring
obedience from its members, its elitist overtones and the
economic interests the party blatantly championed, was
under siege by a new party with the innocuous name of the
Middling Interest. Surprisingly, the candidate to lead the
insurgency's charge had spent most of his life as a self-
described "raving Federalist." 24
To understand the transformation in political culture
that occurred in Boston during the early nineteenth-
century, the political odyssey of this "raving Federalist"
turned insurgent, Josiah Quincy, must be examined.
Quincy's political career had many ups and downs which
resulted in his remarkable political transformation from
Federalism to third partyism. Whether he led the political
and cultural realignments that occurred in Boston's
ordinary citizenry, or whether it led him, is less
important than acknowledging that the two became
inseparably linked and were widely associated with the
other. The political journey of Quincy reflects not only
his personal odyssey, but that of all the Bostonians who
supported him.
Josiah Quincy stood at the epicenter of every
contentious political battle waged in Boston and the state
during the first three decades of the nineteenth-century.
Never hesitating to strongly voice his often irreverent
opinions, he maintained a reputation throughout his career
14
as an individualistic and independent politician who did
not fear retribution from any party elders. He first
earned this reputation while serving as a member of the
U.S. House of Representatives.
15
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CHAPTER II
NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM ON THE ATTACK:
THE WASHINGTON BENEVOLENT SOCIETY AND
TURNING GARDENS INTO REPUBLICAN FARMS
,
1800-1819
"Federalism takes opium; Jacobinism gunpowder and
rum .
"
—Fisher Ames to Josiah Quincy, Feb., 1804
The morning after the devastating defeat of John Adams
to Thomas Jefferson in the election of 1800, Federalism
awoke to the disarming reality that it was powerless on the
national level. The party lost its chief executive and
both houses of Congress. Jefferson stalwart, Albert J.
Beveridge gloated that those remaining Federalists in
Congress were simply a bunch of "grumbling. .. out of date
gentlemen.
. .mournful of a glorious past." Jefferson
himself christened the lingering partisans "mere
obstructionists," who would challenge his mandate in vain. 1
And in many ways, both Beveridge and Jefferson's appraisal
of the battered Federalists was right. Even Federalist
party warhorse from Dedham, Fisher Ames, scolded his party
fellows after the election, professing " [ f ] ederalism takes
opium; Jacobinism gunpowder and rum." 2 Indeed, during
Jefferson's first term, congressional Federalists were
reduced to bitterly complaining about the acquisition of
the Louisiana Purchase and the wholesale reversals of the
Adams administration's policies.
When Federalist Josiah Quincy began his eight year
tenure as Suffolk County's congressional representative in
1805, Jefferson savored his second term victory and seemed
more popular than ever. Both the Senate and the House
remained in the hands of the Republicans and there seemed
little the Federalist freshman from Boston could do. As
his wife, Eliza, confessed to Abigail Adams in 1806, her
husband confined his ambitions to "enjoy [ing] the
satisfaction of preventing evil," but to "produc[e] good,
beyond [his] power." 3
Eliza's assessment of her husband's role in Congress
proved overly optimistic. As a Congressman, Quincy failed
and failed dramatically. Perhaps if "the little band of
federalists," as Eliza described the minority position in
Congress, had been more united the "evil" of Jeffersonian
policies could have occasionally been checked; but internal
differences within the party caused resentments between the
younger and the older generations, dividing congressional
Federalists. 4
Having learned a harsh lesson from their Republican
victors in 1800 and 1805, young Federalists began to
practice oppositional politics in a much more pragmatic
manner than their party elders had ever imagined. Quincy
sided with this vanguard and its new approach to politics.
As Harrison Gray Otis explained, Quincy was "the only man
among us who had intended. . .to pursue politics as a
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profession." 5 This seemed vulgar to older members of the
party. To them government service should be restricted to
benevolent, disinterested amateurs. The old guard
distrusted the very notion of established parties.
Although many were the beneficiaries of their own party's
state and local organizations, these crusty old men
despised what they saw as the corrupting influence party
spirit inflicted on the great united family of America's
revolutionary past. "Let not party-rage, private
animosities, or self-interested motives succeed that
religious attachment to the public weal which has brought
us successful thus far," pleaded Boston traditionalist,
Jonathan Mason. If conspicuous partisanship became the
primary basis for Federalism, what would distinguish it
from the "Jacobin" Republicans? With Jefferson's
reelection, younger Federalists rebelled and openly
disagreed with the very premise of such a question.
Harrison Gray Otis articulated New England's interest in
the fresh Federalist approach: "If we mean to preserve the
commonwealth and New England. .. our organization must be
more complete and systematic. It must extend through every
county and town, and an ample fund must be provided for the
distribution of political truth." Old guard, Massachusetts
stalwarts like George Cabot, Stephen Higginson, John Lowell
and Theodore Lyman looked on in utter dismay as younger
Federalists like Otis and Sullivan established a highly
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effective party structure that would elect and send the
confirmed non-traditionalist, Josiah Quincy to Washington.
After serving only one year in the Massachusetts
Senate, Quincy, at age thirty-two, entered the House with
little political experience. His opinion of the Federalist
traditionalists he met there was unmistakably negative.
Writing to John Quincy Adams, he severely criticized the
old guard as "cautious politicians, who are always prophets
by retrospect; men who neither devise nor execute," and who
were altogether ill equipped to challenge the majority
position in Congress. 7 Often single-handedly, Congressman
Quincy would overtly defy the old guard's party regimen and
follow his own political instincts into unchartered and
often dangerous waters. The result was a botched and
embarrassing congressional career.
Three notable incidents point out his political
naivete, his impetuosity, and his enthusiasm to stir still
waters in order to strengthen his minority position. The
first occurred in 1809. Characterizing Jefferson as a
"dish of skim milk curdling at the head of our nation," on
the House floor Quincy demanded the President's impeachment
just five weeks before Jefferson was to step-down from
office. In his January 25, speech before the House, Quincy
accused Jefferson of corruption, directly linking the
President to staffing problems in the Boston Customs House.
Even House Federalists were appalled by the audacity of the
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charge and Quincy's proposal was overwhelmingly defeated by
a vote of 117 to his l. Four years after the House vote,
Henry Clay predicted that the Federalist from Suffolk
county's act "shall live only in the treasonable annals- of
history. <;
When Quincy rose to the floor to speak against
Louisiana statehood on January 14, 1811, he was once again
charged with treason, this time from his Republican
opponents in Congress and from much of the Boston press.
"If this bill passes," Quincy threatened, "I declare it my
deliberate conviction that the bond of this union is
virtually dissolved: that the states are freed from their
moral obligation: that as it will be the right of all
f so
it wJJJ, become the duty of some, to prepare for a
separation
—amicably if they can: forcibly if they must."
In Boston, the Republican press promised that "the people
of [Quincy's] own state would crush any rebellious
movement ... as quick and as effectively as they did the
insurrection of Shays." Despite Quincy's menacing claim,
New England refused to secede from the union once Louisiana
was granted statehood.
Later that year, in the fall, Quincy concocted an
ambitious scheme to reestablish Federalism as a national
political force. Believing that the recent Republican
clamor for war with England was merely saber-rattling
designed "to embarrass [New England] commerce and
annihilate its influence," Quincy decided to push the issue
by coming out in favor of war. His strategy rested on the
assumption that war with Great Britain was an
impossibility. By strengthening the position of the
Republican "war hawks," as he dubbed them, Quincy believed
he could drive a deep wedge between the pro-war and the
anti-war Republicans. This, he believed, would irreparably
shatter Republicanism. On January 25, 1812, he supported a
Republican war bill to strengthen the navy. in February,
he voted with the war hawks to step-up appropriations for
armed conflict. On June 1, 1812, pro-war Republicans
achieved what Quincy had not believed possible—by a vote
of 79 to 49, the House approved the President's declaration
of war. Much to Quincy' s horror, the war hawks 's clamor
for combat had been sincere. By severely underestimating
the genuine pro-war feeling in the House, Quincy
contributed in provoking an armed conflict that would prove
devastating to his region. 11
As Fisher Ames sadly predicted for Quincy before
Ames's own death in 1808, "I declared to you, I fear
Federalism will not only die, but all rememberence of it be
lost. As a party, it is still good for everything it ever
was good for; that is to say, to cry 'fire' and 'stop
thief,' when Jacobinism attempts to burn and rob. [Yet],
[i]t never had the power to put out the fire, or to seize
the thief." 12 Despite trying to defy Ames's judgment by
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employing Machiavellian techniques to strengthen his
minority position in Congress, Quincy finally absorbed the
fact that Ames's assessment of Federalism was accurate.
Federalists had no place in Washington. They had become
exactly what Jefferson predicted— "mere obstructionalists.
»
"I feel ready... to throw myself out of the window, or into
a horse pond, when I think of coming here [Washington]
again," Quincy confessed in utter dismay to William
Sullivan. 13
In fall 1812, Quincy informed the central committee
that he would decline a Federalist nomination to Congress
if it was offered. Disregarding his wishes, the committee
reassigned him to the post, but Quincy refused to accept.
For eight miserable years in the House, he had filled the
unpleasant role of being one of Federalism' s most explosive
and reactive operatives. His intricate and unsuccessful
political stratagems had caused him to be ridiculed and
spurned by his own party as well as the opposition. He had
few friends in Washington and the capitol, during the early
nineteenth-century, was no more than a frontier town that
Quincy and his wife hated. Writing to his wife on the eve
of the War of 1812, he explained his "odd" position: "By
some I am thought such a raving Federalist as to be
shrewdly suspected of [treason]; by others that I am... in
danger of turning Democrat [Republican]." 14
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Clearly, Quincy's congressional career merited such
confusion. He had called for a popular President's
impeachment; he had threatened New England secession over
Louisiana's constitutional right to enter to Union; and he
had gone against the anti-war sentiments of his
constituents in a failed political scheme to destroy the
Republican party. Quincy had always thought of himself as
a professional politician in the Federalist cause, but his
impulsive and erratic behavior in the House belied any
sense of professionalism. Henry Clay's summation of
Quincy's career held more truth than falsehood when he
stated before the House that, "[t]he gentleman from
Massachusetts.
. .has entertained us with Cabinet plots,
Presidential plots which are conjured up in the gentleman's
own perturbed imagination," and done little else. 15
Quincy's covert partisan adventures marked a man whose
stubborn refusal to surrender his independent and often
self-righteous personal campaigns for more reasonable
solutions to the problems Republicanism caused in New
England, resulted in a highly unsuccessful and humiliating
congressional career. "I left Washington," Quincy wrote in
his 1813, personal journal, "with the feelings of a man
quitting Tadmor in the Wilderness, 'where creeping things
had possession of the palace, and foxes looked out the
windows,' and sought the refuge in home, and in family." 16
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In March, 1813, Quincy escaped from Washington and
seemingly found more refuge in his family estate's gardens
than with his family. According to both his son, Edmund,
and his daughter, Eliza II, the ex-Congressman transferred
his intensity for congressional partisan politics into an
obsession with experimental farming. "[W]ith all the zeal
of his ardent temperament," as Edmund put it, his father
poured money and time into his agricultural experiments.
Soiling cattle (a topic he wrote a book on)
,
cultivating
hedges, using root crops as cattle feed and growing carrots
were Quincy' s particular specialties. As one historian
argues, Boston's early nineteenth-century elite often
turned to the farm to resolve their contradictory notions
of aristocracy and republicanism as embodied in the image
of the sturdy New England farmer. Revolutionary ideals of
equality clashed with the reality of an established, post-
Revolutionary ruling class based in the urban setting of
Boston. Boston elites desperately tried to resolve the
contradictory nature of their existence within a democracy
by dabbling in the soil. 17
If one of the most visible symbols of elite control
—
the country estate—could be manipulated to represent a
more democratic meaning in the popular mind, then the
hypocrisy of a dominant "seated" gentry within a democratic
society could be better hidden. The rub for Boston's
landed gentry was how to go about implementing the
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perceptual change. George Cabot, the director of the
Massachusetts Bank and leading old guard Federalist, found
the solution in cultivating potatoes instead of rare
flowers on his Brookline estate; Thomas H. Perkins took
time out from his work on the Federalist Central Committee
and in the opium business to begin growing fruit; Theodore
Lyman experimented with bananas and pineapples on "the
Vale," his estate in Waltham when he wasn't tallying his
profits from the East Indies and China trade or raving
against the atrocities of one Republican administration or
another. And Josiah Quincy grew a particularly hardy breed
of carrots. 18
The idea was to shift the purpose and meaning of the
country seat from a place of leisure to one of utility.
The country estates, with their beautifully extravagant,
but useless gardens, were transformed into working farms.
With the establishment of the Massachusetts Society for
Promoting Agriculture and the Massachusetts Horticulture
Society, patrician farmers institutionalized their new
self-perception and pursued a bucolic form of noblesse
oblige. The stated purpose of both the MSPA and the MHS
was to provide Massachusetts • s yeomanry with advanced
farming techniques that were being discovered on patrician
estates. In an ironic twist, Boston's Federalist
aristocracy would return to the soil under the guise of
Jef fersonian, agrarian democratic principles. 19
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Most of Boston's "book farmers" clearly were insincere
about their conversion to functional agriculture. None of
them gleaned a living from the soil, but from maritime
commerce or manufacturing. True to the Hamiltonian
economic agenda and as high-ranking Federalists, the "book
farmers" consistently fought America's agricultural
interests. Instead, most Boston elite's involved in
experimental farming saw it as a way to stave-off popular
criticism, and at best, to sure-up the state's yeomanry for
Federalism. 20
Josiah Quincy viewed his estate differently. Perhaps
because he was trying to gain some success as a farmer
after his miserable failure as a Congressman or, perhaps,
sincerely driven by a passion to revolutionize hedge
technology, between 1813 and 1820, Quincy dumped the family
fortune into his experiments. Being "wholly occupied with
thoughts of agriculture," as he explained himself, Quincy
seriously jeopardized his family's financial security as he
plowed more and more cash into his carrots, hedges and
root-crop cattle feed. As his son Edmund gently explained,
his father had lost "more than it was at all convenient to
him to lose," claiming the only profits culled from the
family estate came from selling salt to the local
fishermen—a venture his father had no interest in.
Quincy 's daughter, Eliza, somewhat distressed, confessed to
her dairy in 1820, "upon settling his account. .. [her
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father] found that his expenses were exceeding his income.
A fact that caused him anxiety with regard to future
independence." Summing up the situation, Eliza declared:
"farming experiments were the cause of this difficulty." 21
By April, the Quincy's financial situation became so
grave that they could no longer afford to lease their posh
Boston home on Summer street. Eliza was aghast. "[T]he
only plan to be pursued," she reported to her diary, "was
to reside at Quincy all the year now." Horrified because
this meant "the exit of us from Boston Society," Eliza and
her family prepared for a new, more isolated life as fallen
gentry. Yet, Quincy's uncle, John Phillips, upon hearing
the news, came to the family's rescue and provided them,
free of charge, with a "modest" house on the corner of
Hamilton Place and Tremont street. Although Edmund
remarked their new residence, "was not, in itself, so large
or so good as that [they had] left," the Quincy family was
spared the public mortification of social exile from the
Hub of New England society and culture. 22
Although Quincy spent much of the five years after his
unfortunate congressional career in convalescence with his
hedges, roots and carrots, to the surprise of many, he did
remain engaged in politics. "I thought you would have died
a peaceful political death, but I see it is not in your
nature," Philadelphian, Richard Peters, noted as an aside
to Quincy in a long letter detailing the proper uses for a
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particular breed of Newcastle thorn bushes. 23 When he had
first returned to Boston in 1813, the central committee
rewarded Quincy with a nomination to the state senate. "He
is proverbial industrious," explained Harrison Gray Otis,
"and though an occasional expression or two have served as
catchwords to injure his popularity, I have no doubt that
in th[e] Senate he would soon efface any petty prejudice
existing against him, and be a very useful member." 24
"Useful" may not be the most operative word for Otis
to have used. As Edmund Quincy explained, his father's
"duties [in the Senate] were confined to a few months out
of the year, and were not of a very engrossing nature." 25
Instead, when not in his gardens, Quincy preoccupied
himself with much more exciting extra-legal party affairs.
First as vice-president of the Washington Benevolent
Society [WBS] from 1812 to 1815 and then as its president
in 1816, he remained active and contributed greatly to
local Federalist party business. 26
With the inevitability of war with Britain, the Boston
chapter of the WBS was established in the downtown Exchange
Coffee House on March 6, 1812. Its founding members,
Nathan Appleton, Henry Dwight Sedgwick, Nathan Hale, Samuel
Livermore, Jr., Benjamin Russell, Thomas H. Perkins, Josiah
Bradlee, Francis J. Oliver, and Lemuel Shaw, represented
the local vanguard of Boston's Federalist young turks. 27
Instigated by their anti-war stance, the 1811 losses of the
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governors 's seat and the General Court to Republicanism,
and the ineptitude of Federalism' s past organizational
structure, these men astounded Bay State's old guard by
mimicking Republican political fraternities such as New
York's Tammany. Under the auspices of "benevolence," the
Boston chapter of the Washington Benevolent Society
constructed a highly organized and effective arm of the
Federalist party. 28
The WBS's primary goal was to broaden party
membership. Since 1800, Boston's population had steadily
grown. By 1810, the town held 33,250 people, an increase
from 18 00 of over nine thousand people. The vast majority
of Boston's new arrivals were young, semi-skilled to
skilled native men from the countryside who came to the Hub
seeking their fortunes. Although the political persuasion
of these men is not known, clearly the WBS was partially
established to ensure that these new Bostonians would come
into the Federalist fold. Indeed, society members tended
to be young and semi-skilled or skilled. The Boston
chapter contained 44 laborers, 68 clerks, 296 shopkeepers,
153 professionals and 309 mechanics. Codified into its
constitution under article 17, those who could not afford
the modest initiation fee of two dollars were exempted and
given free membership. Over one third of Boston's
membership in 1814 were designated by the society as "Free
Members. 1,29
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The WBS constitution declared that the society would
"oppose all encroachments of Democracy, aristocracy or
despotism.
. .and with all our strength to oppose the
establishment of any usurped power therein.
.. [we pledge to]
alleviate the sufferings of unfortunate individuals, within
the sphere of our personal acquaintances." 30 The "sphere
of personal acquaintances" of the society proved extremely
limited. In 1813, the WBS gave only $10 out of its total
yearly expenditure of $1,721.70 to the widow of society
member W. Reynolds. When Fred W.A. Brown applied for
charity from the society in 1812, "it was found," according
to the WBS minutes, "that he is not a member of the Society
& consequently not entitled to relief." 31 According to the
WBS's annual budgets, the income of the society either paid
for partisan propagation or went to speculative business
ventures to turn a profit. The WBS managed its money in
similar fashion as a bank. It made loans and charged
interest much more often than it issued charity. Many
investments were lucrative, but, in 1815, the WBS found
itself in financial trouble, running a deficit of $1,398.33
after one of its companies, Austin & Blanchard, went
bankrupt
.
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Fluid in structure, the WBS's administrative positions
often rotated annually. Its leadership included a
president, six vice presidents, a treasurer, vice
treasurer, a secretary, two assistant secretaries, and a
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standing committee of sixteen that decided upon who would
.ind would not be accepted as members. Underneath this
super-structure lay the heart and soul of the organization.
Each of Boston's twelve wards held a committee of four who
circulated WBS information, collected membership dues,
recruited potential members, oversaw elections for the
society's leadership and reported relevant information from
each ward to the Standing Committee. In turn, the Standing
Committee reported to the WBS leadership that relayed
information directly to the Federalist Central Committee. 33
By 1813, the Boston WBS boasted a membership of 1,500.
That same year, it formed a committee to centralize and
coordinate the efforts of all the WBS chapters throughout
the country. Boston's highly organized system proved so
effective that Federalists from all over New England began
writing to the Boston chapter for copies of its
constitution, advice and organizational blue-prints.
Shilborn Whitman of Pembroke's letter is typical of the
flood of communications arriving at the Boston WBS
headquarters: "[i]t is my wish to have a copy of it [the
constitution] ... and ... I will thank you for your opinion, on
this kind, in every town in the County, the Officers of
which, shall be the organs of communication to the county
Society, & they the medium of intelligence to the Head
Quarters of Good Principles— I am seriously of the opinion,
that if this plan could become universal in each County in
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the State by next year, good men would be restored to their
standing " 3 < The Boston chapter sent organizational
material to towns as close as Salem, and as distant as
Hallowell, Me. After one year of its founding, voter
participation in the state gubernatorial race swelled 13%,
the majority of which voted Federalist. In 1812,
Federalism recaptured the governor's seat— a position the
party would hold until 1823.' m Portsmouth, NH, a
young, budding Federalist, Daniel Webster waited for his
copy of the Boston chapter's constitution so he could draft
one of his own. 36
Partially due to the WBS ' s success, the society
provoked the wrath of Boston's Republican press. The
Independent Chronicle charged that "the ' Washington
Benevolent Societies , • so called, were established to
answer the purpose of a political party, and that they are
in direct opposition both to Washington and Benevolence
,
must be evident to every one who will give himself the
trouble to review their conduct. The fund, said to be
raised for benevolent purposes, is ... expended in paying for
banners, votes, ribbands [sic], and other vapid trumpery,
to make up a show."
The Chronicle ' s assessment of the WBS • s allocation of
society funds proved accurate. In 1813, $101.61 went to
pay the Federalist-leaning Boston Washington Artillery
Company for firing cannons during a society festival.
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Other militias often employed by the WBS were the Boston
Light Infantry, the Boston Hussars and the Winslow Blues.
These militias not only provided great color to WBS
functions, but also protection. After the 1812 pro-war
riots in Baltimore, where mobs attacked and killed several
society members, the Boston branch heeded the advise of
G.S. Stewart, the WBS Secretary of Maryland. Stewart,
fearing for his life during the rioting, fled Baltimore for
exile in Philadelphia. He provided the Boston branch with
a detailed description of the Baltimore rioting and urged
the Boston chapter to hire protection. Baltimore, Stewart
claimed, had been "shamefully troddened under the foot by a
brutal and licentious mob who exercise an alarming tyranny
over the good people of Baltimore and its vicinity.
[Society members] have fallen victims to the fury of a mob,
and the treachery of the civil authority. The reign of
terror and confusion," Stewart heralded, "still continues
to agitate that infested city, where scenes of massacre and
bloodshed have of late occurred." Taking no chances, the
Boston chapter of the WBS had various militias on its
payroll and placed WBS members to lead them. Certainly the
militias would prove loyal to the WBS since they were well
paid, but also, as Fisher Ames once had suggested, "[l]et
the popular and wealthy Federalists take commissions in the
militia, and try to win the men [for Federalism]." 38
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The WBS functioned solely to broaden and deepen the
Federalist party's social base. The Boston Blt&lflt accused
it of attracting "the neediest and meanest people. WBS
celebrations featured liquor, mummery, and rowdiness.
After one Boston banquet, drunken society members stumbled
through the streets causing havoc. "[T]hey were
exceedingly noisy and sang songs and swore oaths, and did
commit other acts of folly and wickedness," explained one
observer. "Yea, they took the vessels of glass which
contained the wine and other liquors, and did throw them at
the heads of each other. .. .And the watchmen who guarded the
city, hearing the uproar, rushed in among them. .. .And some
fled one way and some another, and some were lying
motionless on the ground like men slain in fighting." 40
Although old guard Federalists were disgusted by such
unruly behavior, in many ways, such political antics were
exactly what was needed to reinvigorate the party. The
founders of the society understood this from the WBS's
inception. As the preamble of its constitution declared,
"[w]e hold it to be always a right & sometimes a duty, to
assemble & deliberate upon the state of public affairs to
acquire & impart knowledge & to increase the ardor of our
patriotism by the warmth of our social attachments." 41 In
the rough-and-tumble, urban culture of early nineteenth-
century Boston, what could be more effective in
"increas[ ing] the ardor" of Federalist-style patriotism,
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than a boisterous party? Here the lowly mechanic met the
silk stocking merchant on the common ground of gluttony.
In this, at least, they were eguals.
Judging by the reaction of Republican press, the party
of Jefferson genuinely feared the society. According to
Federalist operatives outside of Boston, Republicans had
begun intercepting and destroying communications between
various New England societies. WBS member, Otis Williams
of Easton, MA warned the Boston chapter's first President,
Arnold Welles, that "owing to the treachery of some of our
political opponents.
.. [s]ome person has stopped the papers
[sent by you] by some means or other as there is very
violent opposition to the formation of the Society in this
town." Refusing to trust the mail service for matters so
important, Williams sent his warning to Welles via courier.
William Gordon of Keene, NH, had similar problems and also
refused to use the mail. Instead, he sent his own son all
the way from Keene to reguest a copy of the Boston
chapter's constitution. 42
When the WBS contacted Quincy in 1812 after its first
meeting at the Boston Exchange Coffee House, he still
served in Congress and had not yet heard of the
organization. "Although I have no previous delineation of
the plan of the institution, of which you inform me, I am
elected Vice President," Quincy explained to Lemuel Shaw,
"the object expressed in its designation and the venerable
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and ever cherished name associated with it permit no
hesitation. I therefore accept the honor." 43 The
Washington Benevolent Society would gradually lure Quincy
out of the isolation, safety and protection of his beloved
gardens and into the public arena again. The society's
inclusive approach to politics meshed well with Quincy'
s
pragmatic style of politics. The Washington Benevolent
Society would provide Quincy with the confidence he had
lost in Congress. More importantly, his involvement with
the WBS would expose him to an urban constituency of lower-
to-middling-folk who would supply him a popular base for
new and untried political ventures.
Although rain threatened to ruin the Washington
Benevolent Society's April 30th, 1813 celebration, the
heavens held as some two-thousand disciplined, but joyous
WBS members and their supporters paraded through Boston's
streets. Just weeks before the celebration, Federalist
Caleb Strong, running on a "peace ticket," thoroughly
thrashed the Republican candidate for governor, Joseph B.
Varnum by 10,421 votes. The two-thousand member WBS parade
was a show of force demonstrating the potency of Federalism
and anti-war sentiment in the state. Members from
throughout Massachusetts converged on Boston to participate
in the ceremonies that honored Washington's inauguration.
Three-hundred and twenty eight armed militia-men of the
Winslow Blues, the Boston Light Infantry, the Boston
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Washington Artillery Company and the Boston Hussars marched
ahead of two-hundred and seventy uniformed "school boy
Federalists," as Edmund Quincy remembered. Behind them,
some one-thousand loyal Federalists and WBS members from
the rank-and-file marched, four abreast—waving banners to
the Boston throng who watched from sidewalks and balconies.
Eliza Quincy vividly described the broad social composition
of the typical WBS parade: " [R] epresentives of all the
Trades drawn on sleds with appropriate standards, and
carrying their tools [marched]. The bricklayers were
building a house, they broke their bricks and worked
busily. The carpenters were erecting a temple of Peace. The
printers worked a small press, struck off handbills ... and
threw them among the crowd. The bakers, hatters, paper-
makers, blockmakers, etc., etc. had each their appropriate
insignia." At the head of the procession, mounted on a
white stallion and serving as the Boston Hussar's newly
elected Captain, Josiah Quincy led the column to the "Old
South" church for a huge banquet and orations."
Trying to discredit the parade, the Republican
Independent Chronicle reported that the WBS parade was
racially integrated, "including the gentlemen from
[Boston's] Negro-Hill." The report chastised Quincy,
likening him to his horse, Bayard. The children of the
parade, argued the equally Republican Boston Yankee , had
been "educated like Colts to the menagerie, to be bridled
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with restraints, to be saddled with prejudices, and
jockeyed about by party spirit. When trained sufficiently
in this charity school, they are to be bound out to Faction
to learn the trades of Sedition and Treason."' 5
The lanke^'s charge of treason, though perhaps a bit
overstated, held some truth. William Sullivan privately
explained the WBS was created to block pro-war fervor
throughout the country and promote anti-war sentiments as
well as to buttress Federalist partisanship. Indeed, the
Boston Hussars were trained by a member of the WBS's
Standing Committee member, Michael Roulstone, a local
riding instructor and was founded during the early stages
of hostilities between the United States and Great Britain
in 1810 by wealthy, anti-war, Federalists. Its loyalty to
the Madison administration was in doubt. Many wondered
which side the militia would take if Britain invaded
Massachusetts, and the Hussar's did little to belay such
suspicions. The symbolic pageantry employed by the militia
clearly delineated its political leanings. Hussar uniforms
were modeled after those of the French Imperial Guard and
the militia's most prized possession (which it shared with
the WBS) was the gorget Washington had "heroically" worn as
a British officer during the French and Indian War.
According to Edmund Quincy, the Hussar's costume
represented "their dislike [of] Bonaparte and all his
works." In April of 1813, with the United States at war
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with Great Britain, the people of Boston undoubtedly
interpreted the WBS • s great procession as a massive
demonstration of the anti-war, anti-administration, and
anti-Republican sentiment in New England. 46 if the
symbolic message of the parade was missed by those who
observed the procession, after Josiah Quincy 's partisan
speech in "Old South," any misunderstanding would be put to
rest.
"This war, the measure that proceeded it, and the mode
of carrying it on, are undeniably Southern and Western
policy," Quincy announced to a full audience. "[I]n the
eyes of reason and common sense we [of New England] are
slaves, .. .slaves to no very desirable masters. .. .The new
States govern the old, the unsettled, the settled; the
interests of the emigrants prevail over those of the
ancient natives; a black population overbalances the
white. ... [W] ilderness legislators ... control ... the destinies
of [New Englanders], paralyzing all their interests and
darkening all their prospects." According to Quincy, "this
great and ancient and once proud, but now. .. humbled
Commonwealth, has absolutely no more weight in the national
scale than a specie of beings [black slaves]." "Remember,"
Quincy reiterated, "the very blacks of the Southern States
are equal in weight, in the political scale, to the whole
State of Massachusetts." 47
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By drawing direct connections between national policy
and local anxieties, Quincy had designed his speech
brilliantly. Populated with African slaves and European
immigrants, the South and West had pushed the nation into
war against the wishes and interests of New England. Not
only was this an assault to the region's honor and
authority, but the war, Quincy charged, would transform
each household economy from one of happy prosperity to
"darkening all their prospects." At the hands of the slave
power, hardworking and free New England would be forced
into economic subjugation by western and southern
slaveholders. With one major exception, the ideology
Quincy articulated would, in fifty years, prove remarkably
similar to the foundations of the second Republican party's
free-labor outlook. The exception rested in Quincy 's
skeptical opinion of manufacturing which future free-labor
doctrine embraced. Throughout his life, Quincy staunchly
refused to invest in manufacturing and remained tied to the
state's maritime interests. 48 Also, Quincy' s WBS speech
hinted once again at New England secession.
Although the speech predictably received favorable
reviews from Boston's Federalist organs, the Republican
press lambasted him. "Can any man of sober reflection,"
asked the Independent Chronicle , "attend to a declaimer
acting in the character of a disciple of Washington, while
he [Quincy] exhibits himself in the boisterous attitude of
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a manic?—Foaming beating the air , ... acting the part of
a mad Tom
,
and exposing his folly by rant and arrogance."
How could he have so insulted the Bay state by claiming
"that the Representatives from Massachusetts were no more
weight in Congress than so many b_l&cj£ cattle?" the
Chron ic le questioned. 49 Despite such harsh criticism, the
average Bostonian in 1813 probably would have disagreed
with the Chronicle's assessment of Quincy's speech. The
congressional vote for war had fallen sharply along
regional lines—all of New England's representatives,
including twenty Republicans, having voted against the
war.
50 Also, the effect of war would, in fact, be damaging
to New England's economy, just as Quincy claimed.
The war made some Boston ship captains wealthy as
privateers and hastened the transfer of New England
maritime money into new manufacturing ventures. Also,
Boston banks with sound money, made profitable war loans to
the Federal government. Nevertheless, the Bay State's main
enterprise, maritime commerce, dramatically declined
because of the war. Beginning in 1810, and not recovering
until the war's end in 1815, the actual tonnage of shipping
in customs houses in Massachusetts and Boston dwindled to
new lows that would not be matched again until 1855.
Fishing, a lucrative pursuit for many coastal Massachusetts
towns since the 1790s, also found itself in serious
trouble. The collapse of Boston's largest sector of the
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war impediments to commerce and the war itself intensified
laboring Boston's uncertainties about its future.
Politically, these insecurities were easily exploited by
the Washington Benevolent Society to attack Republicanism
while strengthening the ranks of Federalism in Boston and
throughout the state.
In October of 1814, every Bostonian in the General
Court unanimously voted in favor of an anti-war convention
to be held in Hartford. Suffolk county's representatives
adamantly opposed the war, convinced as they were that the
conflict sucked the life-blood out of the state. Overall,
the General Court decided 2 60 in favor of the convention to
90 opposed. Only the Norfolk county delegation unanimously
voted against the resolution. The majority of every other
district's representative delegation to the state
legislature voted for the convention. In the November
state elections, a month before the Hartford Convention
met, the Federalist slate swept the state. John Holmes,
the Republican leader of the Senate and the most vocal
against the resolution and for the war, was defeated at the
hands of a Federalist. 53 As the General Court's
overwhelming support for the Hartford Convention indicates,
the anti-war and sectional appeal that Federalists such as
Quincy espoused significantly strengthened the party
throughout the state.
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In December of 1814, Massachusetts sent twelve
Federalist delegates to Hartford with the overwhelming
approval of the General Court and the governor. Although
Quincy voted in favor of the convention in the Senate, he
was not chosen as a delegate. As Quincy 's son recalled,
the Federalist leadership was "afraid to trust his
[Quincy' s] impetuous temperament and fiery earnestness."
Such fears were justified. In one of his first acts as a
state senator, Quincy challenged what he saw as the blatant
hypocrisy of his Federalist colleagues. Before Quincy 's
arrival to Senate, the General Court routinely bestowed
official state honors on naval commanders who successfully
protected American waters from British warships. Quincy
viewed such actions by his fellow anti-war Federalists as
two-faced. When the Senate attempted to pass a resolution
honoring the "gallantry and good conduct of Captain [James]
Lawrence, in the capture of a British brig of war," Quincy
rose from his chair. "[I]n a war like the present, waged
without justifiable cause and prosecuted in a manner which
indicates that conquest and ambition are its real motives,"
Quincy explained, "it is not becoming a moral and religious
people to express any approbation of military or naval
exploits .
"
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Predictably, the Republican papers charged Quincy with
"moral treason." John Holmes, having not yet been
displaced from the General Court, demanded that Quincy 's
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remarks be struck from the minutes of the senate. Even
some leading Federalists found Quincy's purist stand
irritating. These legislators saw no harm in tipping their
hats to American bravery when it was merited while still
maintaining an anti-war position. Thus, when the delegates
to the Hartford Convention were chosen, as Edmund Quincy
explained, the Federalist leadership "thought that [Quincy]
would represent too well the spirit of those who demanded
the Convention. He always described the Convention," Edmund
remembered, "as 'a Tub to the Whale,' as a dilatory measure
to amuse the malcontents [like himself] and make them
believe that something was doing for their relief, and keep
them quiet." Nothing would come of the convention, Quincy
told a friend, except an insignificant "GREAT PAMPHLET." 55
With General Andrew Jackson's unnecessary victory in
New Orleans and the Treaty of Ghent, Quincy's prediction
proved only half true. Vilified after the war, those who
took part in the Hartford Convention became marked men
—
seen by most of the nation as secessionists and traitors.
In this sense, the convention had done something of great
significance: it severely damaged the reputation of the
Federalist party throughout the nation. After 1815,
throughout most of the country, to be called a "Federalist"
was a dire insult. An Indiana man successfully sued for
$1000 in damages after being accused by another of being a
Federalist. "Indeed," explained a friend of North Carolina
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Federalist, Ducan Cameron, "the word Federalist alone
without the aid of expletives represents to [the people's]
affrighted imaginations every thing that is base and
infamous.-" Only in New England did the party continue to
enjoy success, but within four years of the Treaty of
Ghent, even the stronghold of Boston would waver.
During the economic crisis generated by the War of
1812, the Federalist party had proved highly effective in
exposing the root-cause of the Commonwealth's financial
problems. Employing the Washington Benevolent Society, as
we have seen, the anti-war, anti-Republican party message
resonated throughout the state strengthening Federalist
partisanship. In addition to this, in Boston, the decline
in commerce was augmented by a rise in urban development
largely funded by wealthy Federalists like Harrison Gray
Otis and William Sullivan. Merchant ships may have been
rotting in Boston harbor, but new improvement projects were
underway in the town. During the Embargo of 1807, workers
began to rebuild India and Long wharfs; the erection of
Central wharf started in the midst of the war and proved so
extravagant that it was not completed until 1816; and
Harrison Gray Otis's Mill Pond Corporation began filling- in
the northern cove of the Shawmut peninsula in 1807. Such
development helped off-set the negative effects of the war
for the town's population and had direct political
implications. Spreading its wealth, Federalism's Boston
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leadership appeared sensitive to the broader population's
financial needs.
Some three years after the war, with the depression of
1819, Federalist rhetoric would seem stale and its coffers
fastened tight. Unlike its response between 1807 through
1815, the party proved ill equipped to deal with the
economic and political turmoil of Boston in 1819. Although
the WBS persisted until 1824, the organization suffered
from financial mismanagement and its overt partisanship
seemed anachronistic during the "Era of Good Feelings." As
the newly elected president of the WBS in 1816, Josiah
Quincy successfully reduced the deficit the society
incurred in 1815, yet membership levels steadily declined.
Nevertheless, the WBS 1 s remarkable political success
illustrated the potential power to be gained by
inclusionary politics. 58 By 1819, in the midst of economic
and political chaos, the Federalist leadership seemed to
have forgotten this and came to be regarded by many
Bostonians as an exclusive "junto" set on maintaining its
political and economic dominance at the expense of the
people. Josiah Quincy would be spared such condemnation.
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CHAPTER III
MILITIAMEN
,
DEBTORS, DOWNEASTERNERS AND "DEMIGODS":
THE INGREDIENTS FOR INSURGENT ACTIVISM AND
FEDERALISM ON THE DEFENSIVE
"I always told you, Mr. Lincoln, that I was the most
of a republican.
"
—Josiah Quincy to Levi Lincoln, Jr. 1821.
The financial panic of 1819 proved much more severe
than the economic problems Boston faced during the
embargoes and the war. As a conseguence of the depression
hundreds of businesses failed causing widespread
unemployment in Boston. In 1823, the North American Review
reported that "thousands [of] mechanics" were out of work
due to the numerous bankruptcies within the city's
mercantile and manufacturing sectors. 1 In June 1822,
forty-two petty merchants in Boston stopped payment on
their debts and faced jail time. In May, June, and July of
that same year, one hundred Boston businesses, estimated to
be worth a total of $4,000,000, went under. 2 More and more
people were being sent to Boston's almshouse and many, for
the first time, were "respectable" voters who had fallen on
hard times. 3
In 1820, the first copy of the Debtor ' s Journal
circulated around town. The "Association of Gentlemen" who
edited the Debtor '
s
f
announced their over-all goals were
"to subdue aristocracy and promote our freedom and
happiness, as Americans." The Debtor '
s
demanded a
political response to the growing numbers of people
imprisoned for debt. It attacked the state's debtor's laws
through the press and in petitions to the General Court.
According to the journal, "our debtors' laws are extremely
oppressive to the poor debtors.
...
[
T ] hey only serve as rods
in the hands of tyrants to torture the unfortunate, while
the more independent debtors have it in their power to
escape the lash." "Viewing this," announced the journal's
editors, "as a growing evil, and as repugnant to the laws
of liberty and equality, [we] deem the subject worthy of
legislative action." 4
Accumulating a remarkable total of 4,000 signatures,
debtor advocates twice petitioned the state legislature for
reform. They asked that work-furloughs for imprisoned
debtor's be extended to include the whole of Boston instead
of the traditional one or two block circumference around
the debtor prison. The General Court responded by debating
the issue, but refused to act. On September 23, 1820, the
Debtor's reported that, "[t]he inhabitants of this town, or
a majority of the legal voters, have petitioned for the
limits of the prison to be extended over the whole town. By
the influence of a petty remonstrance of 120 names, the
petition has been rejected." Having no other recourse,
debtor advocates filed suit against the town. "The
petitioners, finding themselves attacked by a small, though
spirited opposition [in the General Court]," reported the
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Debtor
'
S
"immediately employed two gentlemen of the bar to
defend their cause; and, (what is uncommon for Americans)
were conquered by an inferior force." The debtor advocates
had employed lawyer, Republican operative and future co-
editor of the Jackson Republican, Henry Orne, to represent
them in the Court of Sessions for the County of Suffolk in
September of 1820. The attempt to reform the laws failed
in the courts, yet the Debtor 'a jojjrjiaJ continued to be
printed for another year, keeping the issue of debtor's law
in the public eye. 5
The debtor movement in Boston is significant because
of its advocacy for legislative reforms and for its
identification of an oppressive monied aristocracy that
threatened popular conceptions of democracy. "The rich
man," heralded the Debtor's Journal
,
"is pondering over
hoarded wealth, and devising means to save and increase it,
while the real patriot, the man of honesty, is meditating
upon... the means... to make men equal and happy." 6 The
debtor movement focused on class inequity—a particularly
timely and popular theme for many trying to survive the
depression-ravaged Boston. "With a sincere desire
to... subdue aristocracy and promote ... freedom and
happiness," the movement helped redefine Boston's political
standard by injecting class issues into the political
dialogue— issues that unlike the economic crisis
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surrounding the War of 1812, the Federalist leadership
refused to address.
As the numbers of those imprisoned for debt grew in
Boston, the conservative, Federalist organ, the Columbian
Cent ine l, found it could no longer completely ignore the
debtors. The paper gave the issue credence by running an
editorial debate. Although the Centinel stated that the
existing laws "favored the honest and enterprising
merchant, and show[s] no mercy to the rogue and is
therefore much needed in this country," the paper also ran
a counter-editorial. It argued, "the present severe laws
against insolvent debtors as remnant of barbarism
,
as un-
chr i st ian , and as ineffectual . " The New England Galaxy 's
editor, Joseph T. Buckingham, no stranger to bankruptcy and
debt, actively supported the movement in his paper. 7
Having been born in Windham, Connecticut to a poor
family, Buckingham was an autodidact who aspired to become
a master printer. In 1796, at age seventeen, he secured an
printing apprenticeship in New Hampshire before moving to
Massachusetts where he worked for the Greenfield Gazette
and then in the printing offices of Andrew White and
William Butler in Northampton. Being dissatisfied with his
position and filled with ambition, Buckingham embarked for
Boston in 1800 to make his mark in the state capital.
Within weeks of his arrival, Buckingham landed a job
working for the city's largest printing press, Thomas &
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Andrews. Impressed with Buckingham's printing skill,
Thomas & Andrews in 1805 handed the firm over to Buckingham
to manage. That same year, Thomas and Andrews offered to
sell their press to him. Buckingham jumped at the chance,
but quickly fell into debt. Soon he lost his press and
resorted to teaching school and overseeing the printing
firm of West & Richardson to make ends meet. Despite his
failure, he had worked in publishing for twenty-one years
and had become an expert printer, editor, and writer. It
was these qualities that led prominent freemason, Samuel L.
Knapp to come to Buckingham when he wanted to establish a
weekly in Boston. In 1817, the first copies of
Buckingham's new venture, the New England Galaxy and
Mason i c Magaz i ne , were distributed throughout Boston. The
paper catered to the city's large numbers of skilled
workers and mechanics. Although the GaJ^y promised to
avoid "all partizanship [sic.]," by the panic of 1819 and
fears of going bankrupt once again, Buckingham refused to
stay silent. Between 1820 and 1822, in a flurry of
editorials, the Galaxy attacked the Federalist dominated
legislature for its stubborn support of the old debtor's
laws which the paper described as reminiscent of the
"barbarism of former times."
Picking up the crusade when the Debtor's Journal went
bankrupt, the Galaxy kept debt reform alive in the public
mind. On national issues, the Galaxy was decidedly
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Federalist, but Buckingham took great care to keep his
paper out of the hands of the Federalist Central Committee.
On local issues, such as debt reform, Buckingham assumed a
decisively independent and individualistic view. As one
appreciative reader explained in a letter to Buckingham,
"[y]ou have not only been bold enough to assail the central
committee—a knot of aristocrats—but you have ventured to
attack aristocracy itself ... Your paper remains alone
unsubdued. Bribery, flattery, cowardice and corruption are
the means by which your editorial brethren have been drawn
into the monied aristocracy." Buckingham's commitment to
maintaining an independent voice proved so successful that
the Galaxy held a remarkably high subscription rate of over
one thousand and enjoyed a loyal readership. 9
Buckingham imitated the innovative class-based
editorial approach of the Debtor's Journal
,
charging that
the General Court "is so lost to humanity and common sense
as to wish that the poor man should be punished for his
poverty by even a single hour's imprisonment .... Let the
swindler who hides his wealth for the rightful owners and
laughs at [the debtor's] disappointments and losses starve,
die and rot in his dungeon." The "knavish rich
f
" the
Galaxy argued, who live "in affluence, [and] bring up a son
or two at college, and a daughter in elegant and
fashionable idleness" were unfairly protected by the
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current laws, while the "honest Pnnr '» suffered
imprisonment. 10
As more and more Bostonians failed to make ends meet
in the depressed economy, popular opposition to the debtor
laws heightened political awareness and galvanized Boston
against what it viewed as an unjust Federalist aristocracy
that ruled from the cold towers of the General Court.
Although the debtor movement had discerned a politically
charged and conseguential concern in Boston, this one-issue
movement proved too narrow to construct a viable
oppositional third-party that could disrupt Boston's
traditional Federalist political structure.
The depression spawned another reform movement that
emerged largely from the same social base as the debtor
advocates in Boston. In the midst of depression, many
artisans, journeymen, mechanics, truckmen, and laborers
began to call for the abolition of the state's militia
requirement laws. These skilled and semi-skilled laborers
relied on a steady stream of task-oriented work to maintain
economic solvency and independence. To be forced to leave
the shop or a contracted job for militia duty could mean
financial disaster for this sector of Boston's independent
labor force—especially in the hostile economic environment
caused by the depression. Reminiscing, Buckingham
described the deep resentment the law provoked and the
extent to which poorer people tried to avoid service.
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Describing Henry Emmons, a journeyman friend, Buckingham
explained that »[a]t a time when every man in Massachusetts
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five were obliged to
perform military duty, or suffer the penalty of refusal, he
[Emmons] suffered imprisonment for his obstinacy, and in
order to escape further annoyance for similar cause he
assumed the dress and probably adopted the doctrines of the
Friends. 1,11
Men such as Emmons felt deeply insecure about their
solvency and popular opinion mounted against the
Massachusetts militia laws that they believed to be
oppressive, unnecessary, and a profound economic burden.
Serving in the militia required one to have a functional
rifle, pay for powder, shot, and buy uniforms (many of
which were quite elaborate and expensive) , as well as train
for days at a time with no financial compensation, and take
orders from an officer corps which was accurately perceived
as being exclusively composed of wealthy elites. The
militiamen correctly suspected that the militias were used
by the Federalist party to indoctrinate them to the
Federalist cause. 12
Adding to both the frustration of those forced to
serve and the energy of the movement was the militia law's
class-based exemption policy. All clergy, doctors,
schoolmasters, those in public service (elected and
appointed)
,
justices of the peace, secondary school and
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college students as well as anyone the Governor deemed,
were not required to serve, nor pay for their exemption.
"Every dandy," complained the Galaxy, "who is afraid of a
gun... [and] can push himself into the governor's presence,
and help himself at his table, gets a commission as a
justice of the peace, and laughs at his neighbor, who has
to shoulder the musket The truth is," the Galaxy
concluded, "there is nothing reasonable in the system; and
there never will be til the whole is renovated, and
established on principles of equality." 13 The
requirement to serve in the military during peacetime and
while a national depression gutted Boston's economy,
angered the militiamen. Families suffered while sons and
fathers, forced to postpone work often for weeks at a time,
drilled far away from home. With little or no income
during these periods, family debt naturally accumulated and
fears of imprisonment loomed.
Identifying a direct link between debtors and
militiamen, Buckingham adopted the militia reform movement
and used his editorial skill to splice it with the debtor's
movement. According to his Galaxy
,
"performance of
military duty is considered a hardship .... It is a tax,
which is most unwillingly paid...[T]he military tax is paid
by the poor" only. Then squarely linking the debtor's
plight with that of the militiamen, and employing the anti-
aristocratic rhetoric inherent in both movements, the
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GaliLXy charged that »[t]he laborer, whose daily tasks
supplies but a pitiful morsel for the support of his
family, is called upon for the same sum as the nabob who is
worth millions]
.
He is driven from his employment, and
trained to the use of arms [and] for the defence of what?
Of nothing that he can call his own—of the palace and
treasures of his rich neighbor...." 14
The Federalist Columbian Centir.P.1 responded in 1820 to
attacks on the militia system stating that "[f]ree men
ought ever to consider the privilege of bearing arms and
hojioj: not a tax." Few if any lesser Bostonians had the
financial luxury to agree. In a three month period during
that same year, one-hundred businesses failed in Boston and
the prisons were filling up with debtors. 15 By spring
1820, the militia reform movement organized a state-wide
petition drive and presented its recommendation for the
abolition of the law to the General Court. Much like its
response earlier that year to debt reform petitions, the
legislature ignored the citizen's call for reform. 16
Although the Federalist party's Centinel continued to
defend the existing law, wide-spread criticism steadily
mounted within Boston. In part due to the General Court's
consistent refusal to even address the instructions of the
people— let alone follow them
—
political tensions based on
lower class animosity toward the "FEW" heightened over both
militia reform and debt imprisonment. By the opening
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months of 1821, Boston's political landscape was ripe for
an insurgency that could integrate both issues within an
over-arching doctrine that heralded the injustice of
popular subjugation to aristocratic rule.
Since the state was solidly Federalist, simply being a
Federalist no longer automatically defined a legislator's
position on a given policy. Internal sguabbles not
withstanding, the last word always came from the central
committee, which demanded compliance with its final ruling.
When Quincy and other younger Federalists party operatives
had challenged the conventional wisdom of the party elders
with the Washington Benevolent Society, the central
committee eventually accepted the idea and sanctioned the
WBS due to its effectiveness in strengthening the popular
appeal of the party—something it desperately needed at the
time. Had the committee rejected the society, the whole
idea would have been scrapped and those Federalists who
supported it, had they not fallen in line, drummed out of
the party. Massachusetts Federalism proved flexible, but
only to a point—and that point rested with the central
committee
.
1
By 1819, trouble brewed not only in the Federalist
party's popular base, but also within sectors of its elite-
based, partisan foundation. The political activities
initiated by Josiah Quincy in 1819 are representative of
the predicament Federalism faced. Quincy's role within the
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Federalist party drastically changed once he returned from
Washington and began focusing on local issues as a state
senator. When serving in the United States Congress,
Quincy could clearly define his enemies on partisan lines.
During the "Virginia Dynasty's" rule in Washington, the
Federalist party was clearly the underdog, and Quincy
enjoyed the luxury of reacting against Republican policy.
Once in the General Court, the issues for Quincy became
much more complicated. Although, at first, he did not
distinguish himself from other partisan Federalists in any
significant way as a state senator, the issues that arose
in 1819 forced him into an activist role and at logger-
heads with the party leadership.
By 1819, Quincy had alienated himself from the
committee and lost its support over Maine's separation from
the state of Massachusetts. The central committee's Otis,
Sullivan, and Perkins viewed separate statehood for Maine
as an effective means to purge the state of the meddlesome
problem of down-east Republicans in the General Court.
Without Maine, one Federalists chieftain privately remarked
that Massachusetts would become "a snug little Federal
state for the rest of our lives." 18
Quincy strongly disagreed. "On the question of the
Separation of Maine," his daughter explained, "he was
begged to vote with his party, but he chose to stand alone,
against a measure which reduced Massachusetts from the rank
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of a great State" to a minor one. Indeed, Quincy worried
that significant national representation within the U.S.
House would be lost if the state split in-two. According
to Quincy, if the Maine district was allowed sovereignty,
Massachusetts on the federal level would loose its flag-
ship status as the premier northern state in "opposition to
Southern predominance." Quincy also thought abandoning
Maine's loyal Federalists was an act of irresponsibility on
the part of the central committee. The down-east minority
Federalist position would be pointlessly served-up and
quickly devoured by the ravenous appetite of Maine's
Republican majority. When the question came to the senate
floor, according to Quincy 's son, he "resisted the
passage.
. .with all the energy of his character," which was
formidable
.
19
In June 1819, Quincy stood with the Republican
leadership by actively leading the legislative opposition
to the Maine bill in the General Court. First, he
unsuccessfully tried to bury the proposal in a senate
committee that would review the question of whether any
bill advocating separation should first be approved by
referendum before reaching the General Court. His motion
was defeated by a senate vote of 24 to 12. Doggedly
pursuing his position, Quincy changed tactics by presenting
an amendment to the measure that would require two-thirds
of the Maine district's electorate to vote in favor of
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separation before the bill returned to the legislature for
final consideration. This too was rejected. Despite his
efforts, the Maine bill would come to a final vote in the
senate on June 15th. 20
Having exhausted all parliamentary tactics to prevent
the measure from reaching the floor, Quincy fell back on
his ability at personal persuasion. He spoke against the
bill for two hours. The Boston Daily h^£S£Hssr reported
the speech was "able, clear and forcible," but did not sway
the senate. Quincy' s major problem was the central
committee's strong support for the bill which it had a hand
in drafting. Finding its plans complicated by Quincy 's
obstinacy, the central committee found a worthy proponent
in Federalist operative from Essex, Leverett Saltonstall,
who rose to the senate floor in response to Quincy 's appeal
and delivered an equally long and more persuasive oration
for the bill. When the bill finally came to a senate vote,
Quincy stuck to his convictions and cast his vote with a
bizarre coalition of Maine Federalists and Massachusetts
Republicans that lost to an even more peculiar coalition of
bitter traditional enemies; Maine Republicans and
Massachusetts Federalists out-voted Quincy 's forces by a
margin of two to one. In a last ditch-effort, Quincy
persuaded a Boston representative to introduce his
amendment for a down-east referendum to the House when the
bill arrived there on June 16th. By a vote of 83 to 168,
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the motion for Quincy 's amendment died in the House. The
next day, the House overwhelming voted in favor of Maine's
separation. Thus, not only had Maine gained its first step
toward statehood, but Quincy, by his persistent opposition,
had forfeited his standing within the Federalist party. 21
At the time of legislative debates, the general
electorate seemed largely apathetic to Maine statehood.
Within two years of separation, however, the Boston press
ran editorial after editorial chastising those individual
Massachusetts legislators who had so easily allowed their
down-east brethren to break-off. According to one
observer, "the general feeling was one of regret at a
decision which it had become too late to reverse." 22 Some
three years after separation, the independent Bostonian anri
Mechanics Journal which rivaled only the Galaxy in its
lower-to-middling class readership, argued, as Quincy had
during the debates, that the central committee of "the
•federal party favored the separation of Maine, in order
that the Government of Massachusetts might longer remain in
their hands." The Bostonian accused "the ranks of
aristocracy" of tricking the people for their own selfish,
partisan interests and—though after the fact— it now stood
with Quincy against separation. 23
The immediate political ramifications of Quincy 's
energetic and stubborn defiance of the central committee's
standing orders were severe and came at great personal cost
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to his political ambitions. Before the Maine bill debates,
he had been slated by the central committee to fill Eli P.
Ashmun's U.S. Senate seat once Ashmun retired. After his
stand on the Maine bill, the central committee was so
angered that by Quincy's defiance that it rejected his
nomination to the Senate. Quincy's punishment did not end
there. On March 28, 1820, for the first time since 1813,
the committee's nominating list for the state senate did
not include Quincy's name. In his place, the Federalist
leadership nominated one of its own—insider, William
Sullivan. The committee publicly justified dropping Quincy
on the grounds that he "has not received for several years
as many votes as the other senators had who were on the
federal Ticket." One-time Federalist lieutenant governor
and Quincy's uncle, William Phillips, was outraged and
expressed "strong indignation at the ingratitude of the
party." "I declare," Phillips confided to Quincy's wife,
"if I was Mr. Quincy I would go out of Boston and shake its
dust from my feet." 24
By so doggedly positioning himself against the central
committee and allying with the Republican opposition during
the Maine debates, Quincy found himself ostracized by the
party leadership. Harrison Gray Otis revealed the fissure
between Quincy and the central committee could have been
easily avoided "[i]f he [Quincy] had always voted at his
party's call, and never thought of thinking. .. but he had an
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inveterate habit of thinking for himself." As Quincy's son
remembered, the central committee "look[ed] upon him as one
whose political zeal might out run his discretion, and who
could not be depended on in ... partisan emergenc [ ies ] . •'
This, according to his daughter, "rendered him unacceptable
to the Federal managers.
...
[
T ] hey could not calculate on
his obedience to them," so he was purged. 25
Coinciding with these events, in spring 1820, the
debtor and militiaman movements 1 s anti-aristocracy
rhetoric, with Buckingham's help, was laying the groundwork
for viable third party challenges to the central
committee's strangle-hold of Boston and the state. Before
the April elections, the Federalist Columbian Centin^l
warned its readership of third party activity in Boston.
"[BJeware of mixed tickets," it cautioned. In Essex and
Salem counties attempts were made to establish a third
party against Federalist domination. 26
A month before the state elections, in March, the
central committee fell under severe attack. Buckingham's
Galaxy/ on March 10, made its position clear: "We
despise. .. the federal and all other juntos—and we should
like to see the [end of the] central-committee, which has
so long been the scourge and disgrace of Boston." 27 The
Galaxy ' s next issue suggested a radical plan for the
restructuring of Boston politics, devoid of the central
committee's influence. "At this important crisis, when the
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incompetency of our Central Committee, and Primary c*»n^
are so glaring, and when we are smarting under the disgrace
which has recently been fixed upon us in consequence of
their former folly and obstinacy, I would suggest,
"
heralded "Vox Populi" in the pages of the Galaxy, "the
expediency of taking measures for establishing a new
Committee and Caucus, on the principle of a re_al
representat ion of the wards ; the ward fl&legates to be
actua lly chosen by the... voters in each ward [For] the
junto... are only lovers of themselves [and] manage to
monopolize those offices, which, for the honor of the town
[Boston] and the good of the nation, should be given only
to men of talent and patriotism." 28 "For one caucus to
determine the. .. future, " the Galaxy argued in April, "is
too absurd and ridiculous for the serious consideration of
any but self-created dictators." 29
Responding to the assaults, the Federalist press
argued that "[t]he Central County Committee, in Boston,
have existed ever since parties began; and have the same
political origin, and been organized to advance the cause
of Federal [ism] the same as the old Jacobin Club.... Is it
because the former have been so successfully frustrating
all the plans of the latter," questioned the Federalist
Centinel , "that they have become so obnoxious to their
virulence and abuse?" 30 Despite repeated batteries from
the Galaxy and the Republican press, in the April elections
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the Federalist party ticket held the state, holding a
majority of eleven in the state senate. 31
The events of 1820 generated an initial movement based
on the legitimacy of a new third party committed to ward
voting. Within two years, the ward voting issue would grow
in popularity and the political party it nurtured would
effectively serve as the umbrella under which the debtor's
and militiamen's movements coalesced into a powerful
coalition of popular interests. The Galaxy's charge that
the Federalist Central Committee acted as selfish, "self-
created dictators," supplied the common ground for all
three movements to merge into a single insurgent party.
For Josiah Quincy, the Federalist "wire-pullers" overt
rejection in 1820 caused him great bitterness and
understandable anger. 32 But Quincy also saw opportunity.
His remarkably bold and independent actions over the Maine
bill prompted many ordinary Bostonians to view him
differently from Federalism 's regular operatives. To many
Bostonians, Quincy seemed to possess something quite unique
for a Federalist leader—a highly independent character
consistently unafraid of the central committee and the
immense political power it wielded.
Some in the Federalist and independent press seemed
confused by the central committee's draconian measures.
The Boston Daily Advertiser asked "why [has] the name of
Mr. Quincy [been] withdrawn?" Buckingham's Galaxy viewed
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Quincy as one of the
-few of our statesmen [who is]
entitled to the esteem of [our] fellow citizens
.... [H] is
friends, even those who disapproved of his warmth and
impetuosity, refuse to acknowledge that he was an honest
and upright, and independent politician. He ha[s], in some
way or another," Buckingham explained, "become unpopular in
the federalist party" leadership . (
1
Considering the
growing political dissension and dissatisfaction within
Boston, this was not wholly bad for Quincy.
As the depression plundered ordinary Bostonians's
household economies while the Federalist leadership did
nothing, being viewed as an outsider from the Federalist
"cabal" or "junto" could be exploited politically. Indeed,
in March, 1820, a coalition of dissident Federalists and
Republicans temporarily formed in Boston to successfully
challenge the Federalist Central Committee's slate for the
town's Board of Selectmen. In October, the same coalition,
with the Galaxy ' s support, came dangerously close to
upsetting Boston Federalist stalwart, Benjamin Gorham's run
for Congress with its own Samuel A. Wells. Buckingham
captured the anti-establishment mood of Boston in his
Galaxy : "we would sooner vote for Beelzebub than for the
greatest and wisest man in creation, who should be
nominated by a secret cabal, a junto of purse-proud
demagogues, who care no more for the interest or the
welfare of the middling classes of society than the afore
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mentioned Beelzebub." 34 Having been purged from the
"secret cabal's- nominating list, Quincy was viewed
favorably in the eyes of those who supported the
position
.
Much to the astonishment of the central committee,
after his censor from the party, in April of 1820, Quincy
showed up at the Federalist caucus in Faneuil Hall.
According to his son, »[h]is appearance there, which
was... a great surprise, excited as general a curiosity to
know what he was going to say...—a curiosity probably not
unmixed with anxiety on the part of those who had
engineered the dropping of his name from the lists of
candidates." in particular, William Sullivan was there
representing the central committee. When Quincy rose to
speak before a packed audience of rank-and-file Federalists
in Faneuil Hall, his daughter explained that it was the
"turning point in my father's political life." 35
According to Edmund Quincy, his father addressed the
caucus "in such a strain of humor, [and] wit" that the "old
walls shook with laughter and cheers." After sardonically
explaining the "way in which he had been thrown overboard"
by the central committee, Quincy endorsed the same
Federalist ticket that had spurned him. In so doing,
according to one observer, the oration made him "the most
popular man in the town." Positioning himself in between
the Federalist leadership and the party's rank-and-file,
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Quincy, in one speech, enamored himself with ordinary
Federalists. He had shown himself to be highly critical of
the central committee, yet, all the while, selflessly loyal
to the party as a whole despite its treatment of him.
After 1820, Quincy's political strength would no longer
come from the central committee. Instead, he would garner
political popularity from a Boston electorate that viewed
him as an honest and independent leader who had
successfully stood up to the "self-appointed Federal
dictators" of the central committee
.
H
Quincy's daughter claimed that her father met head-on,
"the desertion of the Federalist leaders," with a new found
"spirit." Also, he had gained the support of many upper-
class Federalists who deemed the committee's harsh
discipline of him unjust. These men occupied a similar
position within the party as Quincy had held before he had
been purged. Men like John Phillips, William Phillips,
Benjamin Pollard, and William Sturgis were established
Federalist politicians. Nonetheless, they remained
excluded from the inner councils of the Federal Central
Committee dominated by Harrison Gray Otis, William Sullivan
and Thomas H. Perkins. It was this group of dissident
Federalists who continued to support Quincy despite the
central committee's order. With John Phillips's support
and influence, Quincy ran successfully for a position in
the lower house of the General Court. Federalists loyal to
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the central committee made his election difficult and
Quincy just barely won a seat in the less prestigious
House. 37
Understanding that he had lost the central committee's
patronage and aware of the mounting popular criticism being
leveled at the Federalist leadership, Representative Quincy
amassed legislative support among both regular Federalists
and Republicans. in one of his first acts in the House,
Quincy angered the central committee by calling for a
state-wide convention to rewrite the Massachusetts
Constitution. "At 10 took seat in house of Rep." Quincy
wrote in his diary. "[A]t meeting... on the subject of
proposing to the people an opportunity of amending the
constitution. Argued to pass such a resolution and appoint
a committee to draft." With the Maine district gone,
Quincy logically and persuasively argued that the old
system of representation within Massachusetts was invalid
and had to be revised. This caused an unforeseen dilemma
for the Federalist leadership. The old constitution of
1780, according to one Massachusetts historian, "was the
pride of the conservative men who led the Federalist party"
from its strongholds like Hampshire, Essex and Suffolk
counties. Support for Quincy' s motion came from
Republicans and representatives from the back-country
districts like Berkshire and Worcester counties, as well as
dissident legislators from Boston. 38 By successfully
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pushing through a motion for a convention to completely
overhaul the constitution, Quincy pressed the central
committee to face democratic reform impulses which it
rather would have ignored. 39
Employing the talents and influence of Governor John
Brooks, the central committee lobbied tirelessly against a
convention. Claiming the existing constitution had been
"drawn by masterly hands" of John Adams, Brooks spearheaded
the committee's position, arguing that any changes to the
constitution should be drafted in committee by the General
Court and then presented to the electorate for
ratification. If done within the General Court,
undoubtedly, all reformist influence could easily be
checked by the Federalist dominated legislature. The
central committee's Federalist press strongly bolstered the
governor's recommendations in editorial after editorial,
but to no avail. 40 Stating that "the federal dictators,
especially in and about Boston," were up to no good, the
Independent Chronicle attacked what it identified as
Federalist subterfuge against the will of the people.
Despite the Federalist leadership's best efforts, the
overwhelming opinion of both rank-and-file Federalists and
Republicans prevailed. In a state-wide referendum the
electorate voted by a margin of two to one in favor of a
convention. 41
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With convention delegates to be elected in town
meetings throughout the state on October 6 and a
commencement date set on November 15, the central committee
rushed to devise a new strategy to control the convention.
Much was at stake. if the reformers had their way, the
apportionment of the senate would no longer be based on
regional property holdings, but population. Federalist
strongholds of Suffolk and Essex counties would loose their
over-representation in the upper-house. As things stood
under the constitution of 178 0, the combined weight of
these two counties sent a third of senate's representatives
to the legislature. Also, reformers demanded that the
legislature have more control over the state-supported
college of Harvard. Reformers also wanted to end the
state's support of Congregationalism which they viewed as
unfair and discriminatory. Thus, the Congregational
church's coffers were threatened by constitution reform.
The independence of the state's judicial branch also fell
under reformist attack. The independent court system,
reformers charged, unfairly upheld the interests of the
elite. Reformers demanded legislative authority over the
courts. Also, they called for the codification of
universal male suffrage, though practically, it already
existed. 42 These reforms were only the ones proposed
before the convention met, although there were undertones
that the militia and debtor's issues would be forced into
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the convention's agenda. Who knew what would emerge at the
convention once the delegates met on November 15th?
Republicans like Levi Lincoln, Jr. from Worcester, James T.
Austin from Boston, Henry Dearborn from Roxbury were
unpredictable and publicly had vowed radically to amend the
constitution. Making matters worse, the central committee
believed delegates sympathetic to reform would hold the
majority at the convention. 43
Understanding its compromised position, the central
committee quickly worked to consolidate its forces in an
attempt to mitigate the potential damage constitutional
reform could wreak on the status quo. Harrison Gray Otis
discharged orders to his operatives throughout the state to
support conservative Republican delegates who would be
sensitive to Federalist orthodoxy. In the Republican
power-broker and state Supreme Court Justice, Joseph Story,
the central committee found its most effective champion.
Though a loyal Republican, Story felt dismayed by his
party's consistent attack on an independent judiciary.
Republican and some Federalists reformers were calling for
legislative authority over the judicial branch. Also, as
the Galaxy charged, "[t]he little state of Massachusetts
[with Maine gone] must still have as many judicial
officers, and pay them as high saleries, as when she had
three times her present territory, and a third more
inhabitants." As the Galaxy further explained, during the
86
depression "when the farmer and mechanic are compelled to
submit to low prices,
" why should not they "expect ... some
method to reduce the expenses of government by reducing
[judge's] salaries or the number of salaries
. "z
44 For
Story, who, since 1809, had lobbied in the legislature for
higher salaries for judiciary members, such sentiments were
repugnant and secured his alliance with the central
committee against reform. 45 Being perceived as a
Republican partisan, Story would use his influence as a
Republican to pacify the more radical reformist voices at
the convention. 46
Cognizant of the committee's tactics, Republican
reformist, P. F. Degrand seemed disgusted with the
ineptitude of his fellow reformers during the elections for
convention delegates. Writing to his friend John Quincy
Adams, Degrand explained his frustration in trying "to move
our political friends to a sense of importance of electing
[to the convention] their own men." 47 In town meeting's
throughout the Commonwealth, as in the convention itself,
Federalist and Republican delegates were both supported and
denounced by the central committee regardless of party.
Traditional party alignments verged on being thrown into
chaos
.
On November 14th, a day before the convention opened,
Story was summoned to Boston to meet with the central
committee's newest rising star and Boston newcomer, Daniel
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Webster. The gathering, which included other Republicans
recruited to the cause, focused mainly on a new and
ingenious strategy to undercut the majority power of the
reformers. Webster's plan was to divide the convention
into ten select committees. Each would have the task of
evaluating each knotty constitutional issue being addressed
at the convention. By controlling and framing the
convention agenda in this manner, the most controversial
concerns could be ignored and the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the entire constitution of 1780, as a
whole, would never come under guestion, let alone fall
under attack. Instead, the delegates and the issues would
be sliced-up into ten detached pieces and buried in ten
separate sub-committees. 48
The first essential step for the central committee to
engage their plan was to secure the president's seat at the
convention. It was the president's responsibility to
appoint the chairman of each of the ten committees. If the
anti-reformists could place one of their own in key
chairmanship positions, the reformers could easily be
controlled. Covering all their bets, Webster and Story
decided to propose Federalist stalwart and chief justice of
the Massachusetts supreme court, Isaac Parker and Story, as
the Republican, for the position of president. No matter
who won, the central committee would have its man. 49
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The next day, with the opening of the convention,
Webster and Story witnessed the fruition of their scheme.
Parker won the presidency by sixty-five votes in a close
election that pitted him against Story. Many of the
delegates from the western part of the state had not yet
arrived to the convention. Interestingly, disgruntled
Federalist and Quincy's first cousin, John Phillips's name
had been on the ballot, nominated as a third party
candidate of sorts, and received fifty votes. Noting that
many delegates were still making the long journey to
Boston, the Pittsfield Sun of the Berkshire region argued
Parker would have been defeated if the vote had not been
rushed through the convention. 50
Clearly disgusted by Federalist political subterfuge,
Buckingham criticized Parker's election, stating, "this is
the first time that a... judge of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts has put off the ... unsullied robes of his
office and entered undisguised and naked on the political
arena, converting the hall of justice into a caucus room,
and its bench into a forum for the promulgation of
sectarian sentiments...." Jettisoning any remains of
honorable disinterestedness, Buckingham exposed
Federalism' s descent into the petty politics of self-
preservation. The Republican Patriot also reprimanded
Parker, but went farther, charging that the convention was
fraudulent to its core: "we very much disapprove [of] the
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design and complexion of the whole [convention]. We cannot
but consider it an injurious [sic] attempt to influence
the pj-pjjOe., whose business it alone is, to alter and amend
that Constitution The people are competent to the task
without the aid of Lawyers...." 51
In spite of such criticism, the convention was
masterfully rigged and the reformers largely defeated
before the debates even began. Josiah Quincy had been
elected as a delegate despite opposition from the central
committee. Wisely, Parker appeased Quincy by appointing
him to chair a committee which the Federalist leadership
knew would limit his potential to disrupt the convention.
As chairman of the committee selected to review Harvard
college's relationship to the state, Quincy found himself
toeing an anti-reform line. On Harvard, Quincy' s loyalties
were known and distinctly conservative. After Maine
separation had so badly damaged the rank of Massachusetts
as a leading state in the nation, Quincy foresaw the
Commonwealth's only hope in regaining national authority
was by maintaining and strengthening its cultural and
educational foundations. Although the state may have
become "second class in population, and of the lowest in
extent of territory," it could emerge, despite its
numerical inferiority, as a national beacon to steer the
moral and intellectual course of the country. According to
Quincy, the maintenance, support and growth of Harvard was
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crucial for the Commonwealth to reacquire national
authority. 52 Needless to say, he was also a loyal alumnus.
Thus, he endorsed and supported the continuation of state
support for the college, despite reformist cries that
Harvard was an elitist institution that had been "built up
by the State," but wholly "above the control of the State
government. ,|53
The one reform Quincy adopted lay within the dogmatic
qualifications required in the old constitution that any
and all ministers on the Board of Overseers were required
to be Congregationalists. With Quincy' s support and
endorsement, this provision was swept away and the
committee recommended that "the constitution.
.. be amended
as to make ministers of the gospel, of any denomination,
eligible to the office of overseers...." 64 On other
matters, Quincy bucked the Federalist leadership at the
convention. During the debates on suffrage rights, Quincy
distinguished himself from the central committee's
representatives who fought to maintain the traditional
voting qualifications. Under the constitution of 1780,
voting rights were restricted to those who owned sixty
pounds of freehold property or earned an income of three
pounds annually. 55 Because, in actual practice, this
translated into universal manhood suffrage, the issue was
largely inconsequential. Nonetheless, it took on
significant symbolic value in helping to define the
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convention's opposing sides. Reformers, such as Levi
Lincoln Jr., asked that suffrage be extended to all of-age
men who paid a state or county tax. According to Edmund
Foster, a delegate from Littleton, "[m]en who have no
property are put in the situation of the slaves of
Virginia; they ought to be saved from th[is] degrading
feeling." 56 On this, everyone agreed.
On a closely related matter, Quincy presented a
convincing case to restrict paupers from gaining the vote.
Arguing that voting paupers damaged the status of the
working poor, he presented an amendment to the convention
floor. Quincy contended that his "provision is in favor of
the poor, and against the pauper ; —that is to say, in favor
of those who have something, but very little;" 57 Quincy 's
position was an old argument that distinguished between the
worthy and unworthy poor. 58
The provision appealed to the lower-to-middling
classes and debtors because it distinguished them from
propertyless paupers. More importantly, Quincy
convincingly argued that to bestow voting rights on a class
thoroughly dependent on wealthy benefactors for its very
survival was fundamentally undemocratic. Without his
amendment, Quincy explained that "the poor man has... lost
his political all; he has no power of indemnifying himself.
Where as the rich, by the influence resulting from his
property over the class of paupers, has the power of
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indemnifying himself a hundred fold." Comparing the
problems he predicted in pauper suffrage to his own
personal anxieties about the future industrial course
Massachusetts was taking, Quincy asked what barriers
existed "to prevent manufactures [mechanics and factory
operatives] from being absolutely dependent upon their
employers The whole body of every manufacturing
establishment.
. .are dead votes, counted by head, by their
employers. Let the gentleman from the country consider, how
it might effect their rights, liberties, and properties, if
in every county of the Commonwealth there should
arise... one, two, or three manufacturing establishments,
each sending. .. from one to eight hundred votes to the polls
depending on the will of one employer, one great
capitalist. " 59
Quincy' s arguments during the suffrage debates expose
his great fear of a electorate susceptible to manipulation.
Bribery of the weak could lead to a managed electorate.
The implications, as Quincy viewed them, would be
devastating to a free and independent electorate. Paupers
would be forced into economic dependency by unscrupulous
partisan operatives, robbing the society's most vulnerable
of their independence. The electorate would fall victim to
the corrupting influence of calculating partisans who would
subvert the electoral system. Powerful interests would
seduce society's most vulnerable members to surrender the
93
most revered emblem of citizenship—the freedom to vote
one's mind. Under such circumstances, the key foundation
of a democratic society—an independent and autonomous
citizenry's right to vote—would be placed in jeopardy.
Whether it be paupers so destitute that financial
desperation drove them to sell their vote, or a future
industrialized world where masses of worker-voters forfeit
political autonomy to "one great capitalist," the result
would be the same. The independent Massachusetts citizenry
would be coerced into a state of dependence and thus,
surrender electoral freedom.
Quincy's overt attack on the state's manufacturing
interests appalled industrialism's advocates, like Daniel
Webster. After Quincy's speech, one of the reformers most
vocal representatives, James T. Austin, referring to
Quincy, remarked, "[o]ne gentleman [has forewarned of] our
becoming a great manufacturing people. God forbid." In
their general opinion of the potential problems growing
industrialization would have on the democratic process,
Quincy and men like Austin agreed. On suffrage rights,
they did not. Austin and George Blake, Republican delegate
from Boston, forcefully championed the pauper's right to
suffrage; yet, finding they held more in common than they
thought, Quincy's and Austin's forces worked out a
compromise provision that excluded paupers from voting, but
gave the vote to all of-age men who paid taxes. 60 As
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mentioned earlier, the suffrage issue proved largely
symbolic. The codification of new suffrage rights in the
state's constitution did not increase voter participation
in Massachusetts after 1821. 61
Despite Quincy's unpredictable nature, he, along with
the reformers, had fallen victim to the central committee's
covert scheme. All the significant issues raised during
the convention were declawed and the constitution that
emerged upheld the status quo. Interestingly, militia
reform secured a spot on the convention's agenda, but all
hopes for any significant changes in the law were quickly
put to rest when Joseph Varnum of Dracut was appointed
chairman of the Militia Committee. Varnum, a Republican,
was the Major General of the Boston Brigade and, in 1820,
had fallen under severe criticism by the Boston press for
misappropriation of militia funds. Specifically, "A Friend
to the Militia," in the Galaxy accused Varnum of syphoning-
off militia funds by giving them to his brigade quarter
master, who happened to be Varnum 's son. Clearly, General
Varnum was highly invested in the maintenance of the
existing militia laws. Chairman Varnum silenced the
reformist voices in his charge and the committee did little
more than insert a clause into the new constitution that
allowed under-aged militiamen to vote for their officers.
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In many ways, the militia committee symbolized the
whole convention process. Despite the great potential for
reform that the constitutional convention offered the
people of Massachusetts, in the end, the reformers found
themselves out-classed and overpowered by a Federalist
machine that had employed the services of various anti-
reform Republicans. As an exasperated Republican, reform
delegate, Nathan Martin of Marblehead, somewhat naively
pleaded, "[w]e know what's right, and what's wrong,... but
it is not to be expected that we can express ourselves so
politely; [we] who have not had the education" of the anti-
reform forces. 63
After the convention, Daniel Webster proudly wrote to
his confidant, Jeremiah Mason, that "[w]e have got out as
well as we expected. ... It was a great body, in
numbers. . .tho' .. .there was a good deal of inflammable
matter, & some radicalisms in it. We are exceedingly
fortunate, in finding a considerable number of Gentlemen
well disposed, who might otherwise have occasioned much
trouble." Webster and Otis's strategy to control the
convention had worked brilliantly. Writing to Mason,
Joseph Story explained, "[t]here was a pretty strong body
of Radicals, who seemed well disposed to get rid of all the
great fundamental barriers of the Constitution. Another
class still more efficient, and by no means small in
numbers was that of the 'lovers of the people, alias the
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lovers of popularity.' The combination of the two classes
sometimes defeated us, and always posed us with
difficulties it was no small thing to prevent sad
mischiefs to the Constitution. The struggle for our part
was not victory, but for the preservation of our
institution. We were for the most part on the defensive:
and... we have repelled the fflflflt popular attacks -""
Although Story did not declare total victory, the
central committee's ability to stave-off popular challenges
to the constitution amounted to a significant triumph. The
central committee successfully reached all its goals. It
had purged the state of Maine Republicans and maintained a
state constitution that benefited its interests. Even more
significantly, the central committee could claim that
neither maneuver had been done in an undemocratic manner or
partisan manner— no one, that is, except Joseph Buckingham.
In a series of articles, the Galaxy, attacked the
convention for ignoring the economic devastation the
depression inflicted on the ordinary citizens of
Massachusetts.' "What has the convention done?"
Buckingham asked. "Nothing—absolutely nothing."
Explaining that the convention refused to address the
depression ravaged state of the Massachusetts economy by
not " lessen [ ing ] the state's expenses," Buckingham
accurately accused the "rich" of rigging the constitutional
process. "Every article of produce has fallen from 20 to
<)7
50 per cent with a few years. The farmer and the mechanic
are compelled to submit to lower prices for their produce
and manufactures, and to many deprivations
.... and had the
right to expect that the convention would devise some
method to reduce the expenses of government, either by
reducing salaries or the number of salary-taking officers.
The Convention itself," Buckingham figured, "will cost the
state $70,000, at the lowest calculation—and who is to pay
it? Not the judges—not the clergymen—for they are all of
the privileged orders; not the stock-holders in banks—
their tax goes to enrich the funds... to buy every man's
vote.... But the farmers and mechanic—the labourer; and the
shopkeeper—who will [on top of] taxes, rents,... bad debts,
and though last not least, the whole burden of military
duty," will be forced to pick up the bill. 66
In the same edition of the Galaxy
,
Buckingham included
a speech given by Quincy at the Massachusetts Peace Society
and followed it up with a very favorable editorial that was
succeeded the next week by an equally positive article on
the same speech. According to the Galaxy
t the Peace
Society, despite its being "the subject of sarcasm,"
contained "a few gentlemen. . .who saw and deplored [the]
military fanaticism.
..
pervading the country." Although
Quincy' s speech did not directly illustrate his opinion on
the growing popular opposition to forced militia service,
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clearly Buckingham discerned the connection when he ran
both articles side by side. 67
The bipartisan alliances made before and during the
convention hastened and exposed the fragility of the two
party system in Massachusetts. Just as members of both
parties fought for reform, so too did bipartisan, anti-
reform forces campaign vigorously for the status guo.
During the debates, party alignment and the posturing of
delegates on a given issue rarely corresponded.
Having distanced himself from the central committee
during the debates, a day after the convention adjourned
Quincy took advantage of the resulting partisan disorder
and cultivated a new base of power. On January 10, 1821,
disaffected Federalists and a remarkable number of
Republican partisans elected Quincy Speaker of the House.
According to the previous Speaker and leading Republican,
Levi Lincoln Jr., "Mr. Quincy had never been so well
understood as since the convention." Republicans like Levi
Lincoln Jr. and James T. Austin, as well as Federalists,
John Phillips and William Stugis, threw their weight behind
Quincy and achieved what Lincoln claimed "no one would
have" thought possible. As Eliza confessed in her diary,
"I knew that my father was a candidate for [Speaker], but I
did not expect his election." Illustrating Quincy'
s
Republican support, Eliza recounted a conversation she had
with Levi Lincoln. Lincoln stated "that no one was more
99
shappy to see Mr. Quincy in the Speaker's chair than
himself." 68 Considering their past partisan warfare, thi
union between Lincoln and Quincy clearly revealed the
growing dissatisfaction and fragmentation occurring within
the Federalist party. 69
Since the beginning of his political career, Levi
Lincoln Jr. consistently spoke-out vigorously against the
Federalist Central Committee. Charging the committee with
"intolerance and oppressive violence in electioneering,"
Lincoln argued that " [individuals have been threatened
with deprivation of employment and an instant exaction of
debt to the last farthing as a consequence of withholding a
federal vote, or rather of not giving one." in his
advocacy to change the basis of representation in the state
senate during the constitutional convention, Lincoln posed
the most formidable obstacle to the central committee's
goals. He emerged from the convention with the distinction
of being reform Republicanism's most powerful and outspoken
spokesman. Feared and respected by the central committee,
during the convention Lincoln forced the issue of senate
representation onto the convention floor in the midst of
imposing opposition. "Our government," Lincoln declared,
"is one of the people, not a government of
property .... Property is incomplete to sustain a free
government. . . .Were it not for a government of the people,
the people would be without property .... It is only
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necessary that all who are taxed should be represented, and
not that they should be represented in proportion to their
tax." 70 As a spokesman for the central part of the state,
an advocate for debt reform and the central committee's
most influential critic, Quincy saw the great advantage of
winning Lincoln's support.
Seventeen days after his election as speaker, Quincy
hosted fourteen of the state's most preeminent Republicans
and those Federalists who had supported him, at a formal
dinner in his home on Hamilton Place. "I never expected to
see Mr. Lincoln & J.T. Austin dining here," wrote an
astonished Eliza Quincy. Quincy charmed his dinner company
that night. To Lincoln he stated, "I always told you, Mr.
Lincoln, that I was the most of a republican . " Where
Lincoln responded that he "did not expect to find that [he]
was more aristocratic than [Quincy]." 71 The dinner
conversation, according to Eliza, was very jovial, "chiefly
political" and indicates the initial preparations for a
future bipartisan front to be launched against the central
committee
.
72
Austin, a Republican activist from Boston, was
considered by both Harrison Gray Otis and Joseph Story as a
dangerous and influential trouble-maker. Writing of Austin
that same year, Story described his fellow Republican as
"hostile & impolite; and [someone who] essentially lowers
the dignity of the great department he occupies."
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Nevertheless, »[p]ublic opinion, " story warned Federalist,
Jeremiah Mason, "begins to manifest itself considerably as
to the merits of J.T. Austin [T]he demagogues approve
it; and the mob cries hurra...." 73
Yet, if future articles are any indication, the
editor of the influential Columbian CentinPl
f Benjamin
Russell, who also attended the dinner, could not be won
over that night by Quincy or his little circle of cohorts.
Despite an editorial by Russell that had voiced subtle
criticism of Chief Justice Parker's nomination to the
convention's presidency, 71 Russell's political positions
were strictly restricted within the criteria set forth by
the central committee. He had been richly rewarded for his
loyalty. In 1819, Russell was admitted into the inner-
circle of the central committee. Unlike Harrison Gray Otis
and Thomas H. Perkins, Russell was not rich, nor was he
ever going to be. Indeed, by 1844 he was penniless, sick
and living in a boarding house. As a fellow Boston
journalist explained, "Russell was proud of his character
as a mechanic. To the mechanics, as a class, he was
strongly and affectionately attached. [Having] associated
with men of the highest rank... and even courted by some of
the leaders of his party, he never forgot that he was a
mechanic." Russell founded the Massachusetts Charitable
Mechanics Association and served as its president between
1808-1817 . 75 Also, Russell and Quincy enjoyed an old
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friendship. Quincy knew Russell from the Washington
Benevolent Society where both had served as high ranking
members and together represented the cross-class basis of
that organization. 76 it was, perhaps, these qualities and
feelings that prompted Quincy to believe Russell would be
sympathetic to him and openly critical of the central
committee. Unfortunately, Russell's loyalties could not be
shaken. Quincy would have to find the editorial support he
needed elsewhere. By the end of 1821, Quincy found his man
and organ in the fiercely independent Joseph T. Buckingham
and his New Engl and Galavy .
In May of 1821, Quincy' s popularity in the House was
reaffirmed when he was re-elected as Speaker. After
reform's failure at the constitutional convention, Quincy 's
original position on Maine statehood became increasingly
popular. With Maine's independence and the convention,
many in the Commonwealth perceived a strengthened
centralized political aristocracy in the form of the
central committee that did, in fact, exist in the state and
was, in fact, repressing the rights of the people. In such
a light, Maine separation seemed a big mistake. "Since her
separation from Massachusetts," explained the Galaxy
,
"Maine seems to be making rapid advances in improvements,
while the parent state, clinging with ridiculous veneration
to old, absurd, and anti-republican principles and customs,
jogs on the beaten path; and if an attempt be made to
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reform an error, to dispense with a useless office, or to
reduce an extravagant salary, the author of it is
immediately selected as a mark for the displeasure of our
political oracles and aristocratic demigods m
Maine.
. .people are allowed to vote for whom they please,
without danger of oppression from the rich But in
Massachusetts, and especially in Boston, all the
candidates... for ...chief magistrate of the state down to
the Keeper of the town ball ,- are selected by the 'Central
Committee. "• "The deserving," have been "driven from your
service," the galaxy declared to Boston. Traditionally,
the central committee so controlled the politics of Boston,
the Galaxy argued that voters "might as well stay at home.
[We ask voters] to break from this ignoble vassalage and
act with independence [and fight against the] mere tools of
a party, the pandar of a cabal." 77
A year earlier, the Galaxy
,
in similar fashion, had
advocated third-party activism in Boston. The first
challenge Buckingham posed to the people of Boston had been
blunted by the Federalist machine. After the convention
debacle legitimized popular fears of an oppressive
aristocracy, growing economic dissatisfaction, and the
advent of dissident Federalists like Quincy breaking from
the central committee, Boston would meet Buckingham's
challenge in 1822. This political insurgency would take
advantage of the bipartisanship that grew out of the failed
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reformist platform at the convention, the debtor's plight,
the militia reform movement, the early call for a ward
system, and other local issues that would arise in the
upcoming year. Most importantly, the coalition would be
held together by a deep distrust and even a hatred of the
Federalist Central Committee, and by a new reverence for a
revitalized and reconfigured political leader, Josiah
Quincy
.
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CHAPTER IV
BOSTON REBELS AGAIN:
LOCAL CHALLENGES TO THE FEDERALIST ORDER
"'the moon had come nearer the earth... and had made
some men mad
.
1 "
—an observation of Boston Town Meeting, Dec. 1821
"The People.
. .were determined it was in vain to
contend.
"
—William Sullivan to Harrison Gray Otis, Jan. 1822
In the midst of depression and the shrinking local
economy, many Bostonians struggled not only under
burdensome state militia laws and fear of imprisonment for
indebtedness, but also under a corrupt and inefficient tax
system. What proved truly irksome for all but a few was
the realization that the town had no power to reform its
own tax codes. Many had expected the state Constitutional
Convention, as Joseph Buckingham put it, to "devise some
method to reduce the expenses of the government." 1 But,
the convention had failed the task and achieved little to
ease the heightened sense of economic insecurity that
average Bostonians felt.
With popular enthusiasm in Boston for meaningful tax
reform peaking in the spring of 1820, integral political
realignments soon followed. By 1821, vocal, cohesive and
widespread third party activism erupted, shaking Boston's
traditional political status guo. Defenders of the
militiamen, debtors and Boston's ward voting advocates
consolidated their forces around the call for tax reform
and used the issue to transform Boston's political
structure toward a much more democratic system. By the
winter of 1821-22, this coalition directly challenged the
town's Federalist order. Stemming from what first seemed a
fairly benign impulse for moderate reform, a successful
endeavor to dramatically alter Boston's traditional system
of governance occurred that ushered in a new municipal city
structure to Boston.
Coinciding with the rise of this coalitional
insurgency and its demand for the radical restructuring of
municipal governance, Josiah Quincy's problems with the
Federalist leadership intensified to the breaking-point.
His defiance during the Maine statehood guestion and within
the Constitutional Convention placed him and the central
committee at each other's throats. After being reelected
as House speaker in spring 1821, Quincy escalated tensions
when he began to publicly criticize the Federalist Central
Committee. Reinforcing popular sentiments in Boston, he
openly lashed out at the party leadership charging that
"the most prominent [fault of the central committee] was
apathy." On April 1, 1821, he presented a cutting speech
enumerating the severe problems he detected with the
central committee's command of the Federalist party.
"[T]hey care nothing about offices," Quincy alleged, "[a]nd
this is one of their greatest faults .... There is scarcely a
man among them fit for an office. And this is the reason
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mast of it." Clearly still embittered by the committee's
why they fish up every crooked stick that floats... and make
a
decision not to nominate him to the state Senate the year
before, Quincy explained in the third person that "he had
liked the [senatorial] office, and had no objection to
serving several years longer. He was snug in his birth,"
Quincy claimed, "when these gentlemen [the central
committee], without saying, with your 1p,W| or bv your
leave
,
turned him out—tumbled him overboard into the
saltwater." Conceding that "[t]his gave him something of a
shock," Quincy concluded that the central committee was
guilty "of turning their officers over-board and making
shark's meat of them." He explained that since the central
committee had behaved "rather uncivil to him," he had
reached out to "our good friends the democrats ." Quincy
speech conclusively attacked the central committee, while
further distancing him from the Federalist party
leadership. 2
The relationship between Quincy and the central
committee had become irreconcilable and each knew it. For
many in Boston, Quincy seemed a concerned and independent
voice—one that understood the problems faced by the vast
majority of Bostonians. The Galaxy carried the whole of
Quincy 's speech and lauded its message. "There are few of
our statesmen," Joseph Buckingham proclaimed, who were
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"more entitled to the esteem of their fellow-citizens, than
the Hon. Josiah Quincy." 3
Less than three months after the ratification of the
new constitution and two months after Quincy 's speech, in
June 1821, the tax revolt ignited in Boston. Eventually
this issue would dramatically change the governmental
structure of the town and Quincy would combine his voice
with a host of other outraged Bostonians struggling to be
heard above the customary Federalist clamor that habitually
enveloped the people's injunctions. 4 The modus operandi
for tax reform ironically developed out of one of the few
new opportunities given to local communities within the
Commonwealth by the new conservative constitution.
Specifically, Bostonians employed section 11 of the 1821
Constitution, which sanctioned the establishment of cities
within the Commonwealth, to achieve some sense of eguity
within the town.
Before the convention convened, beginning in the
summer of 1820, moderate proposals in Town Meeting aimed at
reducing the average Bostonian's taxes were met with fierce
opposition by the county bureaucracy charged with
assessing, collecting and dispensing Boston's tax revenues.
This audacity on the part of the county authorities clearly
demonstrated to most Bostonians the town's inability to
oversee its own affairs.
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In May of 1820, Boston Town Meeting approved a plan
that would, in the up-coming year, consolidate the Town and
County Treasurer's offices into one department. The
original petition modestly argued such a merger would prove
much more efficient and help reduce the tax burden. 5
Because the proposition overextended the designated
authority of the town and expanded into Suffolk County's
legal domain, the state legislature had to amend existing
law before the merger of offices could occur. Secondly, a
gubernatorial appointed judicial body that controlled
county tax monies and made-up of the much hated Justices of
the Peace, the Suffolk County Court of Sessions, also had
to sanction the proposal before the reform could be
enacted. 6
Although it took a year, in May of 1821, both the
General Court and the Court of Sessions approved the plan
as "proper and expedient."' Then, unbeknownst to anyone in
Boston, on June 11, 1821, the Court of Sessions reversed
its decision. At Town Meeting on June 15, Boston's
selectmen had gotten wind of the court's retraction, and
reported that the Court of Sessions had defied the town's
request by appointing two treasurers "at an increased
expense" to Boston's tax paying citizens." Bostonians were
furious. "Curiosity is alive," the Galaxy sneered, "to
know the reasons why the purposes of the town has been
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defeated; and a spirit of indignation seems to pervade all
classes of citizens." 9
Such "disrespect to the People,
.. .utter disregard to
[their] interests, [and] total want of respect to
themselves in their official capacity," led to a Town
Meeting resolution that stated the Court of Sessions was
"unworthy of the public trust and confidence." 10 Also, tax
paying Bostonians became concerned when the Boston press
reported that $9,763.40 in county tax revenues under the
direct control of the Court of Sessions could not be
accounted for. "How happens it," Buckingham asked in the
Galaxy
,
"that the court of sessions gave a statement of the
probable expenses of the county, $2 0,000, and yet drew upon
the town treasury for $29 , 762 . 40?" 11
A committee, appointed by the town and led by William
Tudor, immediately formed to look into how the court spent
county tax monies. Tudor 's committee was to conduct a
thorough audit of the Court of Sessions and the report back
to the town. Furthermore, an angry Town Meeting on July 2
appointed a second committee, chaired by town selectman and
Boston shopkeeper, Lewis Tappan, to investigate widespread
accusations that the whole tax system was thoroughly
biased—favoring Boston's large property owners at Boston's
more modest property holders' expense. 12
For years ordinary Bostonians had grumbled over the
tax code, claiming that it unfairly accommodated "certain
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rich men, who magnanimously retire to their county
seats... in order to avoid the [Court of Session's]
assessors." But not until the court had so blatantly gone
against the will of Boston were concrete accusations of
corruption leveled on the court. Without doubt, the
militia exemption policy for all justices of the peace and
their high incomes (averaging $3000 a year) 13 added to the
animosity.
By September many property owners with moderate
holdings strengthened their indictments, claiming that
court's assessors accepted bribes from large property
owners who were buying favorable assessments. 14
Assessments held particular monetary significance for
Boston's property owners due to the nature of the tax
codes. Bostonians who owned real estate faced triple
taxation. State tax required each citizen above the age of
sixteen to pay a minimum of fourteen cents annually, plus a
percentage on assessed property; county tax was based on
one's assessed property, as was the town tax. If tax
evasion—through bribing assessors or escaping Boston
during the assessment period
—
proved impossible for the
struggling, small property owner, he would be forced to pay
three levels of taxes. 15
At Town Meeting in September, Tappan ' s committee, in a
carefully worded report, only hinted at corruption while
boldly asserting endemic unfairness in the tax system. The
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committee found that "checks can and ought to be made on
[the assessor's]... ability to abate taxes
[because]
.. .opulent citizens do not hesitate to exert
persevering personal application to the Assessors until
they obtain reductions of their taxes." Reaffirming what
most ordinary Bostonians already knew, Tappan reported that
indeed many of Boston's wealthy fled to their country
estates during the April assessment period and those who
stayed in town often threatened to leave if their property
assessment outstripped their tastes. Less wealthy property
owners faced with having to fight off bill collectors
during the depression and who were desperately trying to
maintain their modest holdings within the town deeply
resented such obvious injustice. Such deceit and
selfishness by wealthy Bostonians who could easily afford
such taxes, exacerbated the growing wedge between the
lower-to-middling and the upper class. This anger helped
forge a unified middling class-based sensibility that
eventually expressed itself politically. As "Brutus"
complained in the pages of the Galaxy : "the power of wealth
has corrupted the virtue and subjugated the influence of
the many, to the selfish purposes of the aristocratical
few." 16 "Another complaint to a considerable degree well
founded," Tappan charged, "is that the richer classes of
inhabitants are not proportionally taxed with those of
smaller property. [The small property owner] is unequally
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taxed in proportion to those who are as rich or richer." 17
This class-based perception of injustice would
significantly help define insurgent activism.
After the Tappan report, Tudor rose to deliver the
results of his committee's audit of the Court of Sessions
expenditures of county tax monies. He reminded Town
Meeting that Suffolk County contained only two towns,
Boston and Chelsea, and that, in 1820, Bostonians, as
always, had paid the lion's share of county taxes at
$25,332.25, while Chelsea only contributed $187.63 to the
county coffers. Since Boston paid over 95% of the county
taxes, Tudor argued that the hub was fully justified in its
attempt to find out where its money went, especially when
(referring to the missing $9,763.40), "[i]t would
seem. .. obvious that there must be some waste in our
expenditure." 18 According to Tudor, when the committee
reguested to inspect the court's expenditure records, the
justices refused, arguing "that as the court was not
appointed by the Town, it could not... render an account of
its doings." Undeterred, Tudor 's committee by-passed the
court, going directly to the County Treasurer's office and
demanded to see the records. The treasurer complied, but
as Tudor explained, the committee "found themselves checked
in the outset, by a want of the Schedules ... all of
which... have been taken out of the files." The committee,
he confessed still had "not been able to find them." 19
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Accusing the Court of Sessions with a cover-up, Tudor
charged that "this inferior department of justice seems
liable to many objections under its present system; that
the immediate expense is perhaps the least of its evils."
Because "of these circumstances," Tudor' s committee
recommended that the Town institute yet another committee
"to ascertain whether the Court of Sessions cannot
be. . .abolished.
" After printing and distributing the Tudor
Report throughout Boston, Town Meeting on October 22,
overwhelmingly voted in favor of such a committee.
When this third committee, spearheaded by Stephen
Codman, concluded that the best way to abolish the Court of
Sessions was for Boston to become its own county, others in
the press and in Town Meeting began urging that an even
better solution might be found. "If we adopt a city," one
Bostonian argued, "we shall have the same beautiful,
definite and efficient system, which we admire so much in
its operation in our state and national concerns .... The
whole authority ... emanating from the people.
"
:i The move
to make Boston a city would intensify conflict between the
Federalist leadership and the aspiring forces of political
insurgency
.
Even before the tax revolt, Boston's town meeting
system of government periodically had fallen under
criticism. Many charged that it was fundamentally
undemocratic. As early as 1820, "Brutus" matter of factly
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stated that "in Boston,... a monied aristocracy has
absolutely more sway and is more adverse to our boasting
republicanism, than a legalized aristocracy of birth." 22
Even Josiah Quincy who was highly skeptical of abandoning
the old town meeting system, recalled when writing his
history of Boston that not only were there "no direct check
or control; no pledge for fidelity," on the "agents of the
town," but also typical "town meetings were usually
composed of the Selectmen, the town officers, and thirty or
forty inhabitants" at best. Buckingham's assessment of
Boston's traditional system was even more withering.
"Sometime fifteen or twenty, seldom more... do all the
business of a town that contains near seven thousand
voters," he explained. Also, »[i]t is well known,"
continued the Galaxy editor, "that, in Town-Meetings, when
a subject of great importance is to be referred to a
committee, the moderator ... nominates three, five, or more,
of the citizens present to... select such a committee. .. .Now
it hath chanced that these gentlemen ... have been under the
disagreeable and embarrassing necessity of announcing
themselves as the fittest persons that could be found to
form the committee. This is a terrible evil," Buckingham
charged, "and to get rid of it no sacrifice can be too
great." 23 "It is yet to be hoped," heralded "Brutus,"
"that the middle and lower classes of the community. . .will
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tread back the path of error and endeavor to rescue
themselves" from such domination. 24
Ironically, the direct democracy promised by the town
meeting system was routinely subverted by a small handful
prominent Bostonians who dictated policy by their control
of Town Meeting procedures. Using the parliamentary rules
and practices of the town meeting system, the policy course
of Boston fell under the direction of a few men with
specific economic interests. Disgusted with selfish upper-
class rule, Boston's middling interests demanded more
democracy while Josiah Quincy sought the means to recapture
the power that had been denied to him by the Federalist
hierarchy.
When Federalist central committeeman, William Sullivan
gained the appointment to chair the committee responsible
for "remedy [ing] the present evils" of the town,
Buckingham's assessment of the exclusivity inherent in the
daily operations of Town Meetings was confirmed. Yet,
"Brutus 's" appeal to ordinary Bostonians had not been
forgotten. When the Sullivan committee returned to Town
Meeting with a proposition that fell far short of
establishing a city charter, a jammed-packed and unruly
Town Meeting overwhelmingly rejected Sullivan's proposal
and demanded that the committee be enlarged to include one
representative from each of Boston's twelve wards. 25 These
independent men, it was thought, could sincerely forge the
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town into a city without being influenced by the Federalist
Central Committee. Buckingham strongly praised the
independent course taken by Boston's citizenry. "The
Municipal Affairs of Boston, heralded the GaJ^xy on
December 14th, "are... to be set right at last. The long
experience, the profound legal learning, the acute,
penetrating mental powers, and the disinterested political
views of some of the venerable young members of the new
committee, to whom the report of the old one was
recommitted, afford solid ground to hope the errors and
prejudices of our . . . Sullivans
, and. . . Jacksons, will be
corrected. Old folks used to think young ones to be fools,
but our young folk know the old ones to be so. There can be
no doubt, .. .that a complete system of municipal government
will be reported, and joyfully accepted by the citizens at
the adjourned meeting .... [A] 11 our old abuses corrected
,
and the honors of the new system fairly distributed . "' ' By
the end of 1821, a growing consensus in Boston demanded the
termination of the traditional town meeting system and the
drafting of a city charter as a means of challenging
Federalist rule.
Four earlier attempts to abolish the town meeting
system and institute a city government in 1784, 1792, 1804,
and 1815 had drawn great numbers and faced staggering
popular opposition in Town Meeting. Each time the
proposals were defeated. In the past, Bostonians fought
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off any dramatic alteration to the town meeting system for
fear that a centralized city structure would weaken
majoritarian rule. Before 1821, all attempts to change the
traditional system were instigated by the Federalist elite
to further consolidate its power within the town. On this
issue, a normally inactive Boston electorate in town
meeting had consistently become active. Clearly Bostonians
in the past seemed to have understood elite strategy and
rallied to crush all earlier city proposals by saturating
Faneuil Hall with vocal opponents to the post-charter
plans. In response, Federalist elites changed strategy and
abandoned their calls for a centralized city government.
Instead, they successfully consolidated power in Boston by
assuming leadership positions in Town Meeting which
resulted in their domination of Boston's civic matters. 27
By 1821, popular attitudes dramatically changed.
Boston's new-found acceptance of municipal centralization
was fostered initially by the town's disadvantaged position
within the Suffolk County, the corruption within the tax
assessment process and a distrust of the Court of Sessions.
On top of this, a large voting block came to embrace
municipal change as a means to firmly establish ward voting
within Boston. Ward voting meant more power to the
disaffected. Although minor town bureaucrats traditionally
were elected by ward, town selectmen and all state, and
128
federal representatives, were elected at-large in Faneuil
Hall. 28
Since the 1820 state elections, ward-voting proponents
forcefully advocated the setting up of decentralized
polling stations throughout Boston. In that year, numerous
articles and editorials in Buckingham's Galaxy ridiculed
the at-large voting system as "absurd and ridiculous"—an
outdated system, "manage [d] ... to monopolize those offices"
by the Federalist Central Committee "junto." 29 By the
winter of 1821, the supporters of ward voting, some of whom
had taken on the title of the "Middling Interest," viewed
the chartering initiative as a prime opportunity to codify
their aspirations for a more democratic voting system into
the new municipal structure of Boston.
Ironically, the Federalist Central Committee also came
to support a city system, but for very different reasons.
Men like Sullivan, Thomas H. Perkins, and Harrison Gray
Otis agreed with the popular criticisms of the power held
by the Court of Sessions, but more importantly, they viewed
a city structure in much the same light as Federalist
elites had in earlier years. To the Federalist leadership
in 1821, a city charter potentially could offer the means
to strengthen its power within Boston, but only if it could
control the charter's drafting. 30 Paradoxically, the two
combative factions had hit upon the same strategy to
achieve their opposing goals. For Harrison Gray Otis's
129
individual political ambitions, a city structure meant even
more
.
Otis served in the U.S. Senate since 1817. During
much of his tenure in Washington he found himself
discredited and ineffectual due to his unpatriotic
participation in the Hartford Convention. in an attempt to
rectify his political reputation, between 1817 and 1818,
Otis spent much of his time collecting and organizing as
much material on the convention as he could find. In 1819,
he edited and drafted a public defense of the convention.
Hoping his "Letters Developing the Character and Views of
the Hartford Convention" would finally silence the constant
badgering and criticism he faced on the Senate floor, Otis
published his appeal in the Washington National
Intelligencer under the pseudonym "One of the Convention."
When his defense collapsed, Otis began planning a hasty
escape from Washington politics. As he wrote to
Connecticut Federalist and the Hartford Convention's
secretary, Theodore Dwight, in 1821, "a boundful allotment
of the odium attached to the Hartford Convention has been
heaped upon me." Claiming "'the hounds are all out,'"
sniffing and baying him, Otis plotted his next political
move
.
31
Irritated and consistently checked in the Senate, Otis
set his future ambition on the Massachusetts governor's
seat. His friend and Federalist compatriot, John Brooks
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let it be known that he would not seek reelection in 1823,
opening up the way for Otis to move in. Coinciding with
Otis's decision to run for governor, the city chartering
controversy raged in Boston. Seeing an opportunity in
Boston's call for a city system, Otis devised a strategy to
insure his assent to the governor's mansion. He would
become the first mayor in Massachusetts and use this highly
visible position to launch his campaign for the
governorship. As Eliza Quincy recalled, "Mr. Otis... was
put up for Mayor, and it appeared that a plan had been
formed by a number of politicians, that he should be the
first Mayor, as a stepping stone to the Governor's Chair, &
would then have the arrangement of the City offices &
salaries & could then reward partisans who had proposed the
City Charter through the Legislature for this purpose." In
early January 1822, Sullivan assured the Senator, "[i]f you
incline to live in 'the Mansion House, ' I will mount the
stamp for you, —as will many other who can do more than
I." 32
Driven by such ambition, by December of 1821, Otis
became highly invested and deeply involved in the details
of the chartering committee. Sullivan pledged to do all he
could for his old friend and ally, "whom," he "expect[ed]
to see engaged at the labour of putting the [city]
machinery in motion." Reassured by Sullivan's unswerving
devotion, between December 1821 through January of 1822,
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Otis shot off a litany of firm instructions to his
operatives in Boston from Washington, thus securing his
influence in the town committee charged with forging the
city charter. "it is easier to manage the town of Boston,
he advised Sullivan, "by a Lancastrian system of political
discipline than to institute numerous schools."
"[G]ive.
.
.
[the Mayor] a right
,
without imposing an
obligat i on to ask advise," from other city officials. The
executive, according to Otis, must have the "veto
upon... laws (such as relating to taxes and taking away
private property) [G]ive him the power to ride out the
squalls." Although he had no intention of serving as mayor
for more than one year, Otis directed Sullivan to ensure
that the Mayor "be appointed for more than one year at a
time.... If you [Sullivan] make your mayor respectable by
giving him high authority you will give him auxiliaries to
try the whores and rogues." Otis also strongly urged that
the mayor should receive a "good salary." 33 On ward
voting, Otis was most adamant. "If it is done in wards,
the town will be revolutionized." 34
Unfortunately for Otis and his operatives, Boston's
insurgents who supported the charter viewed ward voting as
the essential element to any acceptable proposal for a city
structure. Indeed, the enlarged Sullivan committee,
charged with drafting a city charter, contained twelve new
members, two of whom were Boston's most vocal proponents of
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ward voting and were the founders of an embryonic third
party in the form of the Middling Interest: riding
instructor, from the 6th ward, Michael Roulstone and the
wealthy disaffected Federalist, William Sturgis of Ward
10. 35 Potentially, these committee members could obstruct
Otis's specific designs for the new charter.
Applying similar tactics employed during the
constitutional convention, Otis's forces seduced at least
one of the "venerable young members of the new committee,"
Republican Gerry Fairbanks into the fold. As a leading
member of Boston's minority party, Fairbanks feared the
politics of Roulstone and Sturgis perhaps even more than
the Federalist Central Committee. If the third party
activism which these men advocated gained significant
appeal in Boston, it would disproportionately damage the
Republican party much more than the Federalists who
traditionally enjoyed majority status in Boston.
Republicanism's position in the town had always been
tenuous and its chronic vulnerability could be easily
exploited by a third, coalitional party that would address
the grievances of Republicanism's traditional constituency.
Fairbanks correctly surmised that rank-and-file Republicans
would abandon his party for the Middling Interest. If this
occurred, the Republican party would become even less of a
force within Boston than it already was. For these
reasons, Fairbanks helped shape and solidify Republican
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opinion on the new chartering committee while reporting his
every move to Otis. Providing Otis with detailed analyses
of Republican sentiments on the chartering issue, Fairbanks
was a valuable source of information for Otis and his
forces. 36
On December 22, the Sullivan Committee presented its
proposal to Town Meeting. At first glace, the document
seemed to be a compromise between Otis' s operatives and the
advocates for ward voting. But after the charter's
publication and distribution throughout Boston, and the
resulting Town Meeting debates of December 31 through
January 2, 1822, most Bostonians clearly refused to view
the document as a victory for ward voting in any way. Otis
had feared such popular resistance, but Gerry Fairbanks
assured him that the plan would have the full support of
Boston's Republican leadership. Five days before the
debates, on December 26, Fairbanks guaranteed the Senator
that the Republican members of the Sullivan Committee were
thoroughly under control. "In fact," Fairbanks assured,
"the prospect for moving for a recommen [dation] " that
excluded ward voting, "came from a republican source."
Despite recent articles in the Boston Patriot that
suggested Republicans were making the chartering a partisan
issue, Fairbanks promised Otis that the Patriot did "not
speak for the sentiments of the party." 37
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Although Fairbanks 's report to Otis may have been
sincere, Fairbanks seriously underestimated Boston's
popular opposition to a chartering plan without an iron-
clad ward voting component to it. This omission gave rise,
according to one observer, to "Bedlam" in Town Meeting. it
was as though "the 'moon had come nearer the earth... and
had made settle men mad.'" The stately and orderly decorum
of the exclusive few who traditionally ran and guietly
dominated Boston's Town Meetings, were overwhelmed by a
Faneuil Hall filled to capacity with an unruly Boston
citizenry that consistently hissed and shouted them down.
Federalist Francis J. Oliver, charged with the unfortunate
task of moderating Town Meeting between December 31 through
January 2, later described the debates as highly "arduous"
and totally "perplexing."'
Much to the astonishment of Otis, Fairbanks, Sullivan
and other Boston "betters," the deferential character that
had so symbolized traditional Boston Town Meeting was
consumed in turmoil as ordinary working Bostonians like
town-crier, Ebenezer Clough and rat-trap maker, Samuel
Adams actively participated in the discussions by bellowing
out objections and invectives to the Sullivan Committee's
proposed city plan. 19
In spite of Otis's objections, Chairman Sullivan, in
an unsuccessful attempt to appease ward voting advocates,
recommended that a city common council of fourteen members
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be elected in wards. No longer would Bostonians have to
trek all the way to Faneuil Hall to elect this body of
local representatives, he claimed. Committee members and
ward voting advocates, Michael Roulstone and William
Sturgis had battled hard for this arrangement. Yet, as
Sullivan confessed, though Boston's electorate could vote
for councilmen within their own districts, "it would not be
expedient to have one Selectman [councilman] for each ward,
as it would tend to divide the town too much into distinct
portions." William Tudor, an original committee member,
agreed that such an arrangement would "break up old
associations, good feelings, [and] .. .there [would be the]
danger of [Boston] splitting into twelve little towns." 40
Thus, though city councilmen would be elected in each of
Boston's twelve wards at twelve separate ward polling
stations, each ward was not guaranteed a representation in
the city council according to the proposed charter.
Having followed Otis's instructions on another matter,
Sullivan, with Fairbank's support, pushed through the
committee a provision guaranteeing that all state and
federal elections would be held at-large in Boston's
traditional central polling station of Faneuil Hall. As
Otis lectured Sullivan, "[y]ou should give no temptation to
your Town Government to dabble in [state or federal]
politicks, [because] if they [Bostonians] be democratic
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which they will sometimes be—you may yet be safe in the
State. " 41
Again following Otis's instructions to establish a
"Lancastrian" system, the proposed charter held that the
city's executive would not be elected by the people in
wards or otherwise, but by the common council instead. 42
In an attempt to justify this provision, Sullivan
disingenuously argued before Town Meeting that though he
"was always reluctant to take away privileges from the
people:... an executive officer will necessarily come in to
contact with the inhabitants; many will be offended; if he
does his duty he will not be reelected, or he will be so
bending as to be unfit for reelection." 43
If the response to and the fate of the Sullivan
Committee's proposal on the first day of the debates is any
indication, this was not at all what the town wanted nor
had expected. Some, like Ebenezer Clough and William
Emmons, so despised the Sullivan report that they switched
their positions and fought against any form of a city
charter. Others, understanding the limitations of the
single ward voting provision in Sullivan's charter,
revealed that in the past, they had felt too intimidated to
vote their conscience in an open meeting at Faneuil Hall.
Addressing his statement to Sullivan and moderator Oliver,
Samuel Adams explained: "For instance a journeyman who is
in your employ. They feel so delicate in your employ, they
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are afraid of offending you." with voting in wards, Adams
charged, "there would be no more coaxing mechanics,
threatening them with loss of work. .. .We know each other
[in our wards].... Here [in Faneuil Hall]," Adams confessed,
"we are strangers." Concluding his arguments, Adams
threatened that "the whole will be lost if we don't agree
to vote in wards." 44
Adams spoke to the common fears of many Boston
mechanics, journeymen, artisans and laborers who resented
that their financial well-being and security was often
directly dependent upon how they voted at Faneuil Hall.
This issue resonated and, much to the Federalist Central
Committee's dismay, refused to dissipate as a key issue.
After much angry debate on both sides, a compromise was
reached. A town-wide referendum would be held on January
8, to decide whether all federal and state elections would
be held in ward polling stations or in Faneuil Hall. 45
The next issue that guickly came under immediate and
staggering attack was Sullivan's proposal for the election
of mayor. Clough successfully argued that the mayor should
be chosen in wards by the general electorate. According to
Clough, if this was left to the city councilmen, the mayor
would "be determined by the rich men... and the poorer
people will have to pay for it." 46 The outcry against this
proposal proved so prevalent, determined and hostile that
Sullivan and his allies quickly acquiesced. 47
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After the first Town Meeting debates on December 3 1st,
Sullivan and the Otis forces left Faneuil Hall astonished
and bloodied. The customary reticence of Boston's
electorate on such matters evolved into an articulate and
potent defiance that firmly rejected Sullivan's motion for
the election procedure for mayor. Also, though consensus
was elusive, the proponents of ward voting had gained a
significant victory with Town Meeting's overwhelming
approval for a referendum to decide on voting in wards.
On January 8, 1822, both the revised charter and the
question of ward voting were presented to Boston. By a
vote of 1,805 to 1,006, Boston accepted the revised
charter. Ward voting also passed by over four hundred
votes. Although the total of Bostonians who voted came to
an impressive 2,811, close to double that number voted on
the ward voting issue. The fact that 4,806 cast ballots on
this referendum question indicated that the ability to
elect state and federal officers without the customary
intimidation issued by Federalists elites to control
Boston's voting behavior in Faneuil Hall held significant
meaning for the town's electorate.'"'
Upon hearing the news, eleven days after the
referendum vote, a dismayed Otis wrote to Sullivan: "If the
provision respecting voting in wards for political affairs
is irreversible, I am not about to cry for spilled milk
—
But I am hard of the conviction of the expediency of the
I 19
measure, and am full of fears, (if the federalism of the
town be worth an effort to preserve—which I may live long
enough to question)." Then, on a more optimistic note,
Otis added, "perhaps the organization of wards, may be
available for political arrangements in favour of good men
and measures—though I had wished to see them kept
altogether distinct from each other." 49
Sullivan one day earlier had shot off a long letter to
Otis. "The People," he explained, "were determined it
was in vain to contend against this determination." As if
to hearten Otis, Sullivan placed a positive spin on the
defeat in Town Meeting, assuring the Senator that the
victory of ward voting would not affect his ambitions to be
Boston's first mayor. Utilizing the same pragmatic logic
in Otis' s letter, Sullivan suggested that despite the
town's decision that "[t]he mayor and aldermen [were] to be
chosen by the citizens, voting in wards [,]... so long as the
present majority in the town continues, the mayor
and. .. aldermen, will be agreed on in Caucus. Proper
measures will be taken," Sullivan promised Otis, "to have
this agreement understood at the ward meetings." This
would insure the Federalist Central Committee's influence
over ward meetings and guarantee Otis the Federalist party
nomination for mayor. Although their original strategy had
been stymied, Sullivan remained buoyantly optimistic. The
wards could be controlled he believed. The Republican
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party continued to be impotent in Boston and was not a
serious threat. There seemed to be nothing to block Otis
from becoming Boston's first mayor and, thereby, achieve
the first phase in his overall design to become governor. 50
Also, as both Sullivan and Otis understood, the
charter first had to be approved by the General Court
before it could become law, and Otis and the central
committee still maintained significant power there. Having
prepared for a worst case scenario coming out of Town
Meeting, Otis had instructed Sullivan to have the charter
altered after it was sent up to the General Court for
legislative approval. 51
When the charter reached the Senate on February 12,
loyal Otis-Federalists flexed their muscles in a successful
attempt to suppress ward voting in Boston. In an act of
utter audacity, the upper house quietly scrapped the
provision in the charter. The Senate's amendment
"provid[ed] that the elections of State and United States
officers shall be holden as heretofore in Faneuil Hall,
instead of being holden in wards as proposed by the bill."
The Senate's actions did not go unnoticed by the town.
When the charter arrived at the lower house, Otis's forces
were not prepared for the opposition. On February 16, the
much more independent lower house, by a close vote of 63 to
61, refused to accept the Senate's revision concerning ward
voting. This was a serious blow to the central committee,
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but Otis's operatives in the Senate had added another
amendment that slipped by the discriminating eyes of the
central committee's opponents in the House. Section 3 0 of
the revised charter stated that nothing in the charter
"shall be so construed as to restrain or prevent the
Legislature from amending or altering the same whenever
they shall deem it expedient." Otis's opponents in the
House had overlooked the implications of section 30. 52
For his part, Otis had wisely predicted problems in
the House. As early as January 8, he had instructed
Sullivan to see to it that once the legislature got a hold
of the charter, the Senate should "insert in the charter
some faculty of obtaining amendments . —As this would be a
privilege, it might be added without [the] instructions
from the town." Following Otis's orders, Sullivan had
recruited William Tudor to unobtrusively drive section 30
through the legislature. Tudor was a perfect candidate for
the job. His nonpartisan role as the town's auditor of the
Court of Sessions and his genuine outrage at the court's
resistance and corruption, made him seem trustworthy to
members in the legislature who distrusted the central
committee. More than anyone else, Tudor provoked and
instigated Boston to move toward a city system in the name
of reform. Nevertheless, as Sullivan fully understood,
Tudor was no radical reformer, but a loyal supporter of
Harrison Gray Otis and would follow the central committee's
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directives to the letter. Though he strongly supported a
city structure, Tudor had consistently opposed ward voting.
Having reached no consensus on ward voting, the legislature
sent a revised charter complete with section 30, and the
ward voting question back down to the people of Boston to
decide on both issues in yet another town referendum on
March 4
.
53
Josiah Quincy had served on the Sullivan Committee and
as usual he had taken an independent stand on the
chartering controversy coming out against any form of city
structure. Like many in Boston, he did not trust Sullivan.
Only two short years before, it was Sullivan who had
replaced him as the Federalist Central Committee's
candidate for the state senate, and Quincy remained
resentful. Also, since 1821, Quincy had chaired a Town
Meeting committee to deal with the growing numbers of
paupers who begged on Boston's streets. Just as he
struggled to navigate through Boston's political
transformation toward a popular democracy, he also
struggled to maneuver through Boston's urban
transformation. Proving himself to be a institution man,
Quincy explained "[t]he leading principle," of his pauper
committee, "was,
—the duty incumbent upon society o f
discriminating in its charitable provisions and
arrangements, between the poor by reason of infancy, age or
misfortune, and the poor by reason of idleness, or vice .
"
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Quincy 's committee had successfully lobbied Town Meeting in
1821 for funds to establish a House of Industry in South
Boston that would segregate the "idle and vicious poor"
from the "worthy poor." By housing and employing the
"deserving poor" far away from the corruption of Boston's
seedier neighborhoods which naturally, according to Quincy,
bred licentious behavior for the healthier, pastoral
atmosphere of rural South Boston, the "worthy poor" could
rectify their lives. 54
The town had approved the plan and Quincy worried his
pet project would be stalled if a radical change in the
town's government occurred just as the appropriations to
build his House of Industry were being decided upon. 55
Adding to this, Quincy, according to the Galaxy
,
perceptively "saw mischief in the section [section 30]
which gives the legislature unrestrained power over the
charter." 56 Fearing "corruption and abuse," as his son
remembered, Quincy "resisted" the charter "by speech and
pen as long as there was any chance of defeating it." 57
Quincy was not alone in his objection to section 30.
"[I]f the Charter is accepted," with section 30, observed
one Bostonian, "we may have as Mayor, possibly, some worthy
gentleman from Berkshire." Buckingham predicted in the
Galaxy that section 3 0 would provoke "many, who are in
favour of incorporation as a city, [to] vote against the
present bill
—
presuming that the legislature has the power
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essentially to alter the charter or constitution of
government.
. .without the concurrence of the citizens."
Because of this and another provision, section 22, which
granted authority to the city common council to decide the
number of representatives to be sent from Boston to the
General Court, Buckingham opposed the charter. He closed
his arguments by reiterating Quincy 's fears that the
charter constituted nothing but a plot by the "central
committee" to disarm the power of "the people." 58
One day before the town vote, on March 3rd, William
Emmons stood before Boston's citizenry at Faneuil Hall in a
final attack against the city charter. "I am fully aware of
the disadvantage, a humble citizen labours under, when
addressing an assembly [at Town Meeting] composed of the
powerful, and that power is their wealth," yet Emmons still
believed that the old system more democratic in the long
run, if "the voice of the rich will no [longer] be raised
higher than that of the poor." Stand with the "intelligent
decisions of a Quincy, and the penetrating eye of an
Austin," Emmons implored. Vote against the charter. 59
Despite the apprehensions of Emmons, Austin,
Buckingham and Quincy, the day after Emmons's impassioned
speech, on March 4, 1822, Boston accepted the charter by a
vote of 2,797 to 1,881. On the ward voting guestion, 2,813
Bostonians overwhelmingly came out in its favor, while only
1,887 had voted against it. 60
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After an agonizing year of heated debates, political
maneuvering and intrigue, Boston, with this vote, finally
became a city, complete with polling stations in every
ward. On April 8, 1822, the city would hold its first
mayoral election and, for the first time, Bostonians would
independently cast their votes with a sense of security and
safety in their own neighborhoods.
Despite the imposing influence of Harrison Gray Otis's
Federalist machine working at high-bore, the majority of
Bostonians had earned the sort of charter they wanted. It
had not been easy. Boston's "senators and
representatives," railed one angry Bostonian, "not only
opposed the wishes of their constituents, but joined in the
votes which in one instance defeated the purpose of the
large majority of the town. .. .We allude to the. . .provision
in the city charter, for the election of State and United
States officers in wards." 61
In spite of resentment toward their representatives'
behavior in the General Court, a voting system that insured
more democracy to Boston's ordinary carried the day with
little support from their own legislators. Unlike the
reformist impulse that was effectively sguashed by
clandestine political tactics during the constitutional
convention, in the chartering controversy the central
committee's machinations failed to guell the resolute
voices of democratic reform.
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During the controversy and quite ironically, the Town
Meeting system and its Straightforwardly democratic
structure worked in the interests ol Boston's majority.
The hated Court of Session had been abolished and the mayor
would be elected for one year by the people—not by
councilmen; executive power would be limited by the city
council; and most importantly to the people of Boston, all
city, state and federal officers would be elected in wards.
Almost all of Otis's edicts for the structure of new city
government had been sguarely checked by a politically
charged citizenry empowered and inspired with growing
confidence and a distinct municipal vision that offered
Boston's lower-to-middling classes a voice in determining
the new city's future.
This was new to Boston. What had begun as a minor tax
revolt calling for modest reform in the tax codes, resulted
in a full blown and successful popular challenge to the
traditional deferential nature of Boston's political
culture. With both ward voting established in the new city
and a raging economic depression that spawned popular-
dissatisfaction with the militia, tax and debtor's laws,
political dissidents like William Sturgis, Michael
Roulstone, and a Boston newcomer and Baptist minister,
Francis Wayland saw an obvious political opportunity to
forge a powerful enough insurgent third party to cripple if
not completely destroy the Federalist party in Boston. II
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Federalism fell in its stronghold, these men believed, the
party would soon atrophy and whither away to nothing
throughout the state. Carefully choosing an inoffensive
name, the insurgents formally named their organization the
Middling Interest and began preparing for its first
challenge—the new city's first mayoral race. 62 in the
course of this new endeavor, they had to seek out someone
who would both champion their cause and be able to stand up
to the Federalist machine and its leader Harrison Gray
Otis.
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CHAPTER V
"TEN-FOOTERS," ZEALOTS AND "LORDLY NABOBS:"
THE MIDDLING INTEREST LEADERSHIP AND COALITIONAL UNITY
"These lordly nabob [ ' s] ... object is to keep the
mechanics and labourers in eternal servitude."
—Joseph T. Buckingham, 1822
"THE PEOPLE... are not only the real but also the
acknowledged fountain of all authority."
—Francis Wayland, 1825
"a band of murmurers . . . a parcel of demagogues"
—Ralph Waldo Emerson on the Middling Interest, 1822
Less than one month before the city charter reached
the General Court for approval, on January 16, 1822, Josiah
Quincy resigned his position in the Massachusetts House of
Representatives. "I relinquish this chair," Quincy
announced to his congressional colleagues, "with a
reluctance, which I cannot conceal and yet, which I cannot
express." He assured the House that his experience as its
speaker had been "a source of unqualified delight and
satisfaction." Speaker Quincy proudly acknowledged he had
earned bipartisan support which he deeply valued and
congratulated both sides of the House for their nonpartisan
allegiance to him. "From every gentleman of every party, I
have, at all times, received and reciprocated the greeting
of a friend and a brother." Reinforcing this position,
Quincy endorsed Republican Levi Lincoln Jr. as his
replacement as House speaker. 1
"On the motives of my resignation," Quincy cryptically
stated, "it is not suitable for me, in this place to speak.
I may be permitted, however to assert, that it has
proceeded from a sense of duty, distinct and unequivocal;
and in the existing relations of my mind— irresistible.
"
Providing no specific designs for his future plans, Quincy,
nevertheless, proclaimed his expectations that the
bipartisanship he had cultivated in the House would
continue and grow once he established himself "in another
sphere." In the foreseeable future, Quincy challenged
Federalists and Republicans "to join my labours with yours,
in promoting the interests of the people of this great
Commonwealth.
"
2
As the tone of Quincy' s mysterious resignation speech
suggests, and as his daughter confirms, the "irresistible"
position that persuaded Quincy to relinquish his
influential seat as House speaker lay in his ambitions for
higher office. Specifically, Quincy had set his sights on
the governorship of Massachusetts. His daughter, Eliza,
recalled that Quincy "thought that some of the Federalists
of that day were on a wrong track." His opposition to
Maine separation and his consistent defiance of the
Federalist party leadership, Eliza argued, made him
"generally known & justly appreciated throughout the State
& his new friends [wanted to] run him for Governor." 3 Such
lofty aspirations would squarely pit him against Harrison
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Gray Otis, and the bipartisan support Quincy earned in the
General Court had the potential to seriously divide and
disrupt Massachusetts Federalism. Also, foreseeing future
controversy in the upcoming legislative session, Quincy 's
resignation as Speaker of the House in January proved
highly pragmatic, timely, and politically advantageous. By
absenting himself from the General Court one month before
the proposed city charter reached the legislature, Quincy
avoided having to take a legislative stand on the most
divisive issue the General Court faced that year. When the
Middling Interest publicly attacked Boston's
representatives "who not only opposed the wished of their
constituents, but joined in the votes which ... defeated the
purposes of the large majority of the town" over the ward
voting issue, Quincy could not be castigated for "utterly
disregard [ ing] ... the people of Boston." 4
Instead, Quincy evaded the controversy and lobbied to
obtain an appointment as a municipal court judge in Boston-
-a position he received and accepted later that month.
Ironically, Quincy 's adversary Governor John Brooks awarded
him the judgeship. Why is not clear. Perhaps, from the
Governor's point of view, Quincy would be less troublesome
to him and the central committee as a municipal judge than
as House Speaker. During Quincy 's tenure as a municipal
judge, he would consolidate power within what was rapidly
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becoming a divided town in the midst of a dramatic struggle
to upset Federalist political hegemony in Boston. 5
The news of Quincy's resignation from the General
Court baffled Harrison Gray Otis. "Mr. Quincy's movement
does indeed surprise me," he admitted to William Sullivan
on January 19, 1822 from Washington. "it is a sort of
practical bathos, to jump from the speaker's chair into
that of the Boston old Bailey." Concluding that Quincy's
"zeal for his friends and party have hurt his popularity,
he probably expects the reward of neglect, which his
friends and party first or last are apt to show towards
those who are too zealous...—and as he gets nothing by
being a great man amoung gentlemen, he will try his hand by
showing himself a good one amoung whores and rogues—Good
luck to him say I." 6 Otis clearly was unaware of Quincy's
more ambitious intentions and had all too quickly written
him off as an insignificant force within the state, let
alone a serious political adversary within Boston. As
future events would show, Otis's swift dismissal of Quincy
was shortsighted.
Despite the optimism of his sponsors, Quincy's
bipartisan power-base did not have much endurance beyond
the boundaries of Boston—and for good reason. By 1822,
the Republican party's power had grown throughout the
state. Although Federalism commanded Suffolk, Essex, and
Hampshire counties, the party of "good men and good
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measures" faced decisive and growing opposition elsewhere
in the state. The treasonous legacy of the Hartford
Convention continued to haunt Massachusetts Federalism,
providing Republican candidates with an easy, effective,
and engaging line of attack in many parts of the state.
The rural interests of town's like Plymouth, Bristol,
Barnstable, and counties such as Norfolk, Berkshire,
Hampden, and Worcester voiced opposition toward the
mercantile and manufacturing interests so endemic to the
Federalist party platform. In the fishing communities of
Cape Cod, Martha's Vineyard and Natucket, Republicanism
consistently was the party of choice. 7
Led by a popular and articulate leadership, men like
Levi Lincoln Jr. of Worcester, David Henshaw of Leicester,
and William Eustis of Boston scrupulously sowed the seeds
of Republicanism throughout the state. Although Federalist
governor, John Brooks, won seven consecutive elections,
often by wide margins, his Republican challengers, Henry
Dearborn, Jacob Crowninshield, and William Eustis still
captured significant numbers throughout the state,
demonstrating Republicanism held substantial appeal.
Clearly, the Republican party of Massachusetts represented
a viable opposition, perfectly capable of challenging
Federalism on the state level. 8
Indeed, the key to John Brooks's political success
within the Commonwealth was his moderate, nonpartisan
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stance. Since his first victory in 1816, Brooks had
disingenuously praised Republican leadership in Washington
while masking his predisposition to Federalism 's most
elitist doctrines. So pronounced was Brooks's nonpartisan
image that President James Monroe, while visiting the Bay
State, reciprocated the governor's flattery of the
"Virginia Dynasty" by applauding Brooks's seemingly
nonpartisan leadership of Massachusetts. As the Federalist
organ the Boston Palladium confessed, Brooks publicly
restrained his excessive Federalism and followed a much
less offensive course of "moderation and candour towards
his opponents." Most importantly, Brooks took great care
to avoid being identified as a member of the Federalist
Central Committee. This was no more apparent when, upon
Brooks's first gubernatorial victory, the Massachusetts
House of Representatives greeted him, proclaiming that the
new governor came from "the same school" as former
Republican governor, Caleb Strong. Brooks swiftly appeased
his Republican critics by appointing them to public office.
According to one student of Federalism, Brooks "beat back
successive Republican challenges with a policy of
moderation," which according to another exemplified "his
artful dodging [that] belied a carefully contrived
electioneering image of a simple-soldier-in politics." 9
After the Hartford Convention, even in Massachusetts,
campaigning as a staunch advocate of traditional Federalist
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principles would be political suicide. Understanding this,
Brooks adopted the image of a sincere patriot who
exemplified the nonpartisan tranquility of the Era of Good
Feelings. His "artful dodging" consistently quelled
Republican challenges to his administration and helped
maintain Federalist dominance in the state. His reelection
numbers steadily rose between 1816 and 1821. 10
If the Federalist party nominated a candidate with
less bipartisan proclivities as Brooks, the Republican
party could offer numerous creditable candidates who could
run, perhaps even successfully. For Quincy, competing in a
state that held a Republican party that, given the chance,
could strongly dispute the dictatorial character of
Federalism' s backroom leadership in Massachusetts, a viable
bid coming from an independent third party like the
Middling Interest for the governor's seat was unrealistic.
If reform in the manifestation of an anti-elite, anti-
federalist platform was to successfully evolve and break
Federalism 's traditional, yet increasingly tenuous
stranglehold on Massachusetts, the Republican party could
do the job.
By the early spring 1822, Quincy abandoned his plans
to run for governor and devoted his political ambition
toward the more reasonable goal of becoming Boston's first
mayor. In this quest, the bipartisan support Quincy had
garnered and was known for in the House, and his reputation
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as a highly independent politician and staunch foe of the
Federalist Central Committee would serve him well. Unlike
the political situation in the state, party organization in
Boston soundly favored Federalism. Despite increasing
hostility toward Federalist elitism, because of tradition
and the party's highly organized machine, Federalism
remained the only viable party in town. The Republican
party continued to be weak in Boston while Federalism
remained ascendent. Thus, unlike reformist impulses in the
state, Boston reformers could not look toward Republicanism
as their savior. Any significant challenges to Federalist
hegemony in Boston necessarily had to develop from a third
party with the ability woo regular Federalists into
insurgent political activism.
By the beginning of 1822, such an insurgency was
refined into a polished and highly defined third party that
gained clarity from a controversial local issue that spoke
to the direct concerns of many of Boston's lower to middle
class voters. Beginning in 1821, many Bostonians were
growing upset with an old 1803 fire law that restricted the
building of wooden structures higher than ten feet within
the town's limits. The anger that middling and lower
orders first expressed over state issues such as the
militia laws, the debtor's laws and oppressive tax codes
was reinforced and heightened due to the inability of many
Bostonians to build affordable decent housing. The town's
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restrictive building codes severely confined the expansion
of low-income housing in Boston. These restrictions forced
many poor to middling Bostonians to become dependent on
landlords who easily sustained high rent rates by
exploiting Boston's tight housing market. Also, the wooden
building law limited work for many Boston master carpenters
and journeymen, as well as profits for emerging
entrepreneurs interested in raising cheap row housing. The
1803 fire law forced Boston's poor to search for
inexpensive housing in Boston's poorer, more decrepit
neighborhoods like the notorious North and West Ends. For
the "respectable" mechanic or master carpenter, the law
greatly obstructed his ability to erect a home or a lodging
house that was affordable. This seemingly innocuous issue
localized anti-elite, anti-Federalist sentiments for many
disgruntled Bostonians whose backs were already bent and
pocketbook's empty—or close to it—because of the
depressed economy. 11
Boston's popular classes experienced a meaningful
victory over the town's "betters" during the city
chartering dispute while also sustaining a struggling
embryonic, yet vocal oppositional third party called the
Middling Interest. Seasoned by past political action, they
developed a unified group-identity of sorts that clearly
and forcefully would exhibit its class interests in the
once forbidden realm of local politics. As insignificant
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as the wooden building issue perhaps seems, it functioned
as the first test-case in public policy for a newly
energized Boston electorate-one freed from the bonds and
obligations so inherent in Boston's past deferential
political structure. The wooden building issue served to
clarify insurgent third party activism by grounding
earlier, somewhat inexplicit calls for reform to a precise
local public policy concern within the specific confines of
Boston.
In 1821, South Boston resident, Lot Wheelright
petitioned Boston Town Meeting to exempt South Boston for
five years from the town ordinance that restricted the
building of wooden structures higher than ten feet. In
May, Town Meeting voted to grant Wheelright his request,
stating " [i]t was Voted, That the Town consent that the
Laws, restricting buildings of Wood, more than ten feet
high, may be suspended for the term of five years, so far
as it relates to that Section of the Town." 12 Taking
advantage of Wheelright' s successful petition, Boston
resident, Josiah Jones presented his own petition that
asked Town Meeting to appeal to "the Legislature to alter
or repeal the Law prohibiting the erection of Wooden
buildings.
. .more than ten feet high" throughout the whole
town. Unlike Wheelright 1 s, Jones's request covered all of
Boston and demanded the total abolition of the 1803 law. 13
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On June 6th, the town committee charged with
considering Jones's petition presented its recommendation
to Town Meeting. Committee chairman and reformer, Stephen
Codman explained that "it is the opinion of the Committee,
that the existing Law may now be modified without any
injury [to the town]; and inasmuch as it appears to be the
general wish so to modify the Law, as to meet the wants and
means of a large portion of respectable citizens, who have
not the ability to erect buildings entirely of Brick or
Stone [,]... [t] he Committee.
. .recommend [s] ... its desire that
the Legislature should be requested so far as to modify the
existing Law." 14 Codman's proposal overwhelmingly passed
Town Meeting by "a majority [vote] of four to one" and the
town's petition moved to the General Court for final
approval. 15
The legislature responded to Boston's petition by
granting South Boston the right to raise wooden buildings
above ten feet, but denied the same privilege to the whole
of Boston. 16 Bostonians responded with immediate disdain.
"Mill Creek Wharf" wrote to his fellow "mechanics of
Boston," "how astonished were the petitioners, to hear,
when the bill was brought in, that it was entirely contrary
to the expectations and wishes of a great majority of the
town. This astonishment was not diminished when it was
found that the greater part of the representatives from
Boston chose to be absent on this occasion." "Mill Creek
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Wharf" explained that "after the bill had received the
signature of the. Speaker of the House [Josiah Quincy],"
further qualifications were imposed by Boston
Representative, Nathan Hale that basically neutralized any
changes distinguishing the 1821 bill from the original 1803
fire law. "it is difficult to conceive," reiterate the
editorialist, "why, after the petition had been approved by
the town, any of our representatives should have been so
much interested as to object ... .MECHANICKS! , " heralded
"Mill Creek," "keep your eyes well to the right—and
steady—and at the next election of representatives, send
such men to the general court as will do their duty without
fear and trembling." 17
Less than a month later, on July 13, a fire broke out
in a wooden boarding house on Union street destroying at
least eleven buildings after spreading to Salt Lane and
Creek Square. One week earlier, another fire ravaged
Charlestown, incinerating at least $20,000 worth of
property before being extinguished. 18 Such outbreaks
seriously diluted, at least momentarily, Boston's outrage
toward the General Court's behavior. Any significant
reform in Boston's fire laws would have to wait until the
summer fires in and around the town faded from public
memory. This would not take long.
In January, 1822, while the chartering controversy
simultaneously raged in Town Meeting, John H. Wheeler
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raised the wooden building issue to the town once again.
This time, not only did the petition reiterate earlier
demands for reform in the fire laws; it also directly
charged that Boston's "Senators & Representatives be
directed to use their influence in procuring the passage of
a Bill by the Hon. Legislature conformable to the... vote
[on wooden buildings] of the Town." 19 As with the Jones's
petition, Wheeler's easily passed Town Meeting and was sent
to the General Court for approval. As the petition's
addendum ordering Boston legislators to follow the town's
instructions suggests, the reformers, this time, left
nothing to chance. The petition would arrive at the State
House supported by a town committee hoping to persuade
Boston's legislators to vote in favor of the town's
request. If Boston's representatives in General Court
snubbed the town once again, there would be serious
consequences
.
20
Upon hearing the news of the second petition's
overwhelming support and passage, Harrison Gray Otis, from
Washington, shot off orders to his operatives to block the
petition. "I see with dismay, the vote for wooden
buildings," Otis anxiously wrote William Sullivan on
January 19, 1822. "It seems incredible—Cannot you check it
in the legislature befor[e], 'Ucalegon burns next.'" 21
Being a landlord and having an extensive land and property
holdings in Boston, the abolition of the fire law would
168
directly effect the value of Otis' s properties. With a
greater risk for urban fires, insurance rates would soar
while property values would decline. Also, if the rental
market in Boston expanded due to the erection of cheap
wooden apartment buildings, Otis would face new
competition. His rent rates would decrease and his income
would fall. 22
Accommodating otis's directive, Sullivan orchestrated
an effective counter-attack. By stacking Town Meeting with
anti-reform, established landlords, Sullivan forced through
the passage of a formal grievance refuting the legitimacy
of the Wheeler petition. According to Sullivan's
remonstrance, Wheeler's proposal was invalid because it had
not been presented in a referendum. As a result of
Sullivan's parliamentary tactics in Town Meeting, the
General Court would first have to rule against the
grievance before it could even address the town petition.
By employing such a strategy, the central committee
crippled reform by complicating the wooden building issue
once it reached the legislature. 23 The Federalist
leadership seemed to be using its political influence to
halt any competition to its economic interests in Boston.
Buckingham was furious. "Certain people," he fumed in
an editorial, "who never trouble themselves to attend town
meeting, —thinking it rather beneath their honorable and
dignified characters to meet in the same hall with
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ance
mechanics and labouring men,
-have presented a remonstr
against the petition." Attacking reform's opposition,
Buckingham stated that "Tilt i c= i n c v^v-+-L j s, short, a mere guestion
of self-interest, in which the purse-proud landlord is
arrayed against the mechanic. The remonstrance would never
have existed, had not the large owners of real estates,
seen in the success of the petition, a reduction of their
already overgrown incomes from cruel and exorbitant rents.
They would have no objection to wooden houses of two
stories, provided they had the exclusive privilege of
erecting and leasing them." 4 Without reform, Buckingham
explained the "present interest and future prospects of the
middling and poorer classes," would remain bleak. "[T]here
are mechanics, who, with the savings of a few years labour,
might live in decent houses of their own, and look forward
to a comfortable competency—perhaps to independence: and
this is the reason, why the petition is so violently
opposed. These lordly nabob[ '] s. .. object is to keep
mechanics and labourers in eternal servitude .... It remains"
Buckingham challenged, "for the legislature of
Massachusetts, to say whether the mechanics and labouring
people of Boston shall be allowed to participate in the
rights of privileges, which any form of government
professes to guarantee to all, or whether all the lands and
houses shall eventually become the property of a few
landlords—whether a mechanic may be a freeholder, or
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whether he must be a tenant." ' Despite Buckingham's
appeal, the General Court agreed with the Sullivan
grievance committee and rejected the town's request.
Otis
-S strategy had worked. Expansion of the housing
market would, temporarily at least, be stopped and existing
rental rates maintained.
The town was again outraged by their legislature's
behavior. So vocal was the criticism that many of town's
representatives grasped for the first time the power and
immense popular support the issue wielded within Boston.
Fearing defeat in the next elections because of their anti-
reformist stance, some Federalist representatives broke
with the central committee's standing orders and scrambled
to reposition themselves on the question. As one Boston
newspaper reported, "a representative from Boston, who
lately remonstrated against the petition for leave to erect
wooden buildings has set his name at the head of the new
petition for the same object. What can have operated so
potent ia ll y on his mind, as to induce him now to advocate a
measure which three weeks ago he considered fraught with
mischief and destruction to the town? Is it possible,"
queried the editorial "that the fear of losing his seat in
the legislature at the approaching election can have
wrought such a miracle, as unstopping the ears of the deaf,
opening the eyes of the blind, unloosing the tongue of the
dumb, and convincing the understanding of the dull and
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obstinate?- By the end of February, the central
committee's traditional authority in the legislature
buckled under the weight of overwhelming popular support
for reform in fire laws. Even obedient and traditionally
loyal Federalists operatives found themselves turning their
backs on Otis and the Federalist leadership out of
political necessity. A number of Boston legislators
perceived that to block this particular popular reform
would be an act of political suicide. For Boston's popular
electorate, the wooden building issue came to represent
much more than simply the freedom to raise more affordable
housing or to reduce rents. By February, the issue came to
embody all of common Bostonians" objections with what their
city's wealthy Federalists leaders. However modest the
reformer's goals, the wooden building issue became the
urban proletariat's symbolic stand against what the
electorate viewed as an elite, Federalist hierarchy.
With a petition signed by a staggering 4,500+
Bostonians, on March 6, Asa Lewis reintroduced the issue at
Town Meeting and, after written ballots were taken, the
measure passed by an awesome majority of 2,263 out of 3,411
votes. This time not only would the town selectmen lobby
Boston representatives, but Town Meeting also granted "the
petitioners [themselves to] be empowered to appear... on
behalf of the Town or City, to advocate, and defend the
petition before the Hon. Legislature." 27 Buckingham's
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Galaxy, commended Lewis and the petitioners while scolding
Sullivan for having blocked the provision. "This result,"
Buckingham snorted, "will stop the clamour which was made
at the former meeting on the same subject, because the vote
was not decided by ballot, it is incontestably proved,"
claimed Buckingham, "that a large majority of the voters
(of those at least who care any thing about the business
[of Boston]) are in favour of the present unreasonable,
unjust, and oppressive restrictions being removed."
Broadening his critique of the wooden building issue,
Buckingham squarely fused reformist goals with the plight
of "the poorer classes [who] are hungry and homeless." 28
Fearing further defections, the Federalist press down-
played the issue as trivial. According to Boston's leading
Federalist organ, the Columbian Cjm&iDJLl, reform in the old
fire laws was of "no great significance to either party." 29
By so misreading the salience of the wooden building issue,
the Federalist press and its masters, unlike dissident
Federalist legislators who switched their position, were
oblivious to the third party activism that had been
smoldering for so long within the town's less affluent
wards. This third party movement would finally coalesce
and ignite over the wooden building issue. Also, the
Federalist leadership's response revealed to the town's
insurgents Federalism 's vulnerability— its brazen
arrogance
.
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The Federalist, Daily Advertise squarely illustrated
the party's temerity when it smugly argued that Boston
mechanics, struggling with high rents, should be happy with
their prospects and stop complaining. "As to the rent paid
by the mechanics," the Advertiser asked, "would it be
better for them to have the price greatly reduced?" of
course not, answered the Advertiser because "high rents are
a mark of prosperity." 30 such insolent and insensitive
logic infuriated a Boston working class that continually
grappled to put food on the table, pay rent, avoid militia
duty and stay out of debtor's prison. An incensed Joseph
Buckingham responded to the editorial, stating that »[i]f
'[h]igh rents are a mark of prosperity,' so are thefts and
robberies. A pick-pocket steals your purse and justifies
himself by this convenient logic— 'It is a mark of your
prosperity; for if you had not a purse, I could not have
taken it.
•
Another rogue breaks into your house; and this
too is a mark of your prosperity, because if you had no
house, he could not have committed the burglary, and a
third murders you—all for your good, .. .proof that you had
life, and you might not have known it had you never
swallowed his arsenic or felt his dagger." Making matters
worse, the "writer in the Daily Advertiser," charged an
incensed Buckingham, irreverently insulted all who had
signed the petition. The Advertiser
,
Buckingham claimed,
"intimates that many of the signatures to the petition were
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procured in grog-shops. This is altogether in K^lna with
the general tone of the writers in that vehicle of
aristocracy, it is meat and drink to them to libel the
mechanic, and middling interests." 31 Indeed, the Centino!
claimed the "tenfooters, » as the wooden building reformers
were called, had "designing intentions, or to say the least
the intemperate zeal of a few, to create out of an honest
difference of sentiment on this minor topic, a general
feeling of hostility which may
. . .divid[e] a party
[Federalism]
.
" 32
Although this undoubtedly was the intention of the
Middling interest, the Centinel boldy underestimated the
insurgency's broader foundations. Although the insurgency
remained inadequately organized, it had not developed on a
whim as the Federalist press suggested. Nor was the
movement predicated solely on the wooden building issue.
Reforming Boston's fire laws only provided the Middling
Interest with one highly charged and popular plank to be
added to its overall reformist platform. As Buckingham
explained, the insurgency's principal agenda was to wage a
protracted battle against the aristocratic and elitist
course Federalism had recently taken—to fight against
those who "see none of [the poor's] miserable tenements,
[and] bears none of their gleanings—for them, he [the
greedy Federalist] has no sympathy, with them he has
nothing in common, but [collecting from] them rent .
"
175
According to Buckingham, unlike the Federalist party, the
Middling interest championed »[t]he mechanics of Boston as
intelligent, and as respectable in every thing, except the
respecta bili ty of w^lth, as any body of men that ever gave
strength, support and security to any city or nation on
earth. " 33
For ordinary Bostonians, Federalism's covert and
consistent opposition to the "ten footers" seemed
symptomatic of the party's larger intentions: to maintain a
ruling political and economic aristocracy at their expense.
Two earlier attempts to reform the wooden building laws by
functioning within established political guidelines were
crushed by the central committee. By the spring of 1822,
there was little doubt among the majority of ordinary
Bostonians that the political system was being manipulated
to sustain elite hegemony against the ascension of the
honest and respectable plebeians. By restricting the
upward mobility of Boston's respectable laborers and
mechanics while exploiting their labor, extracting
excessively high rents, taxing them through the militia
laws and inequitable property assessments, forcing
hardworking Bostonians into debt, while, simultaneously,
demanding and pompously expecting deference, the majority
in Boston lost all respect for the party of "good men and
measures." As Buckingham asked Boston's ordinary voters,
"shall they [the mechanics and laborers] be forever cowed
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down and kept out of countenance by a contemptible minority
of overgrown landlords, and speculators, who were
originally as low-aye, and much lower,
-in the world than
themselves?" These
.'haughty lordling [s] and the princely
nabob [S],... possess no feeling in common with other men and
[their] sympathies are never awakened but by the jingling
of dollars." Because the legislature had disbanded for an
extended vacation, this question, according to Buckingham,
would finally be decided upon in Boston's upcoming mayoral
contest. The hostile sentiments of the town indicated that
the Federalist nominee would not run unopposed. 34
The prospect of having the wooden building issue
define the city's first mayoral contest certainly did not
appeal to the Federalist leadership. Harrison Gray Otis
maintained a controlling interest in the Mount Vernon
Proprietors, Broad Street Association, and Mill Pond
Corporation which had resulted in his commanding a real
estate empire. The prospect of loosening the town's fire
codes clearly was not in his, nor his various corporation's
interests. With the abolition of the fire laws, Otis's
empire would be jeopardized by more affordable building.'
Also, although Otis and his operatives underestimated the
strength of the insurgency, by March, he and his handlers
came to understand that the populist rhetoric of the "ten
footer's" potentially threatened the Otis campaign.
Quickly responding to the central committee's new insights
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on the election, the Federalist press no longer totally
dismissed the "ten footers" as irrelevant, but instead
attempted to appease and quiet the dissident factions of
the electorate by calling for party unity.
-
C i ]t can hardly
be thought good policy," wrote the Column gfintinfili „to
endanger the peace and harmony of our city" over the wooden
building issue. "Let us not... in the name of common sense,
permit the evil spirit of discord to preside at the first
election of our city officers." "Let us not... create out of
an honest difference of sentiment on this minor topic, a
general feeling of hostility.
.. [which will] divid[e] a
party who have hitherto acted with no less union than
success." 36 But the call for party unity came too late.
Much to the astonishment of the Federalist leadership,
the wooden building controversy so vividly illuminated
Federalism 's aristocratic intentions that the party had, in
fact, suffered serious desertions as Boston mechanics and
laborers broke for the Middling Interest. Even worse,
Boston Republicans had been first to rally around the issue
and were swelling the insurgency's ranks. Finding itself
on the defensive, the central committee was forced to
acquiesce on the wooden building question. In an attempt
to preserve Otis' s mayoral prospects and salvage Boston
Federalism from the menace of popular insurgency, the
Federalist leadership reversed its position. As he had
done in the past, Harrison Gray Otis managed damage-control
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from Washington. "From the signs of the times," he wrote
Sullivan on March 21, »l infer that if you mean to prevent
the triumph of the revolutionary movement manifested in the
new city, you ought to let the advocates for wooden
buildings or the Roulstone party or who ever they are,
understand that your opposition will be withdrawn....! go
upon the supposition that the wooden project cannot be
resisted for any length of time: and as in the case of
other popular hallucinations, the mischief must be yielded
to, or others will follow the train." Concluding that the
insurgency must be halted or "the Devil will break loose,"
Otis arranged for Boston's leading Federalists to publicly
support the "tenfooter's" agenda in the upcoming Federalist
caucus. He believed such a preemptive strike would
effectively absorb the political potency of Boston's recent
third party activism. By coopting the insurgency's most
dynamic issue, the Middling Interest would be crushed while
the vitality the third party had garnered by pressing the
wooden building issue could be exploited to reinvigorate
Federalism among the Boston masses. 37
Initially Otis's strategy seemed to work. During the
March Federalist caucuses for the state senate, loyal Otis-
Federalists who recently switched their position on wooden
buildings, gained their party's nomination with little
opposition. Yet, Otis's cunning did not go unnoticed by
Joseph T. Buckingham who saw through Federalist strategy:
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"We had hoped,' Buckingham observed in the Galaxy, "that
the good sense of the mechanics would have triumphed over
the shallow schemes of those who pretend to be their
friends, when, at heart, they are the most thorough-going
aristocrats in the town. We did hope that the wholesale
dealers in soft-soap
,
who harangued the people at the late
caucus, and daubed the middling interest an inch thick with
that slippery commodity; and those who acknowledged their
sudden conversion to the expediency of the city charter,
(when they found it getting into popular favor) would
receive from the mechanics the neglect to which their
unstable, vacillating, toad-eating policy so eminently
entitles them. We still hope that those, who are in favour
of wooden buildings, have not pledged themselves to support
the election of these men, beyond the power of
reconsideration. Anything is better than a weathercock
senator—who signs petitions one day and remonstrances the
next—who, to gain a vote, will undergo a miraculous
conversion, to the will of the people—and who wheedles
with the oily tongue of a republican, though every drop of
blood in his veins curdles at the approach of anything that
is mechanical . " 38
By the end of March, insurgent leaders seemed to have
reached the same conclusion as Buckingham. In a "large and
respectable meeting" held at the Warren Hotel in Boston,
two veterans of the wooden building reform movement,
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Michael Roulstone and William W. Blake, presided over the
Middling interest's first formal caucus.- it was from
this meeting that the Middling Interest first developed a
skeletal program that, in the months to come, would evolve
into a highly articulate, refined and popular manifesto
capable of providing an alternative to Federalism.
The insurgents adopted three primary resolutions. m
keeping with its anti-aristocratic foundations, the
Middling Interest attacked. the central committee, resolving
that "no man nor corporation or association of men are
better than the community in deciding leadership in
Boston." Then, squarely confronting the deferential nature
of Boston's existing political culture, the insurgents
decreed that "all men... are in danger of being led by party
names to act contrary to their true interests" and that
this practice must stop. Finally, the caucus challenged
the Federalist nominees for state senate with its own
nominees. Six office seekers came from both Federalist and
Republican ranks, yet what each held in common was a deep
distrust of the central committee. Heading the insurgent's
list was Josiah Quincy's first cousin, fellow Federalist
dissident and loyal friend, John Phillips. 40
The galaxy heralded the alternative caucus as a
important triumph over "the nomination by the [Federalist]
Grand Caucus, in which every puppet moves as the grand
council of dictators pulls the wires." The Middling
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Interest's nominations, Buckingham explained were, »[a]ll
of them[,]...men in whom the mechanics and Middling
interest men have confidence.'- Although the third party
slate threatened Federalism, the insurgency could not
muster enough support for its senatorial candidates. The
roots of past deferential behavior, though weakened,
remained deep. Despite having amassed notable support, the
Middling Interestmen lost to the Federalist slate. 42
To some extent, the third party's loss was to be
expected. Since the beginning of March, the Middling
Interest primarily focused its efforts on Boston's first
mayoral race. More than any one issue, the insurgent
struggle for ward voting during the chartering controversy
distilled and largely shaped popular, anti-aristocratic
dissidence into a compelling, deviant political force
within Boston-proper, but had inspired little activism
beyond Suffolk county. Although anger over state laws
concerning debt imprisonment and militia laws fueled
populist discord within the town, little could be done to
reform these laws on the local level. Against significant
opposition, the town had successfully forced ward voting
through the General Court, demonstrating that the state
could be moved toward limited reform, if only on the local
municipal level. By mid-March and under siege, the State
House seemed to be warming-up to the idea of significantly
reforming the city's fire laws, but, again, this only
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touched within the parameters of Boston. To achieve
sweeping statewide reform, without an established political
organization and a sophisticated network throughout
Massachusetts, would be impossible. At best, the
insurgency could and did exploit these state issues and,
more importantly, Bostonian's anger over them, to solidify
a local coalition of interests; but to actually change
state policy with the limited authority given to municipal
Boston, was as unrealistic as Josiah Quincy becoming
governor. Also, the initial leadership for the movement
stemmed not from the state, but the local level. Michael
Roulstone and William Blake had little influence or
experience in state politics. Their concerns were
predominately municipal in nature, and as such, they
limited their ambitions to winning the mayoralty. 43
Others in the Middling Interest held more inspired
goals. Francis Wayland arrived in Boston in August, 1821 to
head one of only three Baptist churches in the city—the
North End's First Baptist. As cleric to one of Boston's
poorest wards, Wayland rose to a leadership position within
the Middling Interest party in less than a year after his
arrival to Boston. Wayland 's activist proclamations
expanded the insurgency's ideological foundations by
illuminating what he believed was the inseparable
relationship between Christian theological doctrine and
American citizenship. Christian duty and democratic
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citizenship held tangible social responsibilities that were
inseparable and required devout citizen-stewards to
organize and act against crimes to democratic principles.
The result was a doctrine that justified Middling Interest-
style democratic and social reform by blending it with
Christian doctrine. 11
[ I ] f the church is faithful to
herself, and faithful to her God," Wayland preached, "what
are now called the lower classes of society will cease to
exist [The] middling and lower classes of society
understand the nature of liberal institutions, and those
who are groaning under the weight of civil and religious
oppression. The question at issue is, whether a nation
shall be governed by men of its choice, or by men whose
only title to rule is derived from hereditary descent." As
Wayland revealed to his North End, working class
parishioners, "[w]hatever we would do for our country, must
be done for THE PEOPLE. ..[ for ] the people are not only the
real but also the acknowledged fountain of all
authority
.
"
u in Boston outsider, Francis Wayland, the
Middling Interest found a dynamic, intelligent and
independent voice that offered ordinary people the self-
determination to confront and abandon their traditional
deferential voting behavior. The health of American
democracy, Wayland pronounced, depended on an independent
electorate freely voting its conscience unencumbered; not
one entangled in a web of class spun by an economic elite.
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As a political leader Wayland could be trusted. He
had come from a poor mechanic's family and had pulled
himself up by his own initiative. He was born in New York
city and raised within a staunchly Republican working class
family. As a tanner and an itinerant Baptist preacher,
Francis's father fell in and out of debt. During the War
of 1812, the family went bankrupt. At age twenty, Francis
was accepted to Andover Seminary as a "charity case," and
was the school's only Baptist student. After graduating
from Andover, he wanted to continue his education at
Princeton, but because he could not afford tuition, was
forced to serve as a tutor at Union college to make ends
meet. In 1821, he secured the Boston parish at the age of
twenty-five. 45
When Wayland arrived in Boston he was poor and the
parish he shepherded was even poorer. Indeed, the North
End of the early 182 0s was second only to Boston's West End
for its number of brothels and dance halls. The town's
most famous whorehouse, the "Beehive" stood only blocks
from Wayland 's church. The neighborhood also housed a
large proportion of Boston's mechanics, small shopkeepers,
laborers, and artisans many of whom worshipped at the First
Baptist. As with Boston's lower-to-middling class of all
denominations during the early 1820s, Wayland 's
parishioners struggled during the depression. The young
Baptist preacher soon became renowned for helping people
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struggling with debt. Plying his powers of persuasion to
get credit extended or dispensing what little discretionary
funds were available to him, Wayland aided northenders
threatened with debt imprisonment. His popularity grew
within months of his arrival in Boston and those who
followed him became known as "Waylandites . «
"Waylandites"
were mostly young men who proved as politically defiant and
zealous as Wayland. Following Wayland 's teachings, they
maintained that religiously defined aspects of social
justice should direct secular social policy. "Waylandites"
composed the core cell within the Middling Interest, while
Wayland himself emerged as the insurgency's most
charismatic leader. 46
Embracing the Middling Interest, Wayland distinguished
himself from other insurgent leaders like Roulstone and
Blake by carefully assembling a sophisticated three pronged
political program that appealed to a beleaguered, working
electorate that felt unfairly exploited by what it viewed
as an uncaring and self-serving aristocracy. First,
Wayland passionately believed Christian duty demanded
popular democracy. Without a government by the people,
human progress could not evolve. According to Wayland, if
the rich and wellborn continued to control the government,
the democratic promise of universal freedom could never be
reached. The future of the country "lay in the hands of
•the middling class of citizens, that portion of men who
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unite intelligence with muscular strength-the farmer, the
mechanics,'" and not the wealthy, the connected or the
gentrified. In this sense, Wayland was a democratic
idealist who strongly believed that the voice of the people
echoed the voice of God. Secondly, Wayland attacked both
the Federalist and Republican parties, claiming that
neither represented the true interests of their
constituencies and served only the needs and desires of
party officials. 47 As he wrote to his friend, Mark Tucker,
»[t]he longer I look and think, the more I am convinced
that I am right. I will not be... the subject of a party ." 48
By distinguishing the Middling Interest from both
established parties, Wayland's anti-partyism allowed the
nonpartisan insurgency to draw membership from both
Republican and Federalist rolls. And finally, like his
insurgent colleagues, Wayland guickly came to dispise what
he identified and distinguished from the rank-and-file as
Boston's oppressive Federalist aristocracy.
While Joseph T. Buckingham persistently utilized the
Galaxy to expose the impact of Federalist elitism on the
ordinary citizens of Boston and the state, and consistently
demanded specific reforms, Wayland simultaneously attacked
the corrupting influence of the two party system on the
human soul. "The spirit of party," he reminisced in 1826,
"pervaded all ranks of society, and mingled its bitter
waters with all the relations of civil and domestic
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life.... [it] infused its hateful influence into the
services and devotions of the sanctuary of God.... The
salvation of the soul itself seems unimportant, in
comparison with the all absorbing question, which of these
two political parties should be uppermost." 49 Although
publicly Wayland assaulted both parties equally, privately
he confessed his rhetoric was designed to tear down
Federalism. 50
Orthodox Federalists throughout Massachusetts balked
at the insurgency's public pronouncements. Recent Harvard
graduate and loyal Otis partisan, Ralph Waldo Emerson
clearly illustrated his contempt for the insurgency.
Writing to John Boynton Hill in March 1822, Emerson
explained that the third party was "a band of murmurers
. . .
a
parcel of demagogues, ambitious.
.. of being known, [and]
hoping for places as partisans which they could not achieve
as citizens." 51 The Federalist Central Committee viewed
Wayland 's party and his diatribes in a similar light. How
else could Federalism' s leadership interpret such
threatening statements being issued from the North End
like: "the great changes in a nation must always be
commenced [by] the common people?" or "[t]he question at
issue is, whether a nation shall be governed by men of its
choice, or by men whose only title to rule is... from
hereditary descent." 52 Wayland even went after the newly
revised state constitution, stating that it was "utterly
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worthless" because it was not "written on the hearts of a
people.- with Wayland's vital contributions to Middling
interest doctrine, Federalism faced an energized political
force inspired by moral righteousness.
By the winter of 1822, the disparate and often
fragmented voices of Boston discontent found a viable home
in the Middling Interest party. Armed with a litany of
meaningful state and municipal issues, a sympathetic organ,
the New Enql^nd Oal ayy , from which to disseminate party
ideology and positions, a leadership that held a distinctly
democratic doctrine zealously fortified by Christian
principles, and a disgruntled electorate eager for reform,
the Middling Interest party in Boston had rapidly developed
into a mature, viable alternative to Federalism. in March,
the insurgency leadership began searching for a suitable
candidate to pit against the "aristocracy's" chieftain,
Harrison Gray Otis.
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CHAPTER VI
THE MAYORAL ELECTION OF 1822 AND
THE TRIUMPH OF THE MIDDLING INTEREST
"The wheels of revolution are in motion."
—Joseph T. Buckingham, 1822.
"The magic of the many which sets the world on fire."
—Harrison Gray Otis, 1822.
By late spring 1822, a broad and fractious coalition
came together under the Middling Interest's reformist
banner. "Ten footers" united with frustrated debtors and
angry militia men. Ward voting advocates and tax reformers
joined-in as well. Boston's dissenting electorate
concluded that neither the Federalist leadership, nor the
ineffectual Republicans could or would satisfy its demands
for reform. Thus, it looked elsewhere. Possessing a new
political awareness, ordinary Bostonians moved beyond past
partisan rancor and embraced the insurgent vision put forth
by Francis Wayland and other Middling Interest spokesmen.
The depression of 1819 initiated a charged atmosphere
of social and economic reform that gave rise to political
unrest in Boston. As the reverberations of the depression
spread throughout the city, popular resistance to the
political status guo erupted. Under the weight of
depression, required militia service no longer seemed an
act of patriotism, but an oppressive tax. Imprisonment for
debt seemed excessive when so many Bostonians were
unemployed, or working harder than before on ly to avoid the
debtors' gaol. Boston's fire laws no longer seemed
practical when they helped maintain high rents and stifled
the "small man's" prospects of ever owning a modest home to
insure a secure retirement. Small property owners
condemned a tax code that taxed thrice-over for no other
reason it seemed than to fill the pockets of unscrupulous
judges
.
Even the 1780 state constitution seemed stale and in
need of change due to a myriad of new developments within
the state and the people's consistent calls for reform.
Adding to popular frustrations, once a constitutional
convention met, the reformists were swiftly silenced.
Slick lawyers and unscrupulous judges had rigged the
convention before it had even convened to quell reformist
impulses within the state. On the local level, Boston's
voting majority no longer revered the small band of
Federalists elites who controlled Boston's traditional town
meeting system of governance. Instead, the majority
demanded a representational system where all could vote in
the privacy and security of one's own neighborhood, far
from the prying employer's or client's eyes.
These were the issues and battles—both won and lost
—
that helped bind the Middling Interest coalition together
in 1822. The single most resonate chord among the variety
of interests within the coalition was a unifying and
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impassioned hatred toward a common enemy-the Massachusetts
Federalist Central Committee. For many Bostonians, the
Federalist leadership of Harrison Gray Otis, Thomas H.
Perkins, William Sullivan and their lackeys-those "purse-
proud devils," as Joseph T. Buckingham called them-no
longer were viewed with deference, but, instead, outward
contempt. 1 The adherents of the Middling Interest viewed
this leadership as having betrayed the people's trust.
From the central committee's stubborn defense of the
militia system to its hidden role in blocking any
significant constitutional reforms in 1820-1821; from its
stand against ward voting to its neglect of the debtors'
plight, the central committee faced an increasingly hostile
citizenry. Voters began to detect a pattern in the central
committee's actions. To Boston's insurgents and their
followers, the Federalist establishment rigidly guashed any
popular challenges to the deference it had for so long
enjoyed.
The anti-deferential stance toward Boston's
traditional economic, social and political establishment
(as represented by the central committee) led to a class
confrontation in Boston. This political and cultural
rebellion challenged the patterns of dominance
traditionally exhibited by the established Federalist
elite. Specifically, the insurgency exposed the central
ittee for what it had become: a prejudicial, closedcomm
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fraternity that promoted and perpetuated, through political
manipulation, its own power and class interests. At the
same time, the central committee continued to claim a
disinterested and paternal devotion to all the people
within Commonwealth.
With the committee's cynical responses to popular
demands for reform between 1819-1822, many disgruntled
Bostonians became skeptical of the "honorable- intentions,
if not the very honor of Federalism's leadership. The
deference ordinary Bostonians once voluntarily bestowed
upon leaders like Harrison Gray Otis and William Sullivan
turned sour in the wake of depression. With the Boston
elite's paternal intent under fire, a political and
cultural mutiny arose among the city's rank-and-file
electorate
.
Like 1814, Bostonians in 1819 endured a depression.
But, in 1814, the Federalist establishment's prompt
political and economic response had attended to the needs
of the public. This was not the case in 1819 and ordinary
Bostonians took matters into their own hands calling for a
variety of political reforms to ease spiraling economic
hardships. Elite leadership replied to such grass-roots
activism with obdurate resistance and an insensitive
attitude of upper-class superiority. Drawing support from
both Republican and Federalist ranks, the result was the
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formation of an aggressive, coalitional insurgency, unified
in its common resentment toward the upper class's behavior.
For the central committee and the interests and class
it served, the development of such a dissident political
body held profound implications for its dominance of
Boston, if not the state. For Boston's "commoners" to so
overtly defy the will of their "betters" demonstrated the
fragility of elite-class political and cultural hegemony in
Boston. in this sense, Harrison Gray Otis's fearful
characterization of the Middling Interest as a
"revolutionary movement" was not without foundation. 2
In the Spring of 1822, the insurgency formally
introduced its populistic manifesto, reinforcing Harrison
Gray Otis' fears. in a widely distributed pamphlet, the
Middling Interest declared, "[w]e claim from our
Constitutional agents deferens to the known will of the
majority." m a thinly veiled condemnation of the central
committee, An Exposi tion of the Princip l es and views of the
Middling Interest announced, "we deprecate the secret
influence of a FEW" who ignored the authority of the
majority. Focusing its outrage on the central committee's
recent political intrigue in blocking various Boston
reforms, the Middling Interest claimed that the people
"have been denied in measures. They have been utterly
disregarded by those, whom the people of Boston elected
into the last Legislature .... Our senators and
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representatives not only opposed the wishes of their
constituents, but joined in the votes which in one instance
defeated the purpose of a large majority of the town.
.. .We
allude to the petition for wooden buildings, and the
provision in the city charter, for election of state and
United States officers in wards." Ward voting, the
Middling Interest explained, was essential because
-the
majority are, and of right ought to be, sovereign; and that
there is not, nor can be danger intrusting to the majority,
when every voter in the Commonwealth is left free to form,
[to] express and act upon his own opinion of men and
measures." Holding that the majority "were treated with
contempt," the Exposition assailed those class interests
that the "FEW" represented and the specific business
ventures which had helped make Otis, Perkins and Sullivan
wealthy and prominent men in Boston: "We hold it
preposterous to admit that a high prize in a lottery, or a
successful speculation in l^nd or merchandize, confers
knowledge and understanding, and still more admit that any
man can or ought to have influence on any other
qualification than the soundness of his judgement, the
fairness of his mind, and his ability to be useful." 3
Adding a touch of anti-partyism into the Middling
Interest platform, the Exposition stated that insurgents
"pledge [d] themselves to nothing but the suppression of
party spirit, and the violence and overbearing domination
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of those, who seek power for the gratification of
possessing it, and use the influence it gives, to control
freedom of opinion and independence of suffrage."
Addressing the hyper-critical and obviously threatened
Federalist press, the pamphlet concluded, »[i ]t has been
sneeringly said, that the Middling Interest is an array of
the POOR against the RICH. On the contrary, the Middling
interest are as ready to admit the just influence of the
rich as the few, who affect to enroll all of them in their
ranks,
... [yet] we know many rich men who have not a
particle of political influence." These men, according to
the Expos i tion
,
would be welcomed into the insurgency. 4
If anyone in Massachusetts politics seemed to have
"not a particle of political influence," and had rebuffed
"enroll [ment]" into the "ranks" of the "FEW," it was Josiah
Quincy. After twenty-years in politics and at the age of
fifty, Quincy «s professional life seemed a profile in
political decline. in just nine years, he had fallen from
prominence as a nationally known figure in the U.S.
Congress to a inconsequential municipal judge. Indeed,
Harrison Gray Otis, in January 1822, had written Quincy off
as a tired, political has-been. Having fallen out of favor
in the central committee, Quincy found a renegade urban
constituency ready to welcome him. In his role as a
municipal judge, Quincy first courted and then captivated
this dissenting element in Boston's political landscape.
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The man on the outs with the central committee, was now the
champion of the Middling Interest.
While "trying his hand
. . . amoung whores and rogues," as
Otis disparagingly characterized Quincy's departure from
the State House to the municipal court, the new justice
promptly distinguished himself as an activist committed to
reforming what he charged were obstacles to the "just
distribution and wise execution of the principles of
justice." 5 Quincy understood the enmity the populace felt
toward the judiciary. As a judge he would use this
animosity for his own purposes. Beginning with popular
frustration over judicial exemptions from militia service,
and extending to countless charges of judicial corruption,
judges of all stripes bore vigorous popular onslaughts to
their character. Since the depression's beginning, judges
were attacked for their excessively high salaries. Their
attempt in Boston to maintain their taxing powers by
preserving the Court of Sessions had raised the ire of most
Bostonians. "The truth is," wrote Joseph Story to his
fellow judge Jeremiah Mason in January 1822, "the Judiciary
in our country is... open to attack from all quarters its
only support is the wise and the good and the elevated in
society." 6 It was just this segment of society that the
Middling Interest had declared war on. As a judge,
Quincy's quickly differentiated himself from the rest who
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were routinely perceived as unscrupulous and money-
grubbing. 7
Within two months of his appointment and with an eye
towards gaining the "mass of the community's" support,
Judge Quincy launched a two-pronged attack on the same
judicial system he had so recently joined. First, he
criticized the practice of judicial sentencing. Because
Boston maintained only one jail, all convicted of a crime
within the municipality, no matter the severity, were
confined to the Leverett Street Jail. There was little, if
any, segregation of inmates. Women, children and men—the
violent, the deviant, and the disturbed—all who were
convicted, ended up on Leverett Street; violent criminals
freely co-mingled with debtor's and poverty-strickened
children guilty of petty theft. Such integration outraged
Quincy, for, as he stated before the Suffolk County grand
jury, within a month of Boston's first mayoral contest,
"society itself does little else [under such a system] than
plot the ruin of every juvenile offender, and every novice
in crime, when it provides no other alternative for
punishment, than confinement in gaol." "Why should not,"
Quincy asked, "a power be invested in the judges," to
separate criminals on the basis of "age, or sex, or degree
of offense?" 8 Joseph Buckingham's New England Galaxy
concluded that by "degree of offense," Judge Quincy was
referring to debtors and their imprisonment. Having
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consistently criticized the malady of debtor's, the C^xy.
heralded Quincy as "entertaining such rational and
philanthropic views... [as] to produce a reformation- in
judicial sentencing. The ho^J^R^r^r
, a non-partisan
Congregationalist magazine, praised Quincy's charge
asserting, "we have long felt, doubtless in common with the
mass of our fellow citizens, that there are great defects
either in the laws themselves or in their execution." 9
Quincy's second salvo revitalized long-standing
popular grievances stemming back to the Constitutional
Convention that accused the judiciary with inefficiency and
corruption. In his March directive, Quincy denounced his
judicial brethren for making "gain from their [the
people's] vices: as making profit by their [the people's]
passions; and as interested to enhance their [the people's]
losses and miseries, by multiplying, or lengthening out
their [the people's] controversies [trials]," while
steadily accumulating excessively high court fees. Echoing
complaints first issued by reformers during the 1820-1821
Convention, Quincy charged the judiciary with serving its
own selfish interests at the tax payer's expense. After
scolding his fellow judges for their blatant economic
opportunism, if not out-right corruption, Quincy declared,
"everywhere the robe of justice should be spotless," for it
was the poor who suffered most under a fraudulent
judiciary. 10
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Quincy's widely publicized demands for judicial reform
undeniably added to his popularity. As Boston
editorialist,
"LABEO," commented, Judge Quincy »enlarge[d
his argument before the grand jury] with much force and
eloquence upon the manner in which justice is administered
to the lower classes of society by the inferior judicial
tribunals. And he very properly adverts to that disgrace of
the Statute Book, the act by which the compensation of
Justices is made to depend upon the number of cases they
decide; an act that gives them direct interest in the
stirring up of petty suits, and embroiling the whole mass
of society." This same criticism of the judiciary's
compensation had been raised by Stephen Codman in Town
Meeting one year earlier. 11
As the Codman committee reported to the town,
$1,366.45 was paid "to one Justice between February and
October," while, that same year, three more had divided the
tidy sum of $3,100.63 between themselves. 12 Justice Joseph
Story estimated the average salary of a state judge stood
at $2,400, not including fees rendered in court. 13 When
the average wage of a common laborer rested at 80 cents a
day, a carpenter at 89 cents a day, a printer at $1.22 at
day, and a blacksmith at under $1 a day, the justices'
s
base salaries of $7 a day (not including their fees) seemed
excessive. 14 Considering that in 1822, a gallon of
Jamaican rum cost $1.25 a gallon, a cord of wood went for
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$3.86, and a gallon of lamp oil sold for $l, the high cost
for life's most basic necessities combined with their
modest incomes placed great financial burdens on the
average working Bostonian. 15 Popular resentment toward the
judicial branch's lucrative earnings remained high in 1822
and probably grew as the lingering of depression undermined
the average Bostonians's ability to pay off debts, rents,
and taxes. Once in the court system, the common debtor all
too often watched as lawyers, judges, and plaintiffs walked
away with his hard-earned money, leaving him deeper in debt
and facing jail-time. 16
Certainly, concerns over debt imprisonment weighed
heavily on the minds of many Bostonians who would vote in
the April mayoral election. The call for the law's
abolition was as vigorous and incendiary as ever. In the
spring of 1822, Middling Interest spokesmen seized the
issue stressing it as an essential component in the
upcoming mayoral contest. Days before the mayoral
election, the Galaxy, now fully committed to the
insurgency, joined the outcry against the law. " [l]t is
much to be deplored," wrote Joseph T. Buckingham, "that
some kind of law cannot be made to give relief to a very
numerous and very respectable class of people" who, in
unprecedented numbers, were being sent to prison for
indebtedness. " [A] bolishing imprisonment for debt... is
demanded on every principle of justice and humanity." 17
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Other insurgent partisans concentrated their wrath on the
hypocrisy that Josiah Quincy had identified in judicial
sentencing. As Middling Interest spokesman William Emmons
asked, "how long shall we inflict a cruel, unholy, and
unconstitutional punishment on the unfortunate of our land,
while we treat the felon with less severity than we now
treat poor unfortunate Debtors!" 18
Although Quincy had not directly championed the
debtor's movement, his condemnation of sentencing
"respectable" offenders to the same "gaol" as "vicious"
criminals, combined with his assault on the integrity of
the bench, earned him the support of the debtor's wing of
the Middling Interest. This support only intensified when,
one month before the election, he proposed a solution for
minor crime such as debt delinquency which he claimed
society was responsible for: How "strange" it was, Quincy
declared "to prosecute and punish crime,
... [when] there is
little... in our public institutions of the character of
prevention." 19 According to Quincy, crime—though endemic
to humankind—could be curbed if all of society faced
itself and took responsibility for its uglier sides.
Quincy believed in the organic nature of community.
Therefore, to stop crime, all citizens held a moral
obligation to work towards its prevention through social
reform. 20
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Quincy's successful promotion in Town Meeting for the
House of Industry in 1821 was predicated upon such
conviction. It was the duty of the organic whole to
distinguish between the "vicious" and the "virtuous"
poor. 1 Both could be reformed, Quincy believed, but each
required dramatically different types of disciplinary
instruction. In 1821, despite criticisms leveled upon the
exorbitant cost of the House of Industry, Quincy argued
that segregation of the "vicious" and the "virtuous" was
the "moral duty... in a republican form of
government,
.. .connected intimately with the very principle,
on which its preservation depends. In such a form of
government, the great object of attention is the character
and condition of the mass of the community. What ever tends
to contaminate, to corrupt, or to demoralize the mass, has
a direct effect, not only on the happiness and prosperity
of the state, but also its safety; on the security of
property, of life, and of liberty; all of which
are. . .directly dependent upon the moral character and
condition of the people ....[ This responsibility] cannot be
tested by any narrow scale of pecuniary expense and
saving." As a municipal court judge, this philosophy
informed Quincy's decisions in sentencing criminals he
faced in his courtroom.
Faced with what he viewed as an unreasonable dilemma
of having to sentence both debtors and murders to the same
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prison, Judge Quincy distinguished himself from his judical
brethren by publicly lashing out at the prison system.
According to Quincy, the "moral character and condition of
the people"-the very foundation of "a republican form of
government"—depended upon the benevolent role of an
activist state which held the power and duty to prevent the
demoralization of the masses which would lead to social
chaos. such an essential obligation of the government
outweighed any private concerns over the cost or expense
because both social order and democracy hinged on "the
character and condition of the mass of the community." The
mixing of the "virtuous" debtor with the "vicious" criminal
amounted to a dangerous betrayal by the state to the
people. Such integration, according to Quincy, would
naturally lead to the contamination and corruption of
society. Remaining true to his convictions, Judge Quincy
served uncharacteristically light sentences to those whose
only crime was their proverty. 23 Furthermore, Quincy"
s
March pronouncement on the judicial system adequately
distanced the potential mayoral candidate from the
entrenched judicial establishment, helping him forge an
independent course from which to run for mayor.
When, in the spring of 1822, the Middling Interest
deliberated on a viable candidate to stand against Harrison
Gray Otis and the central committee, Josiah Quincy seemed a
exemplary prospect. First, he desired the position.
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Secondly, Quincy had a long political association with some
of the insurgent leadership going back to his involvement
in the Washington Benevolent Society. One of the Middling
Interest's founders, Michael Roulstone had served on the
same 1812 Standing Committee that had asked Quincy to join
the WBS and function as its first vice president. Also,
while in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, Quincy
earned the Republican minority's respect, especially from
those representatives from Boston who had become recent
converts to the insurgency like Rev. Francis Wayland's
deacon, representative of Boston's Ward 1, Heman Lincoln.
Lincoln had been a loyal Republican before shifting to the
Middling Interest cause and, like Wayland, advocated a
Quincy mayoralty. 24
Middling Interestmen who had stood against city
chartering, like Joseph T. Buckingham, a dissident
Federalist, and William Emmons, a converted Republican,
supported Quincy as well. This faction within the Middling
Interest remained leery of the charter due to the excessive
authority over the city section 30 surrendered to the
General Court. 25 Accurately regarding section 3 0 as a
Federalist Central Committee ploy to control its interests
in Boston, the anti-charter bloc still viewed the charter
with great suspicion. Because Quincy shared precisely the
same misgivings, this wing of the insurgency believed if
anyone could be trusted as mayor, it was Quincy. As
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Buckingham explained, "Mr. Quincy 's opposition to the
charter may, with some persons, be a objection to his
eligibility to the Mayoralty. We think otherwise. He
opposed it because he saw.
. .mischief in the section which
gives the legislature unrestrained power over the charter.
He is... still of the same opinion; and... will be still on
the watch to see that we are not made the foot-ball of a
foolish legislature, and [he will] be ready to repeal the
danger when it approaches." Emmons agreed. Also, it was
remembered that in one of his last acts as Speaker of the
House, Quincy had endorsed the original bill to reform
Boston's restrictive fire laws. Although the Federalist
legislature overwhelmingly struck down the reform bill,
Quincy had supported the Middling Interest's most
publicized policy stand against the "haughy lordlingfs] and
princely nabobs." The prominence of the wooden building
issue in the insurgency's laundry list of policy reforms
held egual value as ward voting in defining the movement.
It was a reform that would have a consequential impact on
hundreds of carpenters, renters, and ascendent
entrepreneurs
.
26
Although Quincy 's position on the divisive issue of
the militia laws remained ambiguous, his speech before the
Massachusetts Peace Society in late December 1820 attacking
"military fanaticism which was pervading the country,"
indicated Quincy 's sympathy toward militia reform. Quincy
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believed war resulted from the two-pronged evil of an
unreformed society where poverty and entrenched military
establishments necessitated war. Why would the poor choose
peace over battle when they
-go... to war beggars, [and]
return from it nabobs," their pockets filled with
"plunder," Quincy asked. with the maintenance of organized
military establishments, "fighting and killing one
another," Quincy argued, "is, no longer... a matter of
blood, but a matter of business." Though he did not
directly vilify the militia laws, clearly he viewed them as
barriers towards "improving [the] moral and intellectual
condition of mankind," which, according to Quincy, was the
only course society could take to achieve peacefulness
.
27
In many ways, the connection Quincy had made between
poverty, military organizations and creating a peaceful
society, harmonized well with the anti-militia movement's
message. The movement had never been based on pacifistic
principles, but, instead, on the growing economic
insecurities of ordinary militiamen who regarded mandatory
service as yet another oppressive tax being heaped upon
them by the elite to protect the monied interests. Forced
militia service drove them into poverty. Thus, the
movement's rhetoric emphasized class inequity within the
unreformed militia laws. As with the debt reformers, after
the militiamen's petitions to the legislature were ignored
or voted down and their voices in the constitutional
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convention silenced, they rejected past partisan loyalty
and united with the Middling Interest. 28 Like the tax
reformers, the debtors, and the "tenfooters , » the
militiamen searched for a candidate who hated the
manipulations and political intrigue so often employed by
the central committee. in Josiah Quincy they found their
man.
indeed, as early as April 1821, Quincy had accepted
his ostracism from the committee and began publicly
distancing himself from the Federalist establishment as a
whole. His speech chastising the committee for "turning
[him] overboard [in the state senate] and making sharks'
meat of [him]," clearly was a well-timed jab at the party
leadership meant to help redefine his political image. 29 A
year later, with his independent stand as a municipal
judge, Quincy had completed his own personal process of
political transformation. To the delight of Middling
Interestmen, not only did Quincy seem perfectly content
with his ostracism from the central committee, but he
seemed happy with it. Freed from the central committee,
Quincy thrived, putting forth his own reformist vision that
served as a distinct political alternative for dissident
factions in Boston's electorate.
In early March 1822, according to Eliza Quincy, "a
number of Citizens ... sent a Committee to his [Quincy's]
house in Hamilton Place, headed by a Master Carpenter to
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ask him [Quincy] to stand [as] their candidate for the
Mayoralty." Because of Quincy. s highly publicized
opposition to the Boston city charter he hesitated at the
request stating "it would be like choosing Guy Faulkes
[sic] for mayor, for he had done all he could to blow up
the city." Nevertheless, now that the governor's office
seemed beyond his grasp, Quincy undertook a personal
campaign to reposition himself in his race against Otis for
the mayoralty. Despite his false modesty, Quincy
immediately accepted the delegation's offer to lead the
insurgency. 30
Having found a candidate, Middling Interest
strategists formed a scheme to capture the mayoralty. The
insurgents planned to raise a floor fight at the Federalist
nominating caucus and thus, displace the central
committee's candidate, Otis, with Quincy. On April 4, the
caucus met at the Boston Exchange Coffee House. William
Sullivan served as both caucus moderator and Otis's
emissary. Many men were nominated for Mayor, but after a
number of ballots were taken, the contest came down to
Quincy and Otis. The Middling Interest strategy seemed to
be working. However, in the final balloting, moderator
Sullivan insured that Otis received the majority by
allowing some Otis supporter's to cast their votes after
the balloting had officially ended. Holding only five more
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votes than Quincy, Otis was declared the Federalist mayoral
candidate. 31
Middling Interest delegates immediately rejected the
decision charging that the caucus had been rigged. The
insurgent delegates, according to the Boston press,
"contended] that persons [Otis supporters] had been
permitted to mark after the vote had passed for the closing
of the marking." The insurgency's charges were valid. As
early as January 18th, William Sullivan had guaranteed Otis
the Federalist nomination. He assured the Senator,
"[p] roper measures will be taken [during the caucus]" to
secure the ticket. Indeed, as the Galaxy later exposed,
the caucus had been controlled by "the exclusive and one-
sided policy [of the central committee]." In an attack on
Sullivan, the Galaxy went on to explain that "[t]he
moderator of [the] caucus has convenient ears ; he never
hears the name of an independent man; but he can hear
Whispers from the well known, tried and faithful servants
of the aristocracy, or he can, upon an emergency, take nods
and winks for a nomination." 32 For the insurgent
reformers, the central committee's conduct in caucus
recalled past unscrupulous indiscretions experienced during
the Constitutional Convention and the Town Meeting debates
over the charter.
Even before the caucus, the Middling Interest forces
were at a distinct disadvantage. Sullivan had been hard at
216
work consolidating Otis loyalists. Beginning in March, the
full weight of the Federalist machine had been set in
motion to promote the Otis ticket and crush any other
challengers. On March 19, 1822, the "fanatical" Federalist
editor, as Joseph Buckingham described him, John Russell,
heartily endorsed Otis for mayor in his Boston Evening
The Boston Daily Advertiser, which Buckingham
declared existed solely to "support a monied aristocracy,"
followed suit as did the "irritable in the extreme"
Benjamin Russell, in his Columbian r^ in ^l Not only did
every Federalist organ in Boston predictably sponsor Otis,
but the entire Federalist press in Boston refused to even
acknowledge Quincy as a candidate. Only on election day
did John Russell's Gazette grudgingly recognize the Quincy
candidacy. Though declining to even identify the Middling
Interest nominee by name, Russell, in one short and
dismissive sentence, unequivocally opposed Quincy' s bid for
the mayoralty. As "citizens and federalists," Russell
wrote, "we feel impelled to resist the nomination of this
gentleman. " 33
Only Joseph Buckingham's Galaxy supported Quincy
against the machine. On March 29, the Galaxy formally
endorsed the Middling Interest-Quincy ticket stating,
"[o]ur mayor should be a man who will consider himself the
chief officer of a large and respectable republic—not the
favored child of [the] junto—a man, who, in executing the
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laws, will not know a Tyrian from a Trojan; and who in
nominating candidates for subordinate offices, will be free
from the shackles of favoritism. Such a man is the Hon.
Josiah Quincy....
[ i ]f a course of honest and intemntent
conduct through evil report and good report-if experience
in the deliberative assemblies of state and nation—if
courtesy to political opponents, and the exercise of
gentlemanly deportment to all, whether high or low, ri£h__Qj:
BOOT, are to be of any avail, Mr. Quincy is pre-eminently
entitled to be the first Mayor of the City of Boston" 34
Despite the galaxy endorsement, Quincy and the Middling
Interest still faced overwhelming odds.
What the Middling Interest proposed was a grassroots
challenge to a hostile Federalist leadership that viewed
Otis' s ascendancy to the mayoralty as the first crucial
step in its ultimate goal of placing the committee
chieftain in the governor's mansion. As the Federalists
caucus indicated, the central committee proved willing to
go to extreme lengths to achieve its final objective. In
this sense, the central committee wagered that the bonds of
deference that had maintained the party's rank-and-file in
the past would hold, despite its conniving behavior in the
caucus
.
It was within this context that the Middling Interest
delegates broke with the Federalist caucus on the night of
April 4, 1822. Furious and embittered by the blatant
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scheming of Sullivan and the central committee, the
insurgents stormed out of the Boston Exchange Coffee House
to hold their own independent caucus the next evening in
Justice Quincy's own courtroom. On April 5, the "Middling
Political Interest" caucus unanimously nominated Quincy as
their candidate. Quincy, in turn, heartily accepted the
nomination. 35
"Of course," Eliza Quincy recalled in a somewhat
bridled statement, "the nomination of Mr. Quincy was a
great surprise to [the central committee] .... Boston it was
said had never been thrown into such a state of
excitement." 36 To be more accurate, Quincy's acceptance of
the Middling Interest nomination sent a chilling shiver
throughout the Massachusetts Federalist establishment that
proved to have devastating political, personal and cultural
implications.
Having been notified of Quincy's betrayal just hours
after the Middling Interest caucus disbanded, Thomas H.
Perkins dashed off an agitated letter to Otis who was still
in Washington. "Quincy has thrown himself into the
•Midling or Medling Interest' and has suffered himself to
be put up as Mayor. .. .As I gave him my mind very freely on
the subject, we are of course at Swords points .... [H] e will
have the high gratification of having split up the federal
party.... Wm Sturgis has been his great 'slang wanger, • and
he carries with him the 'ten footers, • and a portion of the
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Democracy [Republicans] which is always the most opposed to
the most conspicuous of the federal party-Webster, Lowell,
Tudor, all the Judges and those whom I know you to feel a
high respect for, are ardent in the expression of the wish
that your name should not be taken from the list.... But for
this most improper conduct of Quincy, the Election of the
Mayor would have been unanimous." 37
From far-away Salem, Federalist chieftain of Essex
county, Leverett Saltonstall frantically wrote to his
Boston friend and fellow Federalist, William Minot, "What
are we coming to—or rather what are you coming to in
Boston? Quincy v. Otis! This is too bad. There must be
something in this business of which we at a distance are
wholly ignorant [T]hat Quincy should swell the triumph
of a wooden building faction—and of a party who have
abused him these past 20 years Is he fascinated,"
Saltonstall asked, "by the miserable vapor
—
popularity. .. .Good Lord deliver us!... There must be
extensive jealousies among you." Explaining to Minot that
the insurgent tide was spreading into his own county, he
wrote, "I found yesterday master Chander deeply infected
—
he thought Otis unfairly nominated—talked of intrigues,
&C....I am glad, I do not live in Boston. It would not do
for my temperament," Saltonstall confessed. 38 Daniel
Webster was no less frantic. The day after the Middling
Interest convention, he anxiously informed Joseph Story of
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the news from Boston: "We are in a deplorable state
here Mr. Q[uincy] has opposed the City from the
beginning! He now wraps himself up in mystery, &
importance—none of his old friends can get [an] aujiiej^
with him-tho I have no doubt a very active communication
exists between him, & a certain other guarter." 39
Clearly, the Federalist hierarchy felt politically
threatened by Quincy's stand. As Leverett Saltonstall,
somewhat hysterically, pronounced on the eve of the
election, "the Federalists are all dead—dead—dead! I hope
the first election of the City of Boston will not portend
its fall." 40 But, as these letters also suggest, the
betrayal affected Federalism 's leadership on a personal
level. For Quincy to have so publicly betrayed the central
committee not only proved a political embarrassment, but it
held profound cultural meaning for men like Otis,
Saltonstall, Perkins, and Sullivan, as well as for those,
like Daniel Webster, who worked so hard for them.
Partisanship, class affiliation and cultural identity
were all tightly wrapped-up together in the minds of these
nineteenth-century elites. To be a Federalist was to
culturally distinguish oneself from others. In a letter to
William Sullivan on January 19, 1822, Harrison Gray Otis'
s
summed up this sentiment when he wrote that one of the
major reasons for his coming home to govern Boston was "to
train the young leaders of my own breed." As one historian
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of Boston explains, "[office holding elevated Brahmins
status [in the first decades of the nineteenth-century]
through the highly visible symbols and rituals of the
political process.... [T ]he Boston political and economic
elites merged and government service advanced class power
as well as class
... honor . » Another explains, to be a
Federalist meant one "was expected to adhere to the Federal
standard and acceptable conservative creed. To renounce
one's [party] was tantamount to admitting a serious
character flaw." Thus, when the Federalist Portsmmn-h
Journal of Literature and Poli tics offered an explanation
to its New Hampshire Federalist readership for the "unhappy
division of parties [that] prevails in Boston," it
concluded Quincy's betrayal must have been motivated by
"personal considerations." 41
Quincy's conversion to the Middling Interest
discredited patrician honor and, by extension, weakened the
class's cultural power that the Federalist establishment
reinforced and championed. His political alliance with
those whom Ralph Waldo Emerson disparaged as "a band of
murmurers.
. . a parcel of demagogues ... [those] hoping for
places as partisans which they could not achieve as
citizens," demonstrated Quincy's political inclusiveness
while also illustrating that he disagreed with Otis's
reliance on the Lancastarian system of governance and the
deference it demanded. In other words, for many ordinary
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Bostonians, Quincy. s actions de-legitimized the structure
of political dominance used by the political and economic
elite of the region. in this sense, Quincy challenged the
legitimacy of elite-class rule by undermining its
manifestations in politics.
Also, this act of political heresy exposed a fissure
within elite-class solidarity. Pierced not by the dreaded
mob of the masses as the Federalist establishment had
always feared, but by one of its own, the Boston
aristocracy was taken by complete surprise. its reaction
to such apostasy was one of disbelief. Indeed, most Otis-
loyalists believed Quincy, at the last minute, would
withdraw from the race, rather than "be made the
instrument of disunion and disorganization of the Federal
party'
"
which would condemn him to the peripheries of
Boston's elite-class society. As Thomas H. Perkins
proclaimed to Otis, "Quincy has done himself up by the
course he has pursued [H]e will have the high
gratification of having soiled up the federal party and if
he succeeds in his object[,] will lose the place to which
he has pretended so much devotion." Let the election "turn
as is may," Perkins explained because there would be
cultural retribution. "[T]here is no doubt," he concluded,
"that Quincy loses, tho he may gain the majority."
Saltonstall was utterly confused when he wrote to William
Minot: "I have had, as you know, a great regard for Mr.
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Quincy, and regret that he should do anything injurious to
himself," but "that he should be willing to disappoint
friends who have stood by him firmly,... is truly
mortifying. " 42
The Middling Interest challenge and Quincy
-s betrayal
shocked loyal Federalists up and down the eastern seaboard.
Philadelphia's leading Federalist organ, the National
Gazette and Literacy. Register , reported on the severity of
Quincy
-s dissidence. "A new division of parties has taken
place in the good city of Boston, which threatens to
destroy the political supremacy of the old 'federalists of
the Boston stamp. «... [The insurgency's] object ...[ is] to
show that they have the power of making a selection. It is
probable that they aim at taking the nomination and choice
of public officers, from the particular circle to which it
is alleged to have been hitherto confined." According to
Daniel Webster, the world seemed upside-down "when [one]
sees Mr. Quincy the very darling of the Boston Democracy!"
Harrison Gray Otis judged Quincy and the insurgent party in
apocalyptic terms. "They cry out, desert your old friends
and leaders & come into our tabernacks! Sir desert your
friends! [It] is the same which since the world began [,]
corruption speaks to weakness and treachery—which
seduction holds to virtue. ... [It] caused sin into the world
and death by sin.... It is the magic of the many which sets
the world on fire." 43
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For his part, Quincy seemed to thoroughly enjoy the
stir he was causing among Boston's Federalist hierarchy.
When Thomas H. Perkins scolded him for leading the Middling
Interest out of the Federalist caucus, Quincy, according to
a shocked Perkins, simply responded with "a formal bow, and
a stately
-good morning,- having totally dismissed him and
his censure. The day before the election, Quincy and his
daughter Eliza were walking down Summer St. after church,
when they observed Harrison Gray Otis • s son, Harry,
"hurrying along." According to Eliza, "Mr. Quincy called
after him saying, 'Where are you going so fast, Otis?"' a
red-faced Harry replied, "'working against you Sir, as hard
as I can."' Quincy laughed and waved him on stating,
"'Very well, only take care you don't work too hard . <» A4
According to Eliza, while "Mr. Otis's partisans were very
angry [with Quincy • s] ... interference, " and Otis's "sons and
sons in law distributed voters" throughout the city in
"every effort" to get the crusty old Senator elected,
Quincy remained very relaxed and satisfied about the
upcoming election results. 45
Not only had Quincy infuriated his old colleagues, as
Webster fumed, by "wrapping himself up in mystery &
importance.
..
[so] none of his old friends c[ould] get [an]
audience with him," but he seemed to be rubbing their noses
in it. Worse, he did not seem to acknowledge or care about
the disruption he was causing. According to Webster, "the
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dirty squabble of local politics," was subverting "her [New
England's] proper character and consequence
.... I feel," he
confessed, "the hand of fate upon us, and to struggle is in
vain. We are doomed to be hewers of wood and drawers of
water.... What has sickened me beyond remedy is the tone and
temper of these disputes. We are disgraced beyond help or
hope." 4 ' Middling Interest founder, Francis Wayland,
viewed the situation quite differently. Writing to his
friend Alonozo Potter, the day of the election, Wayland
optimistically explained, "[i]n all probability there will
be a revolution in politics Boston it is thought will be
democratic shortly, and this will give a strong impulse to
the state[;] this will produce a mighty stir in the
[country] . ""
Realizing that its candidate, George Blake, had little
chance in Boston because the Middling Interest coalition
drew significant support from Republican as well as
Federalist ranks, Republican party strategists took the
only course open to them. They tried to coopt the anti-
aristocratic platform of the insurgency for themselves by
claiming Quincy was a charter-member of the "aristocracy."
Characterizing both Quincy and Otis as elitists brothers,
the Republican press argued, "Upon what American
principles, upon what American feeling can such men be
worthy of the suffrages of American citizens? In the memory
of many a Bostonian such men would not be tolerated in
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Boston. They would, like the Tea, be thrown into the bay,
by a parcel of Indians, or they would be habited in such
suits of domestic manufacture, that their dearest friends
would shrink from their embraces." 48
The glaring problem with this strategy was that
Quincy, since 1820, had established strong connections
within the Republican party. Some of state's most
prominent Republicans, like Levi Lincoln Jr., graciously
had accepted Quincy 's legislative help, friendship and even
his leadership during the Maine statehood debates in the
General Court. Also, Quincy' s involvement in the
Constitutional Convention of 1820-1821, further solidified
his relationships with Republican leaders Lincoln and James
T. Austin. Thus, likening the reformist Quincy to the
chairman of the Massachusetts Federalist Central Committee
seemed totally erroneous and only played into the anti-
partyism of the insurgency. Indeed, the Republican
strategy proved a complete failure. Out of the 1,200
Republicans who voted in the mayoral election, only 157
marked their ballot for Blake. Josiah Quincy stole the
vast majority of the Republican vote, seducing a remarkable
802 Republicans into the insurgent fold. Although the
Republican party had always been ineffective in the Boston,
with the city's first mayoral election, Boston
Republicanism reached a new nadir. 49
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But what loyal Otis Federalists wondered was whether
their party too would meet the same fate. The Middling
interest could bank on 600 firm third party partisans, but
the number of regular Federalists and Republicans persuaded
by insurgent precepts remained unknown. Two days before
the election, Daniel Webster privately offered his gloomy
prediction to Joseph Story, confessing that »[n]othing
seems practicable but to go forward and support Mr. 0[tis]
& probably be beaten." 50 Undoubtedly, the central
committee's behavior at the Federalist caucus had increased
the insurgency's numbers. Other Otis Federalists rejected
Webster's pessimism. Far too much was at stake.
Foreseeing a Middling Interest victory, in a last
minute ploy to insure a third party defeat, the central
committee agreed to throw another candidate's name into the
race. According to Eliza Quincy, because "Mr.
Quincy.
.. [clearly] was ahead," the committee hoped to
fluster and confuse insurgent voters by introducing another
Middling Interestman, Thomas L. Winthrop's name onto the
ballot. As Eliza recalled, "Mr. Winthrop was put up
without his knowledge, to divide the voters & at least
defeat Mr. Quincy." 51 The sabotage succeeded.
Unbeknownst to him, this "other" Middling Interest
candidate, captured a total vote of 361. Ninety-two came
from disaffected Federalists, 90 from Middling Interest
partisans and 179 from converted Republicans. The vast
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majority of Winthrop's votes, presumably, would have gone
to Quincy if the central committee had not added him to the
race. Despite this, Quincy gained the majority, with a
total of 1,736 votes. Remarkably, his strongest support
came from traditional Republican partisans. Without doubt,
Republicans identified Quincy as their candidate. As
mentioned earlier, Quincy earned the lion's share of their
votes, with 802 out of 1,200. Predictably, of the 600
Middling Interest voters, the vast majority of 510 went
with Quincy. if there was any weakness in Quincy 's
popularity it came from the Federalist party. Out of the
1,900 Federalists who went to the polls, only 424 cast
theirs for Quincy. The overwhelming majority of those who
still identified themselves as Federalist in 1822, had
remained loyal to Harrison Gray Otis. Nevertheless, in a
political culture that maintained three parties, that
proved insufficient. Otis only appealed to Federalist
loyalists, garnering 1,384 votes. Not one Republican or
Middling Interestman had cast a vote for the venerable
Senator. The remaining 62 votes went to a scattering of
nominal candidates. 52
Clearly, the extra-legal manipulations and partisan
zealousness of the central committee spoiled any
possibility for the Otis campaign to appeal to either the
Republican or Middling Interest rank-and-file. However,
the central committee had offset the worst. Webster's
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ominous prophecy had been avoided. Winthrop drew just
enough votes from Quincy to deny him a quorum as the
charter required. if the "other" insurgent candidate had
not been brought into the race, Quincy would have received
785 more votes. Armed with a cumulative vote of 2,521,
instead of his 1,736, the Middling Interest and Quincy
would have easily captured the mayor's office. Yet,
because of the election rules and the complicity of the
central committee, the Middling Interest candidate would
not ascend to the chief executive position. 53 Despite the
loss, the insurgency found significant solace in the fact
that it had successfully blocked the "servant of the
aristocracy. 1,54
Thus, after the initial balloting for Boston's first
mayor on April 8, the Middling Interest and the Federalist
Central Committee had reached a stalemate. Each had
stymied the other and both candidates withdrew from the
race. For ordinary Bostonians, the visible difference
between the two parties was clear. One had employed dirty
tricks to check the opponent; in stark contrast, the other
rejected such partisan scheming and adopted an honest
campaign the insurgency had promised—one based on
integrity and the authority of "the people." The contrast
did not go unnoticed by the Boston electorate. In the
second election on April 16, the central committee once
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again would find itself on the defensive, but this time it
would have to acquiesce to the coalition's demands.
In the meantime, Buckingham viciously railed against
the central committee. Outraged at the central committee's
recent clandestine behavior, the Galaxy, three days after
the election, charged that »[i]t is this kind of management
which has produced a divisions in the ranks off federalism,
and sown the seeds of a new party, which, like the fabled
teeth of the giant, will soon spring up and become an army
that will overpower it predecessor. The party is the
middling interest, and comprises the men who are so far
below a state of overgrown wealth, as not to be able [to]
live without labour, and so far above mendicity [sic] as
to be too proud or too honest, to live by trimming and
fawn ing . It has been said that there is no such thing as a
middling interest—that the rich have no interest separate
from that of the labouring and poorer classes. This
assertion is false The rich are in league to put down,
and keep down, the mechanic and the tradesman. They have
trampled upon the worm till it turns, and the mechanic and
the tradesman would deserve still to be trampled to the
dust, if they did not turn, and at least endeavor to curb
these purse-proud devils of their will." 55
The public outcry against the central committee's
"managements" before and during the election proved so
overwhelming and hostile after Quincy dropped out of the
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race that Thomas H. Perkins was forced to deliver an
"explanatory address" to the people of Boston. Perkins's
address only roused them more by insulting the Middling
interest and Quincy. with this address, Perkins, who had
maintained a low profile during the election, sealed his
fate as, in Buckingham's words, one "of the crafty
politicians." "it is not as... easy," Perkins explained,
"to heal party dissensions, as to ferment ... them— let the
responsibility of the latter rest where it ought."
"Amen,"
Buckingham retorted, but "the guestion is," Buckingham
stated, "[w]here ought the responsibility
... rest? Most
undoubtedly on those [in the central committee], who, at
the [Federalist] general caucus, after the marking for
candidates was declared to be closed, persuaded others to
come and mark for their favorite candidate, thus turning
the scale against the candidate [Quincy] who had the
majority of marks." 56 Buckingham then turned his wrath on
the Federalist press which, he reminded his readers, had
not even "deigned to mention that [Quincy] was a
candidate." "Our ideas of duty and impartiality,"
Buckingham mocked, "may be very unsound and absurd ; we know
they are very unfashionable . .
. ; but, such as they are, we
feel 'impelled' to maintain them; and hope we shall never
feel impelled to adopt that narrow-minded, exclusive sort
of policy, which would seal up the press of this free and
enlightened country, against the expression of the will and
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the specific interest groups that formed the insurgency's
rank-and-file members seems highly accurate. The
depression that first sparked popular political activism i
Boston had not ended by the mayoral election and continued
sending many poor and overextended, middling citizens to
Boston's debtor prison. Just weeks after the April 8
election—beginning in the middle of May and continuing
into June—Boston faced a severe shortage in specie. Bank
were "compelled.
. .to demand immediate repayment of their
debtors, for such notes have fallen due. In many case,"
reported Boston's Evening Gazette, "such compulsion has
been attended with extreme hardship, and has required
numerous sacrifices." 59 The blighted economic atmosphere
that originally fostered the insurgency was not getting
better.
On April 12, the Middling Interest forced an open
caucus to nominate an acceptable nonpartisan, compromise
candidate. Meeting once again in the Boston Exchange
Coffee house, and led, this time, by a humbled Thomas H.
Perkins, insurgents, Republicans and Federalists
congregated to announce a nominee tolerable to all
Bostonians. When John Phillips was chosen, clearly the
Middling Interest held the upper-hand at the meeting.
Having been outraged when the central committee punished
Quincy by taking his state senate seat away from him in
1820, Phillips, ever since, had proven a strong political
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supporter of Quincy. Personally their relationship was
beyond question. They were first cousins, life-long
friends and had suffered through Phillips Academy together.
More significantly, John Phillips had stood as a Middling
Interest candidate during the March state senatorial race
despite his past Federalist partisanship. During that
race, Joseph Buckingham bolstered the Phillips candidacy,
stating that Phillips was the sort "whom the mechanics and
middling interest men have confidence." since then he had
served as the President of the Senate and was described by
Republicans there as a "moderate, intelligent, independent
man." On the April 16 election, Phillips ran unopposed and
overwhelmingly won by 2,467 votes out of the total 2,661
cast. 60
With Phillips's victory the Middling Interest declared
victory. As Joseph Buckingham gleefully announced to
Boston: "The cabal which has so long managed the federal
party has received a blow from which it will not ... recover
,
and will never again carry on its purpose with undisputed
sovereignty. " 61
When Otis began the long journey home from Washington
in May, 1822, he must have been filled with despair. He
had actively maintained a hand in local Boston politics
since he had offered to sacrifice himself in the senate as
an "ambassador of peace and good will from Massachusetts,"
and now the Senator could not even get elected mayor of his
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hometown. He had consistently attempted to manage damage-
control for his party from a far, but "Boston federalism of
the old stamp" lay in shambles despite his best efforts.
He had publicly offered to "yield to the wishes of his
fellow citizens," and become the city's first executive
because his "humble services," he thought, "might be useful
in the organization of the new government," yet he had been
attacked as an elitist, "purse-proud devil." Also, he had
indulged the luxury of envisioning himself seated in the
Governor's mansion, but now that too seemed out of reach. 62
On May 12, when he rose to the floor of Faneuil Hall
to address the city of Boston, his despair seemed to have
turn to self-pitying rage. "I wish that every man of the
middling interest was within reach of my voice, when I
ask," bellowed Otis, "where are the tenants whom I have
ejected—the Debtor's I have sued—the Labourers whom I
have pinched. .. .The poor whose faces I have ground."
Providing Boston with his version of the trickle-down
theory, Otis-style, he explained that "[i]f the stream of
wealth sets in one channel it runs out by another, and the
reservoir between both is connected with each other,"
therefore, "there can be no permanent middling interest."
Because of the flow of wealth from rich to middling and the
rise and fall of personal fortunes, "[t]he people who a few
years ago composed the middling interest now live in homes
of brick," and have become rich. The "middling interest,"
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Otis argued was not a real party, but a rabble of
malcontents-"warm opposers to an imaginary, privileged
order"— "a mere name, calculated to break down [Federalism]
and to build up its adversary." Arguing that "V[t]hree
parties can no more continue in a country, than three men
can continue to fight in a single combat," Otis pleaded
with his ex-Federalist brethren who had joined the
insurgency to return home. Otis maintained that the
interests of the insurgency and Federalism were
"essentially the same." if he had sacrificed the mayoralty
to bring this misunderstanding to the attention of all
Bostonians, then so be it. "I ask not a return of
popularity. I lament not its loss," Otis firmly explained.
"But your esteem is a vested [right]— I am entitled
to... having earned it for good considerat ion--This you
ought not withdraw without good cause— If you do so, you
rob me [of honor]." Then in a quite melodramatic
statement, which, according to the Galaxy, provoked muffled
laughter from certain quarters of Faneuil Hall, Otis
declared, "I feel it might be the last time in which I
shall ever address you from this place— I am no longer a
Candidate for any office—My race is run— I am delighted to
give way to other com[er]s of higher, middle and better
speeds. » 63
Otis' s speech provoked the Nile's Weekly Register
correspondent in Boston, to sardonically report back to his
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Washington office "npvpr- Ch a n t
'
ever.
. .shall I meet with any assembly
comprising so much private worth and such elevat^
Patr i oti sm and the HARTFORD CONVENTION!!??" Joseph
Buckingham was astonished by the speech. "Mr. Otis," the
Galaxy reported, "took leave of his fellow citizens
... on
Sunday evening." Explaining the Senator rose before the
crowd "evidently embarrassed," Buckingham continued by
addressing every point Otis had made and trouncing it.
"When Mr. Otis pretends to see no cause for a disruption of
the Federal party, he pretends to a degree of mental
blindness His arguments against [the Middling Interest]
were altogether inconclusive and absurd Why should,"
Buckingham asked, "the middling interest be forever chained
to the car of the monied interest Why should not the
middling interest do everything they can do, to overthrow
the power, or at least, to neutralize the operations of a
monied aristocracy, whos[e] patriotism is nothing but
selfishness and the love of power, and whose public spirit
is deposited, for safe-keeping, in the vaults of the bank?"
Addressing Otis' s appeal for Middling Interestmen who had
once been Federalist to come back into the fold, Buckingham
predicted that this would never happen because "[t]he
materials are [now] too discordant to amalgamate." "[T]he
wheels of revolution are in motion," Buckingham declared
and nothing could now stop it.' 1
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CHAPTER VII
"THE STEGE OF BOSTON IS ONCE MORE RAISED ":
THE BETRAYAL OF THE THIRD PARTY'S MAYOR AND
FEDERALIST DEATH SPASMS
The "aristocratic band has been abolished, but a more
oppressive and more horrible, and more odious
one... has arisen to fill its place."
—
"Agricola," 1822.
Before an over-flow audience in Faneuil Hall on May 1,
1822, Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court,
Issac Parker, swore into office Boston's first mayor, John
Phillips. Resting on a table before the speaker's platform
sat the newly written Boston city charter enshrined in a
silver case. After taking his oath of office, Phillips
rose to deliver Boston's first mayoral inaugural address.
The speech took less than ten minutes and foreshadowed the
naive and often disinterested course that the Phillips
administration would take in guiding Boston through its
first year as a city. 1
Like his cousin Josiah Quincy, Phillips held serious
misgivings about the charter. But unlike Quincy, Phillips
lacked neither the will nor the political dexterity
to
remedy any piece of it. John Phillips had served
Massachusetts Federalism for twenty-five years, first
as
Suffolk county's state Senator, and then as a
fair-minded
public prosecutor in Boston. After observing
the central
committee's treatment of his cousin Quincy,
Phillips had
become highly suspicious of the Federalist leadership and,
by 1822, was a Middling Interest insurgent. Despite his
alliance with Boston's insurgency, the Phillips
administration proved to be extremely conservative and
timid. "Prudence, caution, and conservatism," according to
Josiah Quincy, "were [his cousin's] predominating
characteristics.
"
2
Employing a literal interpretation of the charter, the
new mayor proved powerless to mend its deficiencies.
Although Phillips happily had accepted the mayoralty to
placate both the Middling Interest and the Federalist
parties, he had neither the inclination, nor the apparent
legal power as mayor to engage in a municipal
administration of activism. The insurgents who elected him
expected a mayor who would proceed aggressively to fulfill
their aims. Less than three months into his term, Phillips
faced severe criticism for his lackadaisical and
ineffective approach to his new position, and his
administration fell under fierce criticism from his former
followers. "For what was our town government exchanged for
that of city, but to break the bonds of an aristocracy, and
relieve the oppressed?" asked a thoroughly disappointed
Middling Interestman who had supported Phillips's
candidacy. "[W]e protest against [the city's] arbitrary
laws by which the free born citizen is oppressed and his
rights wrestled for him." Reflecting back on Phillips's
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tenure, another argued that Boston's first mayor had done
little accept "slept on his post," while receiving a salary
of $2, 500. 3 Clearly, this was not what the insurgency
wanted, or expected in its first mayor.
Phillips faced two principal barriers in fulfilling
the activist role that Boston's insurgents expected of him.
The first was personal. Phillips had entered the mayor's
office severely ill and weary of politics. After serving
on the General Court for twenty-five years, the fifty-two
year old statesmen mistakenly viewed the mayoralty as a
non-confrontational, nonpartisan position of honorable
retirement. He assumed the city would largely run itself—
turning to its executive only for benevolent facilitation
during occasional minor sguabbles.
Also, Phillips had contracted a mysterious disease
that would kill him one month after he left office,
exhausted in 1823. As the course of his administration
would show and as his inaugural speech suggested, Phillips
trusted in an archaic notion of Boston's Christian
character and benevolence. Inflicted with a terminal
illness, Phillips, because of these factors and the
compromise that put him in power, was not inclined to
foment significant changes in Boston. Besides, extensive
restrictions in the city charter also impeded the new
mayor's ability to employ executive power even if he had
wanted to. In his inaugural address, Phillips explained
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that order and welfare would be maintained under his
administration through the »[p]urity of manners, [the]
general diffusion of knowledge [and] above all," he
added, "a firm, practical belief [in] Divine revelation."
Harkening back to Winthrop's Puritan "city upon the hill,"
"love of order, benevolent affections, and Christian
Piety," Phillips explained, "distinguish
... the inhabitants
of this city." And, thus, the city government, according
to Phillips, held little, if any, new responsibilities/
Instead, Phillips extolled the virtues and
memorialized the old town meetings as "testimon [ ies] to the
wisdom.
.. [of ] our ancestors." Deeply troubled by the
changes represented in Boston's abandonment of the Town
Meeting system, Phillips placed Boston in stark contrast to
"[m]ost of the towns in this Commonwealth [who]
may. . .continue to enjoy the benefitfs] of those salutary
regulations" inherent in town meetings. Only because of
"the great increase of population in the town of Boston,"
Phillips sighed, was it forced to become a city. In this
new city, Phillips explained, " [d] if ference of opinion must
be expected, and mutual concessions made, in... the
interests of a large community," but the new mayor made it
explicitly clear that he would take no responsibility over
how those "concessions" would be mediated. "I will not
encumber you with unnecessary forms," Phillips promised the
City Council, "or encroach on your time [B]revity will
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be carefully studied." with this statement and after
Placing the overseeing of Boston in the hands of the "Holy
Spirit," the mayor of Boston stepped down from the podium
and abandoned any leadership role in the new City Council
.
5
Adding to Phillips's passive approach toward his new
job, the charter also restrained executive powers. During
the charter debates, Middling Interest spokesmen on the
chartering committee had feared a strong executive largely
because of democratic sentiments and because their
opponents on the Federalist Central Committee had pushed so
hard for one. Indeed, Harrison Gray Otis, on December 17,
1821, instructed his operative in the chartering committee,
William Sullivan, to give the mayor the "veto upon some of
the... laws (such as relating to taxes and taking away
private property)" and then followed up a month later with
a letter demanding that the mayor be "give[n]...a right [to
widespread executive authority], without imposing [on him]
an obligation to ask advise" of other city
representatives." Insurgent leaders, Michael Roulstone,
Isaac Winslow, George Blake, and William Sturgis, who
served on the committee, balked at such demands and crushed
the Sullivan/Otis initiative in Town Meeting. Although, at
the time, the Middling Interest counted this as a victory,
by so limiting the authority of the executive in the
revised charter, the insurgents had gutted from the
document any practical function for the mayor's office.
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Even after a charter change in 1854 and various subsequent
amendments in 1885, Boston mayor during the early-i890 S/
Nathan Matthew Jr., still bitterly complained that "the
mayor was little more than a figure head" due to
limitations imposed on the executive that were left over
from the original 1822 charter. 7
Mayor Phillips could neither appoint city officials,
nor could he fire them; he had no power to veto city
legislation or control the finances of the city. The only
direct powers solely allocated to the mayor consisted of
summoning meetings of the eight member, elected at-large,
Board of Aldermen, and the Common Council, a group of
forty-eight elected officials who represented Boston's
twelve wards. After 1822, these two municipal branches had
taken-over the responsibilities of the Town Selectmen and
Town Meetings. The mayor could appoint committees that
would report their findings to the City Council (the Board
of Aldermen and the Common Council in conference) and he
served as chairman to the Board of Aldermen, but received
no special veto or voting powers over it. In January 1822,
Sullivan had assured Otis that the aldermen would be
"nothing more than... an advisory council to the executive,"
but this too had not come to pass as hostile insurgents
insured that the popularly elected aldermen would have
significantly more power than the mayor. Making matters
worse, five independent town government boards, the Board
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of Health, the Surveyors of the Highways, the School
Committee, the Overseers of the Poor, and the Board of
Firewards, had survived the chartering process and stood as
autonomous municipal agencies that zealously protected
their traditional municipal domains. Because these were
elected boards, the City Council held little authority over
them. The council could cut off their funding, but had no
prerogative under the charter to then fulfill the municipal
functions of these agencies.. Almost immediately after the
establishment of the new government, the City Council found
itself hopelessly dependent on these independent municipal
boards to oversee many of the basic functions of the city. 8
Despite the weakness of his office and the
decentralized, dysfunctional nature of the city's
organization, the mayor remained the symbolic leader of the
new city government. In the people's eyes, responsibility
for the city's legislation and how it effected them, rested
with him. They had fought hard for a city charter and
wanted significant results from their first mayor. Far
from being a tranquil position from which to honorably
retire from a life of active political life, as Phillips
had hoped, the mayoralty left him exposed to levels of
popular criticism that he had never before experienced.
Worse, because of the limitations of his office, there was
little the chief executive could do about it.
Unfortunately for Phillips, during his tenure, the mayor's
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office essentially functioned as a sounding board for
numerous gripes and complaints made by the city's citizens.
By July 1822, Boston's first mayor began to discover the
true nature of his job.
The small and ordered, puritan Christian community
that Phillips had referred to in his inaugural address
clearly no longer existed. As Josiah Quincy understood,
Boston had become a city, and not just by legal title. Not
only had Boston grown to over 44,000 people by 1822, but it
contained a socially and economically diverse population
most of whom were hard-pressed by economic depression. By
the late teens, many English Protestant and Catholic Irish
farmers, financially ravaged in their native land by
Parliament's passage of the Corn Laws and the Acts of
Enclosure, escaped to Boston. According to historian
Thomas H. 0' Conner, by 182 0 Boston held some 2,000 poor
Irish Catholics and by 1825 the number had risen to exceed
5,000. Historian Peter Knights estimates that newcomers to
Boston composed the majority of the city's growing
population of poor during the early-nineteenth century.
Most in-migrants to the hub came from the country-side
unskilled and "drifted into and out of a variety of low-
level jobs." 9
The demographic changes that occurred in Boston during
the first two decades of the nineteenth-century shocked
shoemaker, Robert Twelves Hewes when he returned to his
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hometown of Boston an old man in 1821. "The place where I
drew my first breath and formed my most endearing
attachment," Hewes reported, "had to me become a land of
strangers. Not only had my former companions and friends
disappeared, but the places of their habitations were
occupied by those who could give no account of them." m
their place had come mostly young men from the hinterlands
of New England like Moses Adams from Ellsworth, Maine. in
1816, Adams arrived in Boston seeking his fortune. After
apprenticing for a merchant and a blacksmith, he worked on
the docks and eventually signed on as a common seamen to
the merchant ship Atlas in 1820. Upon his arrival in
Boston as an outsider, Adams quickly forged alliances of
comradeship and fraternity with other outlanders who held
similar menial jobs and were also new to the city. 10
Within such an evolving urbanized world that grew in
size and complexity from year to year, Phillips's approach
to the mayoralty must have seemed archaic to most ordinary
Bostonians. The Middling Interest had supported him to
curb the unbridled power of Harrison Gray Otis and the
central committee. Less a decision based on Phillips's
qualifications as a insurgent and his disposition, and more
a reactive move, the insurgency had not anticipated
Phillips's antiquated vision of Boston and municipal
governance. Although sympathetic to insurgent charges of
an uncaring and selfish political and economic aristocracy
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that bastardized Boston's character, the new mayor clearly
would not provide strong leadership in the struggle against
the "FEW.
"
One of his first acts as executive foretold his
skewered attitude towards his new job. Immediately after
his inauguration, Phillips met with the city aldermen to
work out future procedure and decide on some various minor
municipal appointments. One of the few significant powers
the charter bestowed exclusively on the mayor and aldermen
was the replacement of the town's elected Board of Health
with a less autonomous commission that would be answerable
to the mayor and aldermen. The old town Board of Health
had fallen under such severe criticism for corruption and
inefficiency that the General Court had added a provision
to the charter abolishing the board. During the Town
Meeting winter debates over the charter, most state
legislative alterations to the charter were met with
intense suspicion and meticulously scrutinized. The Board
of Health amendment received no discussion. Clearly, on
this matter, Bostonians agreed that the corrupt board
should be terminated. On the day of his inauguration,
Phillips inexplicably reappointed the same board members to
the Board of Health. Without delay the board successfully
reestablished sovereignty over its municipal realm. Having
been given a reprieve from extinction, the board
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immediately consolidated itself and directly challenged the
authority of the mayor and aldermen. 11
On June 4, 1822, the mayor and aldermen received a
stern order from the board's secretary, John Winslow,
summoning them to stand before the Board of Health and
explain why the city had not cleaned up "a quantity of
filthy, putrid, and nauseous substances on the premises
belonging to you, and under your direction. You will,
therefore," the summons read, "appear before this Board on
Monday... and show cause, if any exist, why the City of
Boston should not remove," the garbage. Although exactly
whose obligation it was to extricate the garbage remained
unclear, the board laid down the gauntlet and challenged
the jurisdictional authority of the Phillips administration
and the new city government. The predicament the new mayor
and his administration faced was whether they could engage
one of the few powerful mechanisms the charter gave them
and assert municipal authority over the board, or shrink
from the challenge. Would the mayor's office and aldermen
claim municipal supremacy or succumb to a subordinate
board, and thus, set a dangerous precedent of yielding
under pressure to an inferior municipal division? 12
Phillips held the letter for a few days before sharing
it with the aldermen. Eventually he delivered the summons
and the aldermen acquiesced to the authority of the Board
of Health. Although the city refused to clean up the
257
garbage, Phillips had not claimed executive jurisdiction
over the matter thereby abdicating the authority expressly
given to him and the aldermen in the charter. Garbage
continued to rot "on the westerly side of [wharf] T , " and
the rectified Board of Health affirmed its municipal
dominance over the executive and aldermen of the city. 13
Because the garbage incident received little, if any,
coverage in the city press, Boston's insurgents were kept
in the dark about Phillips's bungling. Despite his less
than awe-inspiring inaugural, Middling Interestmen remained
optimistic about their mayor. And, in fact, early on in
the Phillips administration, there seemed to be reason for
them to be hopeful—though it had little to do with the
mayor's leadership. In late July, Phillips and the
aldermen were briefly heralded by the Middling Interest
organ the Independent Boston ig n for supporting a piece of
city legislation that dealt with one of the insurgency's
most pressing grievances. 14
In July, the Board of Aldermen, headed by Phillips,
approved a plan to extend prison limits for debtors.
Although abolishing debt imprisonment which Middling
Interest partisans had advocated since 1820, clearly fell
within the General Court's jurisdiction, the city aldermen
and mayor decreed authority to decide upon the areas within
Boston where debtor prisoners on temporary leave could and
could not go. The Overseers of the Poor traditionally
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allowed almshouse inmates a certain number of hours duri
the day to seek employment, visit their families, and pick-
up odd jobs in specified areas around the city. These
areas, in the past, were designated by the Town Selectmen
or the courts and were usually highly restrictive. inmates
on leave were usually restricted to Boston's docks and
poorer neighborhoods, often imprisoned debtors were not
allowed to enter the location of their shops or place of
employment. with the aldermen's initiative, the whole city
opened to the debtor inmates who could now move freely
throughout Boston seeking work or plying their trade by day
and return to the prison at night. The Middling Interest's
Independent Boston
i
a n supported the mayor and aldermen,
arguing, "we feel aaaaxgd that more debts will be honestly
paid [this way], than by any system heretofore adopted—at
least 'tis worth a trail." 15
According to the Bostonian
, the vast majority in
Boston viewed the extension of prison bounds as sensible.
Simply put, more debtors could pay-off their debts under
such a system, which pleased creditors as well. Others,
however, opposed the ordinance and the city law immediately
fell under severe attack. "The extension of the prison
limits has caused great excitement amoung a class of people
commonly styled pettifogging lawyers," reported the
Bostonian- "After having experienced a severe relaxation in
business.
.. [due to] the late humane provision of the
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oppressed, they have resorted to the last and only means to
Place the system in a way most congenial to their own
feelings, viz. by remonstrating to, and petitioning the
honorable Mayor and Aldermen, to reconsider their vote by
which the limits have been extended, and to confine them
[debtors] within
... Tremont and School streets." 16
Until 1807, colonial custom dictated that insolvents
in prison had the prerogative to practice their trade
during the day to help pay-off their debts. m 1807
Massachusetts Chief Justice Theophilus Parsons struck-down
this liberal policy as more sophisticated methods of debt
collection became more pervasive in the early nineteenth
century and significantly restricted the bounds of
debtors. 17 Despite claiming authority over the Supreme
Court and ignoring the "pettifogging lawyers," editorialist
"D," explained that he had "full faith in the integrity,
intelligence and humanity of the honorable Board [of
Aldermen]" to uphold its recent extension of prison limits.
The board had been approved by the Middling Interest and
would not acquiesce to "these enemies of humanity [who]
have ruled" by "afflicting [the] rod." with the depression
of 1819 gutting the Boston economy and more and more
respectable, middle class voters falling deep into debt and
filling debtor's jail, the mayor and aldermen had
unilaterally overruled the Supreme Court's 1807 decision
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and returned to traditional custom. when the lawyer's
petition reached the aldermen, it was summarily scrapped.
With this defiant act, the new municipal government
and, by extension, Mayor Phillips seemed to have adopted
the activist role that the insurgents had so desperately
wanted. The aldermen had flexed their muscles and
professed supremacy over "trading judges- and "pettifoggi
lawyers." But there proved another side to prison
extensions unrecognized by those who heralded the
administration's extension policy. By extending the
boundary limits of insolvent inmates, the board
strengthened the powers of the Overseers of the Poor.
Being exclusively in charge of the Leverett Street
almshouse/ jail, providing "outdoor relief" to the
impoverished, controlling an operating fund of over one
hundred thousand dollars, and a second discretionary fund
of twenty-eight to thirty thousand dollars that could be
drawn from the City Treasury on a need-basis without havi
to account for it, the Overseers already held commanding
power in the city of Boston. 19
By extending prison limits, the Phillips
administration only enhanced an already powerful
independent municipal agency. As David Montgomery has
suggested, during the early-nineteenth century these
guardians of the poor typically operated more like
indentured labor-brokers than benevolent stewards of the
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Accused
poor. often they contracted out almshouse inmates en mass
as a cheap labor force to local manufacturers,
of using their municipal positions to dole-out patronage,
restricting geographic bounds of prison labor would
undercut the Overseer's powers. Thus, by extending prison
limits the mayor and aldermen had inadvertently
strengthened the Overseers in Boston. 21
Reacting against the city's seizure of power, early in
1823 the General Court made overtures to employ Section 30
of the city charter that gave the legislature discretionary
veto power over any or all city laws, to override the
aldermen's prison extension ordinance. By February the
legislature succeeded, claiming sole authority to set
prison limits in the city of Boston. Rank-and-file
Middling Interestmen throughout the city were outraged.
The legislature, charged the Bostonian and Mftrhanj^
Journal
,
"has thought proper to take the power from the
Mayor and Aldermen of assigning the Jail Limits, and by
this measure, have virtually annulled the humane decree of
that body, passed last season, fixing them to the bounds of
the county of Suffolk [T]his very state, in 1823, passed
an act TO ABRIDGE THE RIGHTS OF THE POOR DEBTOR, HUMANELY
GRANTED HIM BY THE MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF
BOSTON." The editorial continued, demanding the abolition
of debt imprisonment throughout the state. 22
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The society for the Relief of the Distressed, which
had published the now defunct D^p^^rnal and
represented the debtor's interests within the insurgency,
took a pro-active position on the recent legislature's
decision. Explaining that »[t]he society is composed of
some of our most enterprising and respectable citizens, who
have in many instances, done much towards ameliorating the
condition of the poor but honest debtor, who has been
subject to the persecutions of an unrelenting creditor.
[Our] object is not to combine against the law and
justice... but to use every honorable and justifiable way to
get a repeal of those laws, or abol ishment of wmizomste
for debt
.
To... inform [our] fellow citizens on the subject,
and to get such men elected to office in our national and
state legislatures as are favorable to an
amelioration.... The late act of the legislature respecting
prison limits, has produced a general excitement and alarm,
it is almost universally deemed oppressive and cruel, and
has had a tendency to rouse our citizens to action." 23
Although the Phillips administration had stood-up to
the "pettifogging lawyers," it refused to confront the
legislature by petition or by taking the General Court's
action to court. Partly because Phillips continued to
abdicate leadership to others on the City Council and
partly because, throughout the spring of 182 3, various
members of the city government were in the midst of secret
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negotiations with state legislators on another matter. The
mayor and aldermen backed off, accepting the authority
Section 30 gave the General Court to override this
municipal ordinance-and for good reason. The cloaked
negotiations that were held between the legislature and
some in the city government depended upon the power Section
3 0 gave the state.
Incredibly and in direct violation of the wishes of
Boston's citizenry, in the spring of 1823, city officials
sent a secret proposal to the legislature asking it to
engage Section 30 to eliminate the ward voting provision
from the charter. Although Josiah Quincy had opposed the
whole chartering proposal because of the "mischief" he
foresaw in Section 30, most Middling Interestmen had not
heeded Quincy
-s warnings and supported the city charter
largely because it contained provisions for ward voting.
As Boston's Independent Chrnnin.iP explained before the city
chartering in March 1822, "[t]he chief reason for our
friendship towards the city bill... is that it will
introduce into power the Middling Interest
,
an interest
among our citizens, which if it had assumed to its due
weight [through a fairer democratic system of voting],
would long ago have swayed the government of our town." By
the end of the Phillips mayoralty, rank-and-file Middling
Interestmen 1 s eyes were opened. The ward voting provision
was the most important clause in gaining enough votes from
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ordinary Bostonians to pass the city charter. As rank-and-
file insurgents saw it, the charter held no validity
without the guarantee of ward voting, without it, Boston
would return to its old deferential patterns of politics
and the "FEW" would continue to dominate the "many." 24
When the news of the proposal by the Phillips regime to
abolish ward voting leaked, insurgents throughout the city
rose-up in arms against the mayor and his administration.
The BPstonian and MesJianiss laarm] exposed the scheme
and first accused the Federalist Central Committee of being
the true force behind the plot. "Among the pitiful shifts
resorted to by the FEW, nothing is more contemptible,"
charged the BPStonian in an article written for
"Mechanics!," "than their threats to withdraw their custom
from those who may differ from them in opinion The game
has carried on so long in 'the head quarters of good
principles' [the Federalist party], that the labouring
classes are no longer content submit to dictators." 25 "The
old doctrine of passive obedience a nd nonresi^nnp
,
has
long since exploded," editorialist "Alfred" explained, "and
we trust will not be revived by the citizens of
Boston. .. .The monied few are yet to learn that wealth alone
will not entitle them to honors or distinction in this
republican government. The industrious mechanic and the
virtuous tradesmen are entitled to equal privileges as the
most wealthy, and they are possessed with a spirit that
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will prompt them to maintain their rights, not withstand!
the growlings and complaints of a P^rx^i^r^d
nobil ity
.
...We are not of that servile race," declared
"Alfred," "who bow in adoration to the proud aristocrat
because he has money." 26
The Boston ia n and "Alfred's" commentary on the city
government's attempted betrayal, articulated the rank-and-
file insurgent's continued fear of an oppressive, monied
aristocracy dominating city politics. As had been the case
since the insurgent coalition's inception, those most
guilty of perpetuating the "old doctrine of pas^iye
obed ience and passive rPsi^ np0| n according to the
Middling Interest, were the Federalist "junto"—the
Federalist Central Committee. But unlike the past, others
outside the hated "cabal" were at fault too.
Turning on the mayor and his administration, the
Bgstonian attacked the city government's betrayal: "How far
a change of Municipal officers of this city may be
necessary, must be obvious to every elector who is not
blind to his own welfare, and to the prosperity of the city
charter. Aristocracy or the assumption of power never
intended to be delegated to city officers, should be
received with extreme jealousy by every Bostonian who is
independent enough to think and vote according to dictates
of his own reason."" The attempt by city representatives
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to outlaw ward voting vividly exposed the duplicitou
nature of the Phillips administration.
Although the city government had won accolades f
many in the Middling Interest for extending prison limits,
Phillips and his administration already had weathered
significant condemnation for other municipal actions by
many in Boston. Even before the ward voting debacle,
Middling Interestmen's ire had been raised. Specifically,
rank-and-file insurgents had objected to a city ordinance
brought forth in the early-summer of 1822 that intended to
clear the congestion of Boston's narrow streets. The
ordinance severely limited truckmen from plying their trade
within the city by restricting where they could and could
not go. The truckmen of Boston not only carted products
from the docks to retailers throughout the city, but also,
sold products directly from their carts at deflated prices.
Their role in Boston's local economy was essential to those
who could not afford the higher prices imposed by
established merchants. When the ordinance also outlawed
truckmen from setting up their carts on Boston's sidewalks,
it put many of these men out of business and dramatically
effected a shadowy, yet vital local economy which many poor
Bostonians depended on. 28 Where are they to go, asked
editorialist "Agricola," if "they are to be driven from the
stands which they have long occupied .... This is not only
oppressing the truckmen , but the merchants ; for they cannot
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tTMSK as cheap when two or three miles from the
wharf.... [W ]e protest against arbitrary laws by which the
free born citizen is oppressed and his rights wrestled from
him." 29
During a period of severe depression, the Phillips
administration's action seemed, as the Bostoni.n ^
Mechanic* loarnaJ put it, "a bare-faced affrontery" created
"to trample.
. .the honest and industrious citizen." Not
only did the law hurt truckmen, but it crippled both small
merchants, whose costs would increase, and those consumers
who depended on the truckmen to sell goods below retail.
"Why not, before they are forced off," "Agricola" pleaded,
"provide them a suitable place for their stand [s]." 30
The Phillips administration ignored "Agricola 1 s"
suggestion and suspicion toward the mayor rose. Far from
being viewed as the champion of the "industrious"
workingman who would crush the "purse proud devils,"
Phillips began to be seen by some as an enemy to the
"honest" workingman, and those small merchants who had
elected him. From their point of view, he was taking food
from their tables for no other reason than to clear
Boston's streets. Both the Bostonian and Mechanics Journal
and the Castigator ran articles and editorials opposing the
new city law. The Bostonian argued, "we can see no reason
why an industrious and hard-laboring man, in this country,
and especially New England, which professes to make no
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distinction between the rich man and the poor ... should be
denied the common right of every citizen, that of walking
or standing in the street
. -Where is the justice of such a
law?" the Zostenian asked. The Castigator approached the
issue differently by glorifying Boston truckmen as the
back-bone of American citizenry and exposing "gentlemen"
who refused to pay for trucking services—all the while,
railing against the elitism of "the new City Authorities"
who have "grappled... by degrees without [the people's]
consent or knowledge" "the privileges" of citizenship. 31
Adding fuel to the anti-Phillips fire, the passage of
another ordinance by the city revoking a number of liguor
licenses to long-time, established bars outraged the
Middling Interest. As with the truckmen issue, this action
was harshly looked upon as a direct attack against the
"respectful and worthy citizen," who was already hard
pressed due to the city's depressed economy. Unlike the
arguments against the truckmen law, the licensing
controversy introduced a surprising new element into the
attack against the Phillips administration. "[T]o license
foreigners," argued the Independent Bostonian
,
"and deprive
the respectful and worthy citizen of his right, his only
measure to support himself and his family, is tyrannical,
worse than the arbitrary laws of monarchy." 32 Although
personally Phillips detested the more cosmopolitan social
composition of Boston and pined away for the Boston of
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Winthrop, his administration seemed to be issuing patronage
in the form of liquor licenses in a muoh more democratic
way than in the past.
Railing against the new restrictions, a frustrated
Middling interestman asked, »[w]Ould it be right to pass by
the peaceable industrious native born citizen, whose
character has ever been distinguished for integrity and
uprightness, and patronize the foreigner who has not been
with us a sufficient time to. acquire a character? Shall we
continue to support the ostentatious pretensions of
adventurers from abroad at the expense and ruin of our
citizens at home?
... [W] e ... hope and believe that our new
constituted authorities will ever be guided by patriotism,
justice, and national partiality." Amazed that the
proposal for the ordinance had even come up, the
Independent Boston
i
a n pleaded: "Where are the Middling
Interest men?" 33
In early August, the licensing restriction was passed
by the Mayor and Aldermen, and became law, reaffirming for
many that they had made a grave mistake with Phillips and
his administration. "Is this the harbinger of what our
City rulers intend to do?" asked an angry insurgent. " [I]f
it is, we may expect soon to see [in] Boston ... complete
anarchy .... For what was our town government exchanged for
that of a city/ but to break the bonds of an aristocracy,
and relieve the oppressed." 34 The Castigator went so far
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as to charge the city aldermen with overt corruption. its
editors claimed that aldermen were threatening to close
down bars in the city if these city officials were not
given private rooms to gamble in. Another editorial noted
that aldermen who owned retail shops were keeping their
stores open past the ten o'clock curfew that the city
imposed on retailers, thereby undercutting competing
merchants who would have their retailing licenses pulled
for breaking the curfew ordinance. 35
There had been harsh criticism leveled on the Phillips
administration before the ward voting debacle, but most of
the disgrace that might have destroyed Boston's first city
government had been deflected by the city's seemingly
heroic and selfless stand on prison limit extensions. in
early April 1823, with the public disclosure exposing the
Phillips administration's attempt to abolish ward voting,
any remaining support for Boston's first city government
and its first mayor guickly evaporated. 36 The secret
proposal to the legislature only confirmed what many
Bostonians had already suspected: that Phillips and his
administration, the darlings of the Middling Interest in
spring of 1822, had, by 1823, sold them out.
On April 5, the Bostonian and Mechanics Journal
published a front page spread that not only reiterated the
insurgency's political philosophy and its abhorrence of the
Federalist Central Committee, but also articulated the
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broader consequences of the Phillips administration's
betrayal: "We
... renounce the assumed guardianship of a self
constituted who have usurped and exercised our rights,
only to abuse them.... We would transfer the sacred rights
of political self-government, from the drawing rooms of
Aristocracy, to the public assemblies of the Sovereign
People.... He who... bows to the iron rod and unauthorized
proscriptions of a dictatorial Esh, we are compelled to
regard as ojor enemy, and hQ£>$ he may not prove the enemy of
himself and the Commonwealth
.... intimately connected with
the Aristocratic policy of the Zew. leading the Many, is the
fundamental maxim of all Oligarchies, that the People are
not capable of instructing, and should not possess the
power of controlling their Representatives, it is to be
deeply regretted that this anti-republican notion, which
grew out of ignorance and venality of the European mob,
should be most injuriously applied to the virtuous and
intelligent citizens of this country and boldly acted upon,
as it has very recently been, in this our native city." 37
Connecting the licensing dispute and the truckmen's
issue to the recent ward voting affair, in its next issue a
Bostonian editorial demanded the Phillips administration's
ousting. "The conduct of our city government the last
year, with regard to many of the acts, has produced much
excitement and claims the attention of the electors. Their
conduct with regard to licenses
,
the Truckmen and the last,
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though not least, their unjustifiable exertions in
procuring an act to be passed, by the legislature, to
prohibit the meeting inj&rds,," dishonored, the
editorialist argued, all who had supported Phillips in
1822. "Mechanics!," heralded another, "[c]omplaint has
been made in this part of the country, against southern
slaves being entitled to representation in the Congress of
the U.S. at the whim of others, although it appears, in
this enlightened age, that in Boston the boasted home of
Adams, of Hancock, and of [James] Otis, the enemies of
oppression and the promoters of the glorious result of the
American Revolution, a new kind of slavery is struck out,
by those who are ambitious to drive the labouring classes
like task masters." "The Siege of Boston is once mgxe.
raised," proclaimed the Boston i an. "Not only the City, but
the whole Commonwealth, will feel the happy consequences of
a victory, which will do more to raise us in the estimation
of our sister States, than any political occurrence among
Bostonians since the revolution." 38
For most of Phillips's tenure as mayor, Joseph T.
Buckingham's Galaxy
,
a major Middling Interest paper,
remained uncharacteristically restrained. On prison
limits, Buckingham reserved judgment, stating only that
" [wjhether this will be a measure conducive to the general
good, time alone can determine." Concerned with the broad
latitude the ordinance gave to "rich rogue[s], who
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voluntarily becomes bankrupt, and refuses to make any
satisfaction to his creditors, some of whom may be much
poorer than himself
... ought never," Buckingham concluded,
"to have the advantage of any limits beyond the walls of
prison." Also understanding that the ordinance "amounts to
a virtual repeal of the [state] laws relating to
imprisonment for debt," which clearly was not within the
jurisdictional authority of the city government, Buckingham
remained skeptical of municipal prison reform. On the
truckman issue he was mute. 39
Throughout the Phillips administration, the pages of
the Galaxy indicate that Buckingham seemed more concerned
with the Middling Interest forays into state issues and
national elections than the governance of the city.
Buckingham continued his attacks against the state militia
law and persisted in calling for the state to abolish the
law. 40 Also, he devoted much time covering the 1822,
Suffolk county congressional race for the U.S. House of
Representatives. This particular race intrigued Buckingham
because it exhibited both the great strides and the
frailties of the Middling Interest movement.
In Boston's November 1822 congressional race, the
Federalist Central Committee mounted Daniel Webster to
stand as its candidate, calculating a fresh, young face
would change the damaging image the party had acguired in
recent local battles. Understanding that it had to garner
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sizable numbers from ranks of the Middling Interest in
Boston to achieve victory, Federalist strategists seized or
one of the insurgency's most dynamic issues-ant ipartyism-
and exploited it as their own. Despite Webster's
invaluable service to the Federalist party during the
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1820-1821 and
his consistent loyalty to the central committee's local
agendas in Boston, the 1822 Federalist caucus presented its
nominee as a disinterested civil servant who "would be
above the littleness of party feeling." one caucus member
portrayed Webster as a man who "has a hotf and... a h^,"
who understood that "the safest place is in the middle;"
and, in fact, such a portrayal of Webster was not
altogether inaccurate. By 1822, Webster became alarmed by
the narrowness and provincial approach to politics the
central committee had taken. In a private letter to Joseph
Story, Webster confessed that, "[w]e [Federalists] are
disgraced beyond help or hope by these things. There is a
Federal interest, a Democratic interest, a Bankrupt
interest, an Orthodox interest, and a Middling interest,
but I see no national interest, nor any national feeling."
To Jeremiah Mason, Webster went ever further, proposing
that Massachusetts Federalism should drop its party name
because it had fallen to such disrepute in minds of so
many. To maintain traditional Federalist economic and
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political interests, Webster argued the party should change
its name and its insular behavior. 41
At their caucus in November, Federalists disassociated
themselves and their candidate from the partisan carnage
and the divisive course Boston politics had recently taken.
It leveled all blame for stirring up Boston's traditional
placid political atmosphere on insurgent agitators who had
polarized and confused the electorate. Claiming Webster
would restore political harmpny to Boston, one caucus
member explained that the Federalist candidate "would not
represent the 'middling interest' merely
, but the general
interest of the whole." in his statement in favor of
Webster, Benjamin Gorham reiterated this theme and expanded
upon it. According to Gorham, Webster should be supported
not only because he would be "firm and independent" in his
decisions and would transcend "local prepossessions, and
narrow views" of partisanship; he would understand that his
most important role would be to counter "the gigantic
influence of the southern states, whose representatives act
in concert on all national questions .... The south," Gorham
argued, "would never consent to lose her influences by
dividing it amoung a number of candidates," and, therefore,
neither should the North. "We want," Gorham continued,
"representatives from the north, who cannot be drawn from
their purpose by persuasion, nor driven by fear, but who
can be heard, and felt, and respected; who.
..
[will] be able
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to beard the southern members in their own way." 42 m its
approach to the Webster nomination, the Federalist
leadership resurrected a tried-and-true strategy of
creating a monolithic, Southern monster ready to gobble-up
Northern interests. what was new about its approach was
that the Federalist leadership fused this message with the
popular and local anti-party principles of the Middling
Interest.
The Federalist party leadership realized that it was
exposed by insurgents as self-serving, elitist, corrupt and
essentially undemocratic. Attempts by the Federalist
leadership to counter this popular perception through mind-
numbing explanations and defensive partisan tactics that
bordered on illegality had proven costly and embarrassing,
and also had largely failed. The party could not run and
win by allowing local issues to define the campaign. By
1822, Federalism' s credibility as a party willing to
confront municipal grievances was highly suspect.
Therefore, Federalism, under severe popular censure for
past partisan improprieties, turned to the only available
course open to it—to broaden the political debate to
include national issues and thereby exclude the partisan
hazards of localism. The Federalist caucus' portrayal of
Webster as a nonpartisan defender of regional duty undercut
insurgent fervor over local grievances and temporarily
weakened Middling Interest dissent and insurgent unity.
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The Middling Interest party quickly responded to the
Federalist tactic by hammering away at Webster as a
Federalist tool who served elitist interests. To portray
Webster as an anti-party man, was absurd, the insurgency
claimed. Middling Interest operatives reminded Bostonians
of Webster's connections to the central committee and his
history of avid Federalism. "You have already witnessed,"
stated the Bostonian and MPch ani ^ s Jniirn
^ 1 in early
November, "the commotions excited by measures that are
calculated to lull into repose the privileges of the
MIDDLING CLASSES [of this city ] -measure that are likely to
advance into power and eminence, the champion, the id^l, in
fact, the l£Mej: of an aristocratic party—a man [Daniel
Webster] who has ever opposed your interests—who would
have the basis of your liberties founded on wealth
, and
who, in the late Convention for the revision of the
Constitution, called to action all his eloquence, his
rhetoric, and his logic, to promote the ascendancy of the
monied aristocracy over intelligence and virtue . This
gentleman.
. .would have prostrated the liberties of your
State, which may have placed you in the power of a class of
beings, who pant to extinguish the spark you hold next to
life itself," suffrage. 43 From the Middling Interest
leadership's point of view, Webster's recent nonpartisan
pose was disingenuous. After all he had been nominated in
the Federalist caucus and enjoyed the backing of the
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central committee. Nevertheless, Webster's recent adoption
of the insurgency's antiparty message, potentially
threatened Middling Interest solidarity. Ex-Federalists
who had recently joined the insurgent cause out of disgust
with the central committee's partisan trickery in local
Boston issues and its egregious self-interest, might find
Webster's nonpartisan and regional message attractive.
Here seemed a very different type of Federalist from what
Bostonians were used to. 44
When the Republican caucus made a remarkably
unprecedented and pragmatic move to capture the
congressional election by disbanding its own caucus to join
the Middling Interest's, ex-Federalist insurgents abandoned
the Middling Interest en mass. Although a last ditch
effort was made to salvage Federalist support for the
insurgency at the caucus by moderate George Sullivan by
proposing Webster as the Middling Interest candidate, he
was shouted down by the Republican contingent at the
caucus. After numerous flattering speeches, Republican
stalwart, Jesse Putnam "unanimously" received the Middling
Interest nomination. When the speeches were over and the
votes taken, the Republican party proved it had
successfully coopted the insurgency caucus when it placed
its man to head the insurgency ticket. 45
The Middling Interest Bostonian and Mechanics Journal
supported the caucus's choice of Putnam claiming he was a
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"thorough-going Middling Tnt^st- man," "a friend of the
MIDDLE CLASSES... who is not biased by ambitious and
aristocratic views." Vilifying Webster as a many faced
"hydra that has now reared his head against your lawful
rights and privileges," the Bosnian condemned the
Federalist nominee as a tool of the "aristocracy." 46
Despite the fcssj^niiin' s prediction that Jesse Putnam would
"unite the whole strength of the MIDDLING INTEREST, in his
support," the Middling Interest-Republican nomination had
done just the opposite. When Webster thrashed Putnam by a
solid 1,081 votes, the insurgency's nomination of
Republican, Jesse Putman clearly had alienated a large
number of Middling Interest voters who temporarily returned
to Federalism to vote for Webster. Even Joseph Buckingham
was surprised. "Mr. Webster's majority over the opposing
candidate, Mr. Putnam, was... a majority much larger than
was expected by his most sanguine friends." 47
Buckingham had reported extensively on Boston's
congressional race, but uncharacteristically he offered
neither candidates the Galaxy 's endorsement. Although the
"electioneering contest was warm and spirited," the
election was "not acrimonious," Buckingham stated with
approval. Buckingham praised both Webster and Putnam
supporters for not "resort [ing] to the aid of personal
abuse to attain their objects." 48
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With the coming of Boston's second mayoral race, the
GiLUxy. editor reengaged in municipal politics and once
again became a unifying voice for Boston's insurgents.
Perhaps writing more to himself than anyone else,
Buckingham urged his readership to begin to "think on their
municipal concerns, to see whether they have been managed
the past-year with prudence and discretion, and whether the
laws have been executed with the promote, and vigor that
might have been expected under the new [city]
organization." Reestablishing his editorial link with the
Middling Interest, Buckingham renewed his attack on the
Federalist Central Committee and pronounced the continued
need for third party activism in Boston. "While King Log
[the Republican party] is despised," Buckingham explained,
"let it not be forgotten that King Serpent [the Federalist
party] is to be feared [most]. A wise people," Buckingham
concluded, "will not invest either with power and
supremacy. " 49
On the Phillips administration, Buckingham aligned
himself with the Bostonian and Mechanics Journal arguing
that "the general tenor of the measures pursued by the city
council has been...—oppressive in many cases to
individuals, and in most cases injurious to the public."
According to Buckingham, a dramatic shift in the mayor's
office and on the City Council was needed to save the city
from what he perceived as the prevailing "corruption" of
281
the Phillips administration. » [T ]welve separate, petty
oligarchies," Buckingham charged, "in each of which there
is enough intrigue as there formerly was in the whole
town." on the City Council, Buckingham saved his most
scathing criticisms: »[A]s a body, we know nothing they
have done to entitle them even to such a poor reward as a
vote of thanks for their services. That the genius of
intrigue has been busy is evident from a variety of
circumstances—witness the famous [suspension of ward
voting] bill which was smuggled through the legislature for
amending the city-charter." What was needed, Buckingham
theorized, was a strong, independent executive who would
curb warring partisans and municipal corruption so endemic
to the Phillips administration. 50
Under such decisive condemnation from those who had
supported his election only a year earlier, the Phillips
administration's scheme to alter the charter and abolish
ward voting failed. Feeling the heat and recognizing that
the urban insurgency's message potentially would translate
just as well in rural Massachusetts as in the city of
Boston, the legislature let the ward voting proposal die.
The times had changed and the metamorphosis of Boston's
political culture would not sustain such overt oppressive
action. Although he probably was not personally involved
in his administration's complicity with the General Court,
Phillips faced most of the blame for the ward voting
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affair. Exhausted, disgraced and disillusioned, he decided
not to run for re-election in 1823, citing ill health. The
man who inspired the Middling Interest to declare victory
over the "dictatorial FEW" in Federalist Central Committee
left office viewed as a traitor to the insurgent cause
whose followers had elected him. Sadly, he would die just
weeks after he stepped down from office, a broken and
misunderstood man. 51
Although the Federalist Central Committee's
congressional candidate, Daniel Webster, managed to
convince enough Bostonians to win a seat in the House, this
election would be the last significant victory for the
central committee. As Middling Interest leader, Francis
Wayland predicted early in 1822, the defiance first
expressed by Bostonians toward the Federalist party in the
1822 mayoral contest quickly spread throughout the state.
Feeding on Boston's defiance of 1822 and starved by
economic depression, the people of Massachusetts in a
resounding mandate finally abandoned the Federalist party,
leaving it behind to atrophy and die.
Despite Harrison Gray Otis's 1822 declaration that he
would never again run for any public office, in 1823 he
decided to stick to his original scheme and campaign for
governor. Not understanding the depth of popular hatred
toward Otis within the state, arch-Federalist John Lowell
thought Otis a fine choice and encouraged the Senator.
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Lowell believed the average Massachusetts Federalist would
have no choice but to vote the Otis ticket, rather than
defect to Republicanism. indeed, it had worked for
Webster. Only if a third party candidate emerged like the
"memorable treachery of [Quincy 's alliance with the
Middling Interest] March last," Lowell wrote to the ex-
Senator, would he have trouble carrying the state. Lowell
calculated that, "the
-oi Polloi' must follow us, because
they have qd^Iss to follow....." After Webster's victory
in the congressional races, Lowell's logic certainly seemed
reasonable, especially to the ambitious Otis. "[T]he washy
Federalist must act with us, unless a third Candidate shall
be run," Lowell counseled Otis less than two months before
the election. Even dissident Federalists like Quincy and
Phillips would come around Lowell predicted. For "[w]hat
would Q [Quincy] & P [Phillips] & all the P's [Phillips's]
& Q's [Quincy's] become, if Democracy gets... well seated in
the saddle...?," he asked. Besides "we have ojig hold of
them in this Election which appears to me too strong to
break. They know, that on ye power of the party their very
existence as publick men depends .... They will never again
be heard of [if they once again betray the party]. They
will eat no more Corporation dinners, nor be regaled any
longer with the odoriferous praises upon which they have
subsisted heretofore." 52
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Where Lowell's analysis proves sort sighted is in its
assumption that the first party system could not mutate
into something new-that the Quincy's of the world, had to
be either Republicans or Federalist of the "old stamp."
Unbeknown to Federalist strategists, the political culture
of Boston and Massachusetts had changed. The "oi Polloi"
no longer blindly followed the old men of the Federalist
party who they now viewed as, at best, out of touch with
their needs, or worse, self-serving and corrupt members of
an oppressive elite regime. Nor did many of the "higher
class," as Lowell called them, care about being "regaled"
at "Corporation dinners." The "power of the party" was
highly vulnerable in the 1822 mayoral elections and could
do little but damage the political ambitions of politicians
like Quincy. Indeed, Webster had won his seat in Congress
not because of the central committee's support, but despite
of it. As Webster understood, his victory had depended on
playing the peace-maker among warring local partisan
factions—to present himself as a candidate above the
narrowness of partisan sguabbles. In other words, adapting
himself to Middling Interest principles. By redefining the
issues from local to national, Webster discovered a viable
vehicle to ascend to Congress, even running under the
Federalist party name. Portrayed as the nonpartisan
defender of the region's survival, the Boston electorate
overlooked Webster's affiliation with central committeemen
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like Otis, Sullivan and Perkins. Otis would not have this
luxury. By 1823 as Otis would learn, being a Federalist
had become a political liability.
After 1822 the Federalist party existed only in name
and in the stubborn imaginations of the upper-echelon
members of the Federalist hierarchy who were late in
perceiving what had happened to them and their party. The
realization that the times and rules had changed, and that
their proud party, in the end, had been undercut by its own
rank-and-file membership's alliance with the Middling
Interestmen and the Republicans was a medicine that, at
first, refused to go down. The final death-blow to the
Massachusetts Federalist party was hastened, ironically, by
the party's leadership's own insecurity and stupidity.
Scrambling to salvage the Otis campaign, the
Federalist Central Committee botched a covert attempt to
undercut the opposition late into the race, with this,
most loyal Massachusetts Federalist abandoned the party out
of disgust. In the spring 1823, Boston's Middling Interest
leadership made significant headway spreading the insurgent
message to other parts of the state. Provoked by the
Federalist's nomination of Otis, insurgent committees began
popping up in communities outside of Boston to stop the
central committee's candidate. Such state-wide, Middling
Interest organization was exactly what Lowell and other
well-connected Federalists had feared. The central
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committee aggressively responded to the challenge by
undercutting any emerging statewide third party
organization. From Worcester, an Otis operative reported
to the central committee in Boston that »[s]pies have been
[successfully] placed in several of [the Middling Interest]
committee's so that almost everything they have undertaken
has failed in consequence of the information they have
given to our veteran leaders." Unfortunately for the
central committee, this letter had fallen from its
operative's pocket and been retrieved by a Middling
Interestman in Worcester who immediately sent it to the
editors of the Bostonian and MP,rha n jCs Journal . 53
The public disclosure of the letter in the Bostonian
,
horrified the city. "We perceive in th[is] electioneering
campaign [of the central committee] the last mad struggle
of Aristocracy," explained one infuriated Boston insurgent.
"They [the Federalist leadership] call upon us in the most
pathetic manner to vote for their cand i darp--their party.
How long is it since they tried to lull us to sleep by
singing to us 'their is no party '--this is the 'era of good
feelings • . . . . When will the mad ambition of these men
cease?" Then articulating the ultimate goal of the central
committee, the editorialist condemned the anti-republican
political perspective of the Federalist party. "They are
striving to perpetuate in a few families their connections
and dependents all the 'high places."' After the 1823
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gubernatorial race men like Lowell were forced to absorb
new political realities. No longer would the "people"
follow the "FEW." By 1823, Federalist elite of
Massachusetts lost any regaining political legitimacy still
associated with it. 54
Otis suffered a devastating loss to Republican William
Eustis. For the first time in the party's history, it lost
the Federalist strongholds of Hampshire and Essex counties.
Boston was no better, with the hackneyed Federalist
machine at its breaking point, Otis achieved what he could
not the year before and carried Boston. But even in this
traditional Federalist stronghold, the once well oiled
party machinery clogged with age and rust within the fresh
and fertile democratic troposphere of the new urban
realities of Boston. Otis won Boston by a meager 108
votes. out of a total of 5,564 active voters in Boston,
Eustis gained 2,728 votes to Otis's 2,836, indicating that
the Republicans captured all the Middling Interest and
Republican votes, and, perhaps now not so surprisingly, a
good number of rank-and-file Federalists. Equally
significant, close to two-thousand more people participated
in the 1823 gubernatorial race than had in the mayoral race
of 1822. According to Samuel Eliot Morison, an Otis
descendent, "[w]ith the defeat of Otis, the Federal [ist]
party lost its last state." 55
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Although Morison laments his ancestor's defeat a
Middling Interestman in the ^mian an. M^nlsaJournil
heralded the Republican victory, claiming it for himself
and his party: "Certain great men of the city, have
asserted, that there is no such thing in existence among us
as a Middling Tnter^t. This may be very true, when
affirmed of those wretched countries where nothing meets
the eye but Palaces and the Mud-Cottages. But that this
assertion is not true of Massachusetts, a thousand
arguments might be adduced to prove; and the best argument
of all is the success of EUSTIS. Had the people been
blindly devoted to party, Mr. Otis would have been elected,
for the Aristocrats had previously carried a
majority But Mr. Otis was no sooner proposed than the
people excersized their Reason instead of their Leader's.
They saw their interest and that of the Aristocracy
, led
different ways. Otis recommended by his subserviency to his
Party, but the people preferred a man subservient to their
own Interest
.
And they chose plain sense in a good cause
,
in preference to splendid talents in a bad one ." 56 Calling
himself "A friend to Political Equality," another Bostonian
proclaimed Otis's defeat a triumph for the Middling
Interest, but explained the battle would not be fully won
until the "Aristocrats" were driven from the City Council.
"The ranks of Aristocracy are broken, and with one effort
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more," "a friend" predicted, "we shall destroy that
dictatorial power which has so long bound us to service." 57
Ironically, the mayoral candidate that the majority of
the Middling Interest supported would turn out to be one of
Boston's most dictatorial mayors of all time.
Nevertheless, Josiah Quincy would govern Boston in a
different way than Boston's past leadership. He would not
bind the people "to service," but instead display a respect
for the electorate's power. Unlike the dominant political
order before the Middling Interest movement, deference,
under the Quincy administration, would be earned and not
expected. The course of the city no longer could simply be
determined by a select number elites with mutual interests
in a unilateral manner. Instead, municipal policy would
have to meet with the approval of a highly critical and
politically empowered electorate. Also, despite the future
mayor's autocratic approach to municipal governance,
insurgent, rank-and-file Bostonians would demand an
independent leadership that curried favor to no one
particular set of interests, least of all those set forth
by the central committee. Instead, Quincy would court the
collective interests of the majority in Boston. 58
The Phillips administration had been a disaster.
Absent of any executive leadership or direction, the city
was left to the bidding of Boston's independent municipal
boards and a City Council determined to gut the people of
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their democratic rights. in one year, the majority of
Bostonians had gone from extolling the chartering and the
Phillips mayoralty as a clear triumph for the "many" over
the "FEW," to condemning the administration as a corrupt
agency ruled by the "FEW. " By the mayoral election of
1823, the Phillips betrayal seemed as sinister as any of
the Federalist Central Committee's past actions. Indeed,
the duplicity of the ward voting affair struck many
insurgents as extraordinarily, familiar. As one Middling
Interestman put it, the Federalist Central Committee,
»[t]hat aristocratic band[,] has been abolished, but a more
oppressive, more horrible, and more odious one... has arisen
to fill its place." 59 m the city's second mayoral
contest, Boston's insurgents would purge this new "more
horrible.
. .and odious" band, and place their confidence
once again in Josiah Quincy.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE POWER OF LOCALISM:
POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND THE "PERSONALITY" OF POLITICS
"'ICHABOD, the Glory is Departed.'"
—Joseph T. Buckingham, 1823.
"We have lost that lay priesthood who were once the
?he
e
st^e
m
"
delS
°
f Uving
'
and »h°-.- ^rect red]
—Josiah Quincy, Jr., 1888.
The success of the Middling Interest coalition during
the gubernatorial race of 1823 shook the Federalist party
to the core. As Joseph T. Buckingham explained, "the
federalist party of Boston, signed its death-warrant" by
choosing Harrison Gray Otis as its candidate. "Boston
federalism," Buckingham revealed, might as well now "'hang
out its banners on the outerwalls, « and inscribe thereon,
ICHABOD, the Glory is Departed.'" 1 Daniel Webster agreed.
He had predicted the ruin of Otis would seal the fate of
Massachusetts Federalism. Writing to Joseph Story after
the election, Webster criticized the "miserable, dirty
squabble of local politics," that surrounded the
gubernatorial race, and confessed that he was "not
disappointed at the result of the election. .. .My 'agony,'"
he revealed, "was over before the election took place, for
I never doubted the result. Indeed," Webster admitted, "I
could have enjoyed the triumph of neither party." 2
Despite Buckingham and Webster's foresight,
Federalism 's crushing defeat to the Republican party in the
1823 gubernatorial race baffled most of the city's pundits.
Hardly anyone in the Bay State anticipated the degree of
damage Massachusetts Federalism incurred in 1823. Even
Buckingham described the election's outcome "as unexpected
as it was mortifying to the federalist party." "That [Otis]
should fall so far behind his adversary in the political
race could never have been believed till the fact had been
proven.
"
3
Scrambling to make sense. out of what had happened,
most of the Boston press attributed the upset to what the
Republican, Boston Patriot identified as "sir Harry" Otis'
s
past "treason" at the Hartford Convention. The Republican-
leaning Boston Statesmen agreed, but posited that Otis's
Unitarianism, a sect "devoted to the propagation of a
particular creed, and. .. exerted an undue and highly
prejudicial influence [which] depress other ... denominations
of Christians," also played significantly in his
overwhelming defeat. 4 Although both explanations may shed
light on why some Massachusetts voters turned on Otis,
neither the Patriot nor the Statesmen took into account the
turmoil Middling Interest insurgents generated within the
ranks and organization of the Federalist party.
Less a matter of past Federalist indiscretions at the
Hartford Convention, and more an overwhelming rejection of
the "self created [Federalist] central committee of THREE
[Otis, Sullivan and Perkins]," 14,909 new Massachusetts
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voters turned out in the 1823 gubernatorial race to subdue
the "Aristocracy the "Cabal
, "-the »ZM. » In Boston,
increased voter turn out parallelled the general upsurge in
the state. 1,864 new voters went to the polls in Boston,
the vast majority of which, the Boston^n ^ N-tnnjr-
jQUrn ^ 1 claimed, had voted Republican because there was no
third party candidate. 5 Clearly, such wide-scale Middling
interest and Republican voter participation in Boston and
throughout the state could not be simply attributed to
Otis's role in the Hartford Convention. As Buckingham
explained just days after the election, »[w]e take no
notice of the slang about... the Hartford Convention" as
sufficient reason for Otis's loss. Dismissing such
suggestions as mere "electioneering tricks" which had had
"very little effect," Buckingham advised his readers to
look elsewhere to discover the genuine reasons why
Federalism had been thoroughly thrashed throughout the
state. 6
Buckingham credited Federalism' s decline to the vital
role a new generation of voters played in the election.
According to the Galaxy
,
young voters flocked to the
Republican candidate because Federalism' s leadership had
barred them from any participation within the party. "We
apprehend," Buckingham explained "that [the young adopted
the Republican candidate because of] the course of
favoritism and exclusion which has been pursued by the
301
ng
federalists." The "great political questions effect!
[the] state" had little to do with Harrison Gray otis's
defeat at the hands of this new generation of voters,
Buckingham argued. Instead, they had chosen the Republican
party over the Federalist because the central committee had
contemptuously spurned them. "[WJhat prospect is there for
the gratification of [the youthful and ambitious voter] by
uniting with the federalist party of Massachusetts?"
Buckingham queried. "Not the slightest. When has it been
known, within the last ten years, that any young man,
whatever may have been his intellectual talents.
. .has
attained to distinction in the federal ranks? The leading
men in the federal party cling to the honours and offices
in the gift of party with an affection stronger than
death.
.
.
Wealth and parentagp, (we speak particularly in
reference to the Boston federalists,) are the universal and
exclusive passports to office and distinction [and are
issued by] our old superannuated nabobs and their special
favourites.
"
7
After its editors mulled over the dramatic political
realignment in the state, the Republican, Boston Patriot
eventually reached the same conclusion, confirming that a
new generation of young voters "who have attained manhood
since the termination of the late war [of 1812]" had
rejected the Federalist party en mass. Such young men, the
Patriot posited, dismissed Federalism as archaic and had
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"ranged themselves beneath the banner of democracy [the
Republicans]." indeed, William M. Penniman's newly
established, Middling interest leaning Y^n^l^ catered
to exactly this new bloc of Boston voters and had squarely
endorsed the Republican ticket in 1823 over that of the
"aristocracy." To these young voter's Harrison Gray Otis
seemed a haughty, old Federalist silk-stocking—hardly
someone who would address their growing economic
insecurities. Before the election, the Federalist press
inadvertently reinforced this perception of Otis by
devoting most of its copy defending the Federalist
chieftain's involvement in the Hartford Convention. Also,
it heralded the Senator's congressional efforts in getting
the federal government to reimburse Massachusetts for costs
incurred by state militias which had defended the coastline
during the War of 1812. For the first-time voter with only
vague memories of the War of 1812, these concerns seemed
anachronistic and insignificant when compared to the more
pressing issues the depression was generating in the state
by 1823 . 8 Even staunch Federalist editorialist, "Anti-
Gracchus," bitterly conceded in the pages of the Columbian
Centinel that his party had politically miscalculated and
that race had come down to a question of "personalty" and
not much more. 9
Fundamentally agreeing with "Anti-Gracchus • s" point,
the Middling Interest organ, the Bostonian and Mechanics
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Journal, claimed that the Republican victory indicated the
fruition of the insurgency's hard organizational work, the
immediacy of the insurgent message, and ultimately
evidenced the firm establishment of the Middling Interest
party in the city of Boston. "it is asserted," the
Boston ifl n reported after Otis carried Boston by a scanty
108 votes, "that the results of the late election in this
City has converted at least one thousand of the late
predominant party. The ranks of the Middling Interest are
filling up with unexampled rapidity, it is scarcely
possible to find a man who claims any affinity with the
crest fallen aristocracy. Yesterday all was party with
them, today they belong to no party." 10
The political culture of Boston had changed enough to
sustain political alternatives to Federalism, with no
substantial disagreements on national issues being
presented to define and distinguish the Federalist party
from northern Republicans, local grievances relating to
Boston's economy and management, generational differences,
political personalities and partisan style became the
predominating factors in determining who Bostonians would
vote for governor. Local gripes and resentments were
voiced through oppositional politics and took priority over
traditional partisan voting behavior. Provincial, single
issue, and highly volatile insurgent cells emerged out of
past political complacency and partisan uniformity.
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For ordinary people, economic depression precipitated
mounting popular resentment toward those who seemed
untouched and proved uncaring; the politics of
"personality or, perhaps, more accurately, the
"personality" of politics, came to redefine political
culture in Boston. Underlying and defining the
"personality" of politics, rested deep-seeded bitterness
predicated on obvious class distinctions between elites and
everyone else. As Buckingham explained, "[t]he honour and
emoluments of office are fair objects for competition
amoung ail classes and professions, and its is right and
proper that it should be so." 11 The artisanal class and
petty merchants united with their employees with enough
property to vote, consolidating against the common enemy.
Not excluded from the coalition was the voting independent
laboring class of truckman, stevedores, draymen, and
peddlers, all of whom rallied against the undemocratic
character of the city's traditional, elite elders.
Although somewhat concerned by, what he called, the
"distracted state of our politics at this unhappy period,"
Josiah Quincy enjoyed his independent status as a municipal
judge and political pundit. His apostasy from the
Federalist Central Committee made him one of Boston's most
popular characters. At the Federalist caucus that
nominated Otis for governor in spring 1823, the Bostonian
reported that Quincy delivered "one of the merriest and
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most humorous speeches we have ever heard in the cradle of
liberty." Quincy "harangue [d] » the caucus's choice for
governor. Exploiting the popular image of Otis as a
condescending and rich aristocrat, Quincy sardonically
claimed that inflicting the gentle Senator's constitution
to the harsh rigors of the governorship would be unfair to
the aristocrat's natural disposition. Declaring »a diamond
necklace should not be converted into a drag-chain, or an
Arabian courser turned into a dray-horse," neither should
Otis be forced to toil the bureaucratic rigors and drudgery
required in serving as the governor. Humorously reminding
the audience of "the failure of Mr. Otis in his struggle"
for the mayoralty in 1822, Quincy argued that with Otis as
the Federalist nominee, the Republicans would easily win
the election. He then shocked his audience by denouncing
the Federalist party leadership. According to the
Boston ian
,
"Judge [Quincy] concluded by hoping that the
Federalists [at the caucus] would [choose] Mr. Otis and
thereby give the Democrats [Republicans]" the governor's
mansion. Although some Federalists listened to Quincy'
s
speech with outrage, the "harangue" was conveyed in such a
amusing manner that the Bostonian concluded "[t]he learned
Judge, was, as usual, inveterately popular " when he left
the hall. 12 Clearly, this was Quincy 's intent.
Ever since becoming a municipal judge, Quincy had
consolidated power around himself—often testing the limits
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of his judicial authority to reach this aim. The activism
of the Quincy court was widely covered by the insurgent
press. Hardly loosing himself "among the whores and
rogues ," as Harrison Gray Otis had predicted, during his
tenure as a judge, Quincy remained prominently in the
public spotlight. Never having given up hope of becoming
mayor, Quincy
-s decisions on the court, though often
criticized by lawyers as dictatorial, were skillfully
designed to lay the ground work for his future campaign. 13
His brutal attack on Otis at the Federalist caucus proved a
timely maneuver in a well laid strategy to receive
frustrated Federalists, Republicans and Middling Interest
support. In mid-December 1822, and after dropping out of
Boston's first mayoral contest, Judge Quincy ruled on a
highly visible case that assured him the continued support
of Buckingham. His opinion outraged conservative lawyers
throughout the state while it delighted the anti-lawyer
sensibilities of many Republicans and Middling Interestmen.
In the fall of 1822, the Galaxy published a number of
scathing articles that arguably slandered roving, itinerant
Methodist preacher, John Newland Maffitt. Maffitt was a
highly popular evangelical whose flair attracted
overflowing audiences who often climbed through church
windows to hear his sermons. In a series of articles,
Buckingham presented the famous preacher as a con man and a
lecher whose wanton behavior was "unbecoming a gentleman
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and a christian." Maffitt, it seemed, had a strong
propensity for strong liquor and underage women, and the
galaxy had said so. 14
After the Galaxy's exposes on Maffitt, the Methodist
preacher sued Buckingham for libel. The case ended up in
Quincy's court. Maffitfs lawyer presented Galaxy articles
that clearly tarnished the minister's character and argued
that the case, therefore, was clear cut. Quincy responded
by boldly redefining the libel law. He would allow
Buckingham and his lawyer to prove the truth of the
Galaxy's articles. if they withstood scrutiny, then,
Quincy charged, they were not libellous and Buckingham
would be acquitted. Quincy claimed that freedom of the
press was at stake and that, under the Massachusetts
Constitution, the liberty of the press transcended an
individual's right to privacy. On the other hand, Quincy
decreed that if Buckingham had fabricated the Galaxy 's
stories, then they were written with malicious intent only
to slander Maffitt, and, therefore, Buckingham should be
found guilty of libel. This interpretation of the
Massachusetts Constitution was highly unorthodox. 15
According to Quincy 's son, his father "argued that the
common-law doctrine, that the truth could not be admitted
in evidence under an indictment for libel, —or, as usually
put that 'the greater the truth, the greater the libel,'
—
was overruled by the express provision of the Constitution
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of the state, which made a specific reservation for its
citizens of the liberty of the press,
-a liberty
unknown... to the common law,
-and declared that all parts
of that law repugnant to that liberty are not to be
considered law under the Constitution." After two days of
hearings filled with witnesses and affidavits, Quincy ruled
that Buckingham had written the truth and, therefore, was
innocent. "This was the first time," Edmund Quincy
explained, "that such a ruling had been made in the case of
an ordinary indictment for a libel on a private individual,
and it excited much discussion and no little censure at the
time." 16 Having acquitted Joseph T. Buckingham using such
an intrepid and radical interpretation of the law, Quincy
insured the galaxy's and its editor's loyal support in the
future
.
Quincy fully understood that maintaining Buckingham's
support was even more essential to his 1823 campaign than
it had been just a year earlier. Just as the Middling
Interest fissured over the Webster/Putnam congressional
contest, the insurgency would split over Quincy, and the
patient mayoral hopeful knew it. Much had changed in the
past year and the Middling Interest's Bostonian and
Mechanics Journal refused to endorse Quincy for mayor.
Instead, it went with the Republican candidate George Blake
and for good reason. 17
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After Otis's dismal showing in the gubernatorial
contest, the central committee turned on its renowned
chieftain in a desperate attempt to revitalize the party in
Boston. To achieve this the central committee focused on
winning the mayor's office. The dilemma for Federalist
operative William Sullivan was how to appeal to Middling
Interestmen on local issues. Running a partisan Federalist
within such a hostile political environment would clearly
result in defeat. The committee had to find a unique
candidate who the electorate trusted. Remarkably and
despite Harrison Gray Otis's ardent objections, the
committee decided to approach Josiah Quincy to run on the
Federalist ticket. As Eliza Quincy explained,
Massachusetts "had become democratic [Republican], and Mr.
Sullivan and other Federalists came and requested Mr.
Quincy to consent to stand for Mayor as the last hope of
[the Federalist] party,'' ''as his popularity with the people
gave [the Federalists] their only chance." To have, of all
people Quincy «s arch-nemesis, William Sullivan, come, hat-
in-hand, and beg him to save the Federalist party, must
have seemed to Quincy a just reward for the party's past
betrayals of him. Also, Quincy was clearly not a
Republican and the insurgency's recent shift toward that
party made it difficult for him not to accept Sullivan's
offer. However, Quincy remained highly skeptical of
Sullivan's proposition. Hesitantly, Quincy accepted the
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nomination, but on his own terms. He stipulated that all
members of the central committee would take a back seat in
the election. Like Webster, Quincy understood that the
strong presence of central committee members in his
campaign would severely undermine his chances of victory.
Instead, Quincy 's campaign would be run by two of his most
loyal Middling Interest supporters, insurgents Francis
Wayland and Heman Lincoln. Instead of doing the bidding of
the central committee, Quincy turned the tables and the
committee lay utterly beholden to him as its party's last
salvation. The combative insurgents who the Bostonian
spoke for viewed Quincy 's embrace of Federalism with great
suspicion and refused to overlook it, siding with the
Republican candidate. 18
Thoroughly embittered by the Federalist choice,
Harrison Gray Otis and his partisans were appalled and
deeply offended by the committee's nomination of Quincy.
How could the committee endorse the same apostate who had
so seriously betrayed the party just one year earlier and
had publicly disgraced the honor of Boston Federalism 's
most distinguished standard bearer—Harrison Gray Otis just
weeks earlier? For Otis and his partisans the central
committee's action proved a betrayal too burdensome to
bare. To them, all seemed in chaos and they bolted from
the party. Upon Quincy 's nomination, Otis broke from the
central committee and launched a campaign to destroy the
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Federalist candidate even if it meant a Republican sitting
in the mayor's office. The politics of "personality., had
caused an irreparable fissure within the Federalist
leadership. Facing an internal reactionary rebellion
within the ranks of its leadership, the already beleaguered
and besieged Federalist party could not withstand the
pressure. Ironically, those who led the insurrection had
been the party's most orthodox leader and its most loyal
partisans. Just as the Federalist nominee for mayor
splintered the insurgent coalition, Quincy's nomination
cracked open the once impenetrable fortress of Boston
Federalism—the central committee. 19
Otis supporters began zealously searching for a
specific issue to discredit and destroy Quincy. m Maffitt
vs. Buckingham, they found their dirt and unsparingly
exploited Quincy's unorthodox ruling to lead an assault
upon his intelligence, legal skill, and character. Before
the election a pamphlet rumored to have been written by
Harrison Gray Otis, circulated around Boston. The author,
who identified himself only as, "A Member of the Suffolk
Bar," disingenuously claimed to have been a "busom friend
[to Quincy], his 'council's consistory' in all bright and
all dark periods of our nation's history for the last
twenty-five years." But after the judge's ruling in the
Maffitt case, "A Member" explained, that for the good of
the Commonwealth, he was now forced to betray his
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friendship and expose Quincy as dangerous to the sanctity
of the Commonwealth's law. charging Quincy with stupidity
and "aggravating] evil" while serving on the bench, "A
Member" reprimanded the Maffitt decision as "evidence of
[only] a superficial acquaintance with the law." According
to "A Member," Quincy was so driven by petty personal
ambition that he overlooked that fact that his ruling was
thoroughly "inadequate" and "illegal." "Determined to
override... the supreme court," and make a name for himself,
"A Member" charged that Quincy had not only botched the
decision, but had broken the law. The invective portrayed
the municipal judge as a ambitious amateur—a dangerous
incompetent. Due the timing of the pamphlet
-s release, the
clear intent of Otis partisans was to discredit Quincy 's
mayoral campaign by attacking his character. if it could
be shown that Quincy had proven corrupt and inept—an utter
failure as a lowly municipal judge—certainly Boston's
electorate would not vote him into higher office. 20 Otis
partisans wagered that in the wake of Middling Interest
charges that the Phillips administration was corrupt and
incompetent, such indictments against Quincy would be
seriously considered by Boston's insurgent voters.
The Federalist press took a neutral stance over the
controversy. In a quandary over which faction to follow,
Federalism 's organs decided not reprint or report the
reproach as Otis partisans presumably wanted. Realizing
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s
that "A Member's" charges were as much an indictment of h
as Quincy, Joseph T. Buckingham rushed to his candidate-
defense. The Galaxy addressed each of "a Member's" points,
squarely dismissing them as either illogical and/or
selfishly motivated by petty personal partisanship.
Buckingham urged Bostonians to disregard the pamphlet as
simply an ujigejitiejjianiy attack of an anonymous
writer... destitute of goojUaaimfira. . .and quite derogatory
to the character and official duty of Judge Q«« who had
served the court admirably. Harrison Gray Otis was accused
of authoring the assault out of petty personal vengeance
and the dispute immediately became politicized. Catapulted
from the realm of judicature into the broader sphere of
Boston's personality politics, the Maffitt decision helped
define the mayoral campaign of 1823. m his own pamphlet
which enjoyed a reprinting in the Galaxy, "A Citizen-
explained that the leg.il controversy was driven by personal
partisanship and nothing else. Squarely identifying
Harrison Gray Otis as the first pamphlet's author, "A
Citizen" revealed that "[w]hen the rancorous zeal of party
shall have subsided, when the vindictive violence of
personal enmity shall be spent, and when the voice of the
false, insidious friend [Otis] shall be silent, [only] then
will his title to applause be admitted." Realizinq their
ploy had back-fired, Otis operatives vigorously denied that
their leader authored the denunciation of Quincy's decision
HI
in the Maffitt case, but few in Boston believed them.
Although the anti-Quincy invective was, in fact, written by
the old Federalist chieftain- s impulsive son, Harrison Gray
Otis was held accountable. The impact of the pamphlet wars
only added to Quincy's popularity among wavering insurgents
and rank-and-file Federalists who were appalled by the
unscrupulous and hostile nature of the Otis pamphlet,
although Boston cynicism toward such methods of politicking
had risen to such a level that few were surprised. 21
Quincy's past record as a vocal Boston citizen and
jurist also reinforced the sense in Boston that he was
driven not by personal or elitist interests, but by an
incorruptible love of Boston. Though the provision
(section 30) within the city charter endowing the General
Court power to unilaterally alter local Boston law and its
municipal structure had not been a burning issue during the
city's first mayoral contest, after the Phillips
administration's attempt to repeal ward voting using
section 30, middling Bostonians fear of the provision
magnified in 1823. Bostonians had learned from the
Phillips administration to dread the potential power
section 3 0 gave to the General Court over their lives. At
any time and for what ever reason, the General Court could
usurp the autonomy of the Boston citizenry.
By the 1823 mayoral race, anxiety over section 30
proved one of the few remaining cohesive chords that bound
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-stents together. Although the^ and the
^^W^™ represented the two opposing wings of
the insurgency and could agree on little, both printed
scathing attacks of section 30 before the election.
Identifying section 30 as an undemocratic strategy
implemented by the General Court to impose its mastery over
the city, some Middling Interest pundits went so far as to
recommend that whole charter be revoked and replaced by the
old town meeting system. Quincy had advocated this since
1821 and his spokesmen were sure to remind Boston's
electorate of their candidate's stand. Insurgent leader,
William Emmons evoked the "intelligent decisions
of... Quincy," when he railed against the charter in an
crowded Faneuil Hall. indeed, as Joseph Buckingham
explained, Quincy had consistently fought the charter
because "he saw.
. .mischief in the section which gives the
legislature unrestrained power over the charter." As
mayor, Buckingham posited, Quincy "will be still on the
watch to see that we are not 'made the foot-ball of a
foolish legislature.'" 22
Between Quincy's 1822 and 1823 mayoral campaigns, he
appealed to insurgent sensibilities on other matters as
well by using his position as a municipal judge to address
pressing local concerns. As a judge, Quincy had shown
sympathy towards the truckmen's grievances. The case of
the Commonwealth v. Solomon M. Levengston is representative
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of Quincys disposition toward this group of independent
petty
.erchants. Levengston was arrested and charged with
hawking his products directly to the public and shopkeeper
below retail and established wholesale rates-seething he
did not have a citv licence +•«^y s to do. Also, because of the
city's new truckman law passed by the Phillips
administration, Levengston had broken the local ordinance
by selling his products openly from his cart. 23
Levengston-
s attorney and Republican partisan, Andrew
Dunlap, argued that, in his client's case, the local
ordinance was unconstitutional because it restricted an
individual's right to earn a respectable living and gave an
unfair advantage to well established retail merchants
within the city. if » [a] man has a right to earn an honest
livelihood by trade in his shop, fixed to a certain spot,"
why, Dunlap asked, should his client "not have this same
right" even if his shop is his cart? Claiming that the
licensing law did not apply to his client because
Levengston 's "case was not at all analogous to the
restrictions upon innholders and retailers of liquor; for
those restrictions are imposed and required from a regard
to public morals; but no such grounds existed for the
support of th[e] law" that Levengston was charged with
breaking. All his client had done was sell products to
individuals and shops below competing retailer's and
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wholesaler's prices. Certainly, there could be no harm
with that, Dunlap maintained. 24
Summing up his plea, Dunlap placed the case squarely
within the political storm that had circled Boston for the
past four years. The law Levengston was charged with
breaking "gives an exclusive advantage to one class of
citizens, and imposes a partial burden then upon another;
and, therefore, is unconstitutional." Judge Quincy agreed,
"CT]he law," according to Quincy. s ruling, "was certainly
of a dubious character" and Levengston was acquitted. As
the explained, because the Levengston case "was the
first case, which had arisen upon the law since its
enactment," Quincy 's charge authenticated him as a friend
to the truckmen and petty merchant. 25
On the eve of Boston's second mayoral contest, the
Federalist party was racked with factionalism. Joseph
Buckingham had been precisely right when he, in retrospect,
pronounced that "the federalist party of Boston [died],
when it voted for a city charter." Indeed, in the end,
local municipal issues first introduced and then stubbornly
pressed and doggedly pursued by the insurgent coalition
facilitated internal party feuding within the Federalist
Central Committee. Tormented by the abolition of
deferential voting behavior, surrounded by growing numbers
of voters with louder voices demanding a political
leadership devoid of "aristocratic" pretention, exposed as
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"political zealots and party inquisitors," and besieged by
the democratic principals of "measures, not men; the
People, not the Cabal; the Many not the Few," the
Federalist party leadership fractured into hostile camps.
Under such extreme and mounting pressure, Boston's "lay
priesthood," as Otis, Sullivan and Perkins came to be
described, splinted into two opposing sects that devoured
each other. 26
On the eve of the city's second mayoral contest,
Boston's electorate no longer could rely on any semblance
of a cohesive party system to direct its voting behavior.
The mayoral election of 1822 had been complicated enough
with four candidates and three parties anxiously vying for
votes. m that election voters were asked to choose
between, Federalism's Otis, the Middling Interest's Quincy,
Republicanism's George Blake, and the mysterious forth
candidate, Thomas L. Winthrop, snarling the process.
Despite the clutter, each of the local parties in 1822
forged and articulated divergent agendas that represented
substantial differences in popular opinion. On the
surface, 182 3 seemed much less complicated with only the
Republican and Federalist candidates making a bid.
However, underneath what seemed to be a return to a simpler
two party competition lay only the broken hulls of past
party structures and organizations.
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Flailing about with no particular direction or command
structure, and after a battle that bankrupted them both,
the Federalist party and the Middling Interest
coalitionalist insurgency discovered in 1823 that their
fractured organizations no longer represented any
meaningful programs for the future. Federalism descended
into the petty politics of personalities resulting in its
ruin as Webster had predicted. The Middling Interest's
hatred of the "FEW" had been successfully exploited by the
Republicans to force a schism within insurgent ranks that
resulted in the syphoning-of f enough numbers so that the
Middling Interest had no chance to further develop a viable
party structure in the city, let alone the state. Although
Republican accomplishment within the traditional Federalist
stronghold of Boston seemed impressive, it was not enough
to insure Republican dominance in the city. So where would
the majority of Boston's voters turn in 1823?
Acting as both a Federalist and a Middling
Interestman, Josiah Quincy invited them to come to him and,
on election day, the majority of Boston's electorate
answered his call. A new coalition formed, this time
around the character of one of Boston's leading citizens.
With the Galaxy's loyal support and the hard work of
Francis Wayland and Heman Lincoln, a broad-based Quincy-
coalition narrowly defeated the Republican candidate,
George Blake by 32 5 votes. Quincy had snatched victory
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fro, the hands of the Republicans who had been waiting
breathlessly for the demise of Federalism. m the
municipal elections for the city's Aldermen and Common
Council, Boston spoke even more forcefully. All eight of
the Phillips administration's bipartisan aldermen were
forced out of office. Of the forty-eight who served on the
Common Council only eighteen survived the election.
Significantly, William Sullivan who represented Ward 6
during the Phillips administration as a city councilman,
watched in horror as his ward turned Republican. m 1823,
it had gone with William Eustis in the gubernatorial race
and Blake in the mayoral contest. Adding insult to injury,
in the municipal elections of 1823, Republican William
Wright challenged Sullivan and won. 27
Voter turnout in the 1823 mayoral race dramatically
surpassed that of 1822, with 1,061 new voters going to the
polls for a total of 4,764. Although voter participation
in the mayoral race fell short of the number involved in
the 1823 gubernatorial race by 881, this proved to be in
Quincy's advantage. According to Joseph Buckingham, this
number of nonactive voters disproportionatly represented
"the particular friends of Mr. Otis [who] absented
themselves from the polls," rather than casting their votes
for the apostate Quincy or the "Jacobin," George Blake.
Although Quincy easily won the traditionally Federalist
eighth and ninth wards (gaining 63% of the vote in the
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eighth, and 65% in the ninth), he had not carried the, by
the overwhelming margins Otis had earned just weeks before
in the gubernatorial race (Otis carried the eighth with 65
of the vote, and, the ninth by 72%). m those wards
combined, Quincy lost nine percentage points, which
presumably represented disgruntled Otis partisans who
stayed away from the polls. But what Quincy had lost in
the eighth and ninth, he gained by carrying the twelfth
ward-a ward Otis had lost. where Otis held six of
Boston's twelve wards, three of which he had retained by
very slim margins (Ward 10, by 48 votes; Ward 11 by 38
votes; and Ward 4 by only 15 votes), Quincy had gained
seven and won them with significantly higher numbers (Ward
10 by 84 votes; Ward 11 by 98 votes; Ward 4 by 4 5 votes;
and he won Ward 12 by 72 solid votes). On the whole, in
the Republican-leaning wards that both Quincy and Otis
lost, Quincy lost by less; and in wards both had won,
Quincy had won by more (see Figures 8.1 and 8.2).
Throughout the city, Quincy captured 2 3 percentage points
more than Otis (see Figure 8. 3). 28
Quincy 's margin of victory was more than triple that
of Otis's (in Boston, Otis won by a margin of 108 votes to
Quincy 's 325), yet the new mayor's success over Blake
remained ambiguous and certainly did not indicate a
mandate. He had gambled that the Middling Interest
coalition would unite around him despite his acceptance of
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Figure 8.1 1 823 Gubernatorial R, Ce: H. a. otis v w,
EuslLls. Results by ward, % votes won, # of votes won bySource: Abel Bowen, Plan of Boston (1824 map) reprinted inSnow, History of Boston , 1-2. Columbian Conti^y April 91823 and April 16, 1823, A£S_.
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Figure 8.2 1823 Mayoral Racp ; J. Oui.ncy v. ft. Blake .
Results by ward, % votes won by, # of voters won by.
Source: Abel Bowen, Plan of Boston (1824 map) in Snow
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Figure 8.3 Comparison, in %. between Otis and Quincy in
1823 : Mayoral and Guvernatorial Elections, by wards.
Source: Abel Bowen, Plan of Boston (1824 map) in Snow
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the Federalist party's endorsement. Tn is had not happened,
in a bizarre and hurried coalition formed from past bitter
enemies, distrustful Middling Interestmen and vengeful Otis
partisans sided with the Republicans in an unsuccessful
attempt to rout Quincy. Although for entirely different
reasons, each group, by 1823, viewed Quincy as an apostate.
After his acceptance to run on the Federalist ticket and
led by the Etonian ^ Mprh^ni^^jaugnaly a minority of
rank-and-file insurgents refused to deem Quincy a Middling
Interest leader as they had in 1822. Supporting Blake,
this Middling Interest-Republican bloc of voters demanded
that Boston's next mayor be from the middling classes.
Articulating this bloc's position the BjasJtojiian stated,
"the Mayor of London is a brewer, and the Mayor of
Philadelphia is a hatter," why could not the next mayor of
Boston be from the middling sort? 29
Having impulsively bolted from Federalism, Otis
partisans also turned to the Republican party solely to
deny Quincy political ascendancy. As Buckingham reported
in the galaxy
,
"Mr. Quincy was selected at the federal
caucus, as the candidate for mayor; but instead of
receiving the unanimous support [from] the federal part[y],
the particular friends of Mr. Otis.
. .gave their votes for
the democratic candidate!" Severely criticizing Otis's
followers, Buckingham charged them with "imprudent
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stubbornness," having "sacrifice[d] -
"patriotism" for
"Pr ivate and p^i-fr^pai vi OMg i.ao
Although the opposition held significant strength, the
Quincy forces persevered with a similar coalition as the
one he and Phillips forged in 1822. Though the Phillips
administration's policies had alienated some Middling
interestmen to such an extent that they refused to follow
the nominee of their leadership, thereby forcing them into
a Republican party that greeted them with open arms, the
majority followed Quincy as they had done the year before.
Due to his past battles with the central committee,
Quincy's recent affiliation with the Federalist party in
1823 could hardly be taken too seriously by knowledgeable
Bostonians.
Stressing this point, the Middling Interest's most
prominent leaders continued to vigorously work for him.
Although Buckingham, Wayland and Lincoln could no longer
deliver Quincy one unified insurgent bloc as they had done
in 1822, they did hold the majority. Their candidate's
unconstrained and independent positions on various
municipal policies provided them with weighty material to
work with. Quincy had forged his own sovereign course that
withstood the electorate's cynicism and disorientation
towards Boston's chaotic political environment. Quincy
wisely had not precisely categorized himself as a
"Federalist" or a "Republican," or even as a "Middling
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interestman... instead, he ran as an incorruptible
outsider-an individual who had taken the nonpartisan
ideology f irst expressed by Middling Interest and lived up
to it. When certain cells within the insurgency allowed
themselves to be coopted by the Republican party, they
betrayed the Middling Interest's founding principles of
remaining nonpartisan-beyond the pettiness of party
interests. Quincy. s actions, it seemed to many Bostonians,
were unsullied by local partisan warfare that had destroyed
or seriously damaged all three parties in Boston.
indeed, after the election, Francis Wayland came to
Quincy to congratulate him on his victory and offer some
advice to the mayor-elect. According to Eliza Quincy,
Wayland advised the Quincy "not to lose his popularity,
which gave him such... power to be useful.—But Mr. Quincy
only laughed," Eliza recalled, "and told him popularity was
the last thing he should think of, he should do whatever he
considered his duty, & the people might turn him out as
soon as they pleased." 31 After the baffling and often
vengeful provincial politics that had dominated Boston for
the past five years, these sentiments were exactly what
many jaded Bostonians longed for in a leader.
As mayor, Quincy carved out a place to accommodate the
truckmen. His proposal for enlarging Faneuil Hall market
place would serve their interests, while also, as Quincy
later explained, help to "reduce the prices of provisions,
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for the poorer classes." This, coupled with his ruling in
the Levengston case, further indicated that Quincy
understood the profound impact the city ordinance
restricting truckmen had had not only on the truckmen, but
also on Boston's extra-legal, urban economy that so many
depended on. When the truckmen ordinance was first
proposed the Middling Interest demanded that the city at
least "provide them [the truckmen] a suitable place for
them to stand." The call in 1822 was ignored; it would not
be under the Quincy administration, within his first year
as Boston's mayor, under a pall of criticism from
established land owners, Quincy single-handedly expanded
the market place two-fold. Truckmen were given a central
location to sell their wares. These small-time peddlers
and the shady urban economy within which they worked were
given a new sense of legitimacy and respectability under
the Quincy administration. What became to be known as
"Quincy »s Market" proved such a success for truckmen and
minor retailers that the new mayor never lost their
support. 32
On other burning issues that had helped to incite
political insurgency in Boston, Mayor Quincy quickly proved
his administration to be malleable to insurgent demands.
During his six year reign as chief executive of the city,
Quincy refused to touch the ward voting provision that the
Middling Interest had fought so hard for, establishing that
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elective system in Boston for future decades. Although
Quincy had held misgivings about the repeal of the ten-foot
fire law, once mayor he did not try to revoke it. Instead,
Quincy professionalized Boston
-s fire department to deal
with the perpetual threat of fires in Boston's congested
environment.
Before Quincy
-s administration, sixteen squadrons of
highly competitive volunteer fire-fighter companies
contended with each other to gain the honor of putting
fires out around the city. Competition between these
companies was fierce and proved extremely inefficient. On
occasion, two competing companies would meet each other,
both rushing to a fire only to engage in street fights
rather than lose out to the other. Customary etiquette
dictated that the use of water hoses to fight fires was
dishonorable. Instead, bucket brigades were used under the
volunteer fireman's belief "nearer the fire the higher the
honor." Naturally, under such a system, fires often were
allowed to spread out of control as contending firemen
fraternities waged war blocks away or when "honor" and
small pails of water could do little to extinguish a raging
inferno. 33
According to Quincy, the existence of wooden buildings
higher than ten feet within the city proved largely
inconsequential to the problem of fires within urbanized
Boston. The real problem as Quincy saw it rested with the
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city's antiquated fire-fighting system. During nis third
administration, Quincy consolidated Boston's volunteers,
Placing them under his authority. He appointed a chief'
engineer to replace the city's Firewards. Coordination of
Boston's volunteer fire fighters would no longer be
haphazard. instead the chief engineer would have direct
control over both the professional and volunteer fir,
fighters. At first, Quincy faced stiff criticism f
_
abolishing the fraternal orders of volunteer firemen'
autonomy, yet after the city hired some twelve hundred
firemen on either a part-time or full-time basis, censure
of the mayor's action quieted. Also, the modernization of
fighting fires significantly reduced the ravages of fires
in Boston. With twenty engines, a professional "hook and
ladder company, eight hundred buckets, seven thousand feet
of hose, and twenty-five hose carriages," Boston's semi-
professional fire fighters proved much more effective in
stopping outbreaks and protecting lives and property.' 1
Quincy 's reform in fire prevention represented the
fierce activism of his administrations. Not only had he
squarely addressed the problem of fires within the city
without imposing "oppressive" municipal building codes that
threatened middling, entrepreneurial interests like those
of the past, but he had also confronted the city's high
unemployment rate by establishing a municipal department
that offered Boston's lower sort wage-earning municipal
$3]
jobs. Needless to say, dispensing uunicipal patronage on
such a wide-scale did not hurt Quincy. s annual re-election
bids.
In 1822, Quincy had lost the mayoralty by a hair. m
1823, his election proved tough, but he won with a slim
margin. After he was well seated in mayor's office, Quincy
would run five more times and as his first four elections
show, his appeal among the electorate grew. For four years
he dominated Boston politics. m 1824 and 1825, Quincy 's
popularity proved so overwhelming that he ran uncontested.
In 1826 and 1827, the Republicans mounted two separate
candidates, but Quincy handily routed both of them with
ease. He consistently and successfully presented himself
as a disinterested municipal leader whose main objective
was not personal ambition, but the material progress of
Boston and its citizens. 35
One crucial element to Quincy 's success rested in his
ability to wrestle municipal services away from the
independent boards that had so bogged down the Phillips
administration. By seizing their municipal functions and
placing their authority squarely in the mayor's office,
Quincy incrementally consolidated power around himself.
Contesting the power of Boston's independent municipal
boards was a bold move, yet Quincy 's various coup d'etats
during his administrations should not have surprised
anyone. In large measure, insurgents who supported
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Quincys election had voiced their disillusionment with the
Phillips administration's timid acquiescence to Boston
'
s
various boards by voting for the outspoken judge. when
Quincy insinuated the abolition of all autonomous municipal
boards in his first inaugural address, he set into motion a
Plan that would establish him as Boston's most powerful
mayor of the nineteenth-century.
"In every exigency," Quincy claimed to, "endeavor to
imbibe and to exhibit, in purpose and act, the spirit of
the charter." Placing his administration in stark contrast
to the unassertive Phillips mayoralty, the new mayor
assumed broad executive powers that were only implied in
the city charter. Quincy pronounced that the "spirit of
the charter" accorded him the right to enforce the "laws of
the city," evaluate all "subordinate officers,"
"prosecute.
. .and punish" "all negligence,
carelessness,... and violations of duty." The independent
municipal boards, Quincy asserted were "great defect [s]"
that existed only to shelter one another from any "blame"
for problems within the city. "The remedy attempted by the
charter," Quincy declared, "is to provide for the
fulfillment of all these duties [executed by the
independent boards], by specifically investing the chief
officer of the city with the necessary powers... for their
efficient exercise." Then mapping out his specific
jurisdiction, Quincy stated all of Boston's "public
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institutions, its edifices, hospitals, almshouses, jails,
should be made the subject of frequent inspection" by the
mayor. it would be his duty to insure that all "errors
corrected,
» and all "abuses exposed." 36
Quincy then tempered his speech by appealing to the
nonpartisan sentiments of Boston insurgents. "of local,
section, party, or personal divisions, [the mayor] should
know nothing, except for the purpose of healing wounds they
inflict; softening the animosities they engender; and
exciting, by his example and influence, bands, hostile to
one another in every other respect, to march one way, when
the interests of the city are in danger." 37 After this
call for unity, Quincy got down to the business of
dismantling Boston's entrenched independent municipal
boards
.
The first to be purged was the Surveyors of the
Highways. One of Quincy 's initial actions as mayor was to
appoint a Superintendent of the Streets whose authority
superseded that of the Surveyors. The Superintendent
marshalled gangs of laborers that set to work nightly to
clean and repair the streets of Boston. Though this
directly infringed on the Surveyor's jurisdiction, the
Superintendent and his crews assumed responsibility over
Boston's streets and did the job much more effectively than
the Surveyor's methods. Having proven the efficiency and
superiority of this new system, and just two weeks after
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his inaugural address, Quincy called a general meeting of
the people of Boston to vote on a referendum to abolish the
board and place responsibility for the maintenance of the
streets under the authority of the Mayor and city aldermen.
Quincy 's referendum passed, and on June 11, i 82 3 the
legislature approved the measure. Quincy had gained
control of Boston's streets. Next to be purged was the
powerful Overseers of the Poor-a board Quincy particularly
disliked. 38
Ever since Quincy had proposed the House of Industry
to better house imprisoned debtors in South Boston, the
Overseers had challenged the idea, yet the House of
Industry was not completed until 1823, so conflict had been
avoided during the Phillips administration. By Quincy 's
ascension to the mayoralty, construction of the House of
Industry was completed and the new mayor demanded that the
Overseers empty the Leverett street jail of its debtor
inmates so they could be transferred to South Boston. The
Overseers refused to follow the Mayor's executive orders on
the ground that they were popularly elected by the people
and, therefore, did not have to follow the Mayor's order.
Deadlock between the Overseers and the Mayor's office set
in and both sides refused to back down. 39
In 1824, Quincy initiated a plan to break the
stalemate. Suspecting the Overseers of corruption, Quincy
ordered city accountants to audit the board's finances.
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When the Overseers refused to allow Quincy. s officers to
examine its books, the Mayor publicly charged the board
with corruption and called for a city-wide referendum that
proposed altering the city charter to grant the mayor
unequivocal supremacy over the Overseers, when the
referendum failed, Quincy took matters in to his own hands.
He defied the Overseers by selling the Leverett street
jail. With that, the Overseers found themselves in the
awkward position of having no choice but to move inmates to
South Boston's House of Industry. Although the Overseers
of the Poor remained a state sanctioned municipal board,
Mayor Quincy had undercut all its authority, significantly
increasing the power of the executive. 40
Quincy ravaged the Board of Health in a similar
fashion as he had the Surveyors of the Highway. First,
Quincy assumed all responsibility for the health of the
city. Under Quincy 's directions, the city bought a fleet
of carts and horses, and hired a squad of laborers to
remove any potential health hazards within the city.
Justifying his actions, Quincy explained that, "[i]f the
powers vested seem too great, let it be remembered that
they are necessary to attain the great objects of the
city,—health, comfort, and safety." Then presenting his
reasons for taking over the Board of Health's
responsibilities in insurgency rhetoric, Quincy argued that
"[t]o those whose fortunes are restricted, these powers
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ought to be peculiarly precious. The rich can fly from the
condemn* the ppor to remin ann i,,,.,, >h . n _ 1f^
"'"""'"**
effluvj^ To a ll classps who ^„
city,
these powprs w n priviwp anri a H^,. 1n7 ,. Having
successfully justified to Bostonians his cooptation of the
board's responsibilities and proven the efficiency of his
own system, in 1823, Quincy abolished the Board of Health
and placed all its responsibilities upon the shoulders of
the city marshal, his appointee. 41
By 1824, Quincy had successfully abolished or
dismantled the power of three out of the five municipal
boards that had ensnared the Phillips administration. When
Quincy went after the Board of Firewards it would take an
devastating urban disaster to wrestle control away from
this powerful and popular municipal board. in 1825, an
enormous fire burned out of control, spreading down State
and Broad streets. The voluntary fraternal firemen's
orders, mentioned above, proved totally ineffective in
fighting a blaze of such magnitude. When the fire finally
burned itself out, fifty stores were lost and, when the
smoke cleared the city of Boston discovered that $1,000,000
worth of damage had been incurred. Although Quincy had
tried earlier to abolish the old fire fighting system, his
attempts had failed. After the inferno of 1825, in a hotly
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debated city-wide referendum, Quincy. s proposal for the
abolishment of the Board of Firewards and the creation of a
new, modernized fire department passed/ 2
As mentioned earlier, with the adoption of a
professionalized fire department that held both volunteers
and fire fighting specialists, Quincy further consolidated
his political power through his use of municipal patronage.
Unimpeded by any structured party organizations to answer
to, Quincy single-handedly dictated an active urban policy
between 1823 to 1828-one totally divorced of partisan
concerns. These years were marked by a political vacuum
that Quincy filled with municipal activism. Bostonians may
have questioned the wisdom of their mayor's actions, but
they never accused him of being influenced or driven by
partisanship.
By 1823, Quincy had established himself as a leader
who transcended trivial partyism and partisanship, and
proposed to lead his constituents on an independent course
for the good and advancement of all voting Bostonians.
Clearly, the "Great Mayor," as Quincy would later be
called, prescribed municipal policy based upon his own
assumptions and prejudices. At least one student of the
Quincy mayoralty has described it as a "dictatorship," but
that was a gross overstatement. 43 Instead, Quincy was
centralizing his authority to promote a more modern
political system required by the emergence of large urban
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centers. Yet
,
by 1823 and partially due to his past
political activism in the Middling Interest, Boston's
voters had matured into an independent and self-confident
electorate that shed its past deferential behavior.
Because Boston's traditional party organizations lay in
chaos, each year Bostonians evaluated their mayor from an
independent view point, judging his worthiness by his
actions-not his class, pedigree or even his party.
Reflecting back on Boston's complex political culture
when the Federalist elite's hegemony in the state was
firmly in control, Josiah Quincy III, the mayor's second
son, wrote in 1888 that "men of the stamp of Sullivan and
his friend Otis were more conspicuous for what they w^rs
than for what they did. They were predominant men, and gave
the community its quality, shaping, as if by divine right,
its social and political issues .... [W ] e have lost that lay
priesthood who were once the accepted models of high
living, and whose qualifications to direct the State were
eminent and undisputed
. Although the younger Quincy
does not offer an opinion as to when such "divine"
authority came under dispute, by 1823 Boston's "lay
priesthood" found its authority politically vanquished and
culturally overwhelmed by the political will of an unruly
congregation which neither liked its imposing political
style, nor its elitist culture. To sustain itself, the
Federalist elite would have to do something that it could
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not-change with the democratic current. No longer would
authority simply be bestowed to a leaders because of who
"they aexe.." Indeed, it was who Harrison Gray Otis ^
that largely destroyed his gubernatorial campaign of 1823,
taking with him the Federalist party of Massachusetts.
Tipping Boston's past political culture on its head, the
electorate mandated that leadership and authority be
granted to individuals based upon "what they did," opposed
to who "they tterj,." Josiah Quincy understood this as h . s
activist reign as Boston's mayor indicates.
Middling class values of hard work, independence,
productivity, and accomplishment displaced inherited
wealth, leisure, and pedigree in setting the criteria for
community authority and leadership. This is not to say
that many elites would not still be elected mayor of
Boston. But it was because they were politically capable
and resourceful men, who understood their authority rested
in an discriminating electorate that demanded satisfaction,
Indeed, it was not because of their social position, but
despite of it. These new values, heralded the working
electorate, would give the community its guality, not the
"divine right" of a self-ordained "lay priesthood."
Harrison Gray Otis and leading Federalists had remained
blind to the dramatic shift in popular attitudes toward
them. Their ignorance and tenacious dependency on the
cultural politics of the past, more than any other factor,
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marked their defeat. Politicians coming fro, the state's
economic elite class would now have to pay respectful
attention to the voice of a new generation which held very
different values from their fathers.
According to Buckingham, the principal responsibility
for Federalism-
s demise in the Bay state rested in the
hands of the "great body of intelligent young men in
Massachusetts... who are now coming forward in life, [and]
do not feel all the excitements, that govern the conduct of
their fathers." Because "the course of the federalists
leadership]... is not calculated to perpetuate its
existence, by extending the hand of patronage and
friendship [to this powerful new electorate]
.. .without
distinction of person and family...; and so long as
[Federalism is] reserved only for the rich, or the sons of
the rich, as a sort of [archaic] hereditary possession,"
Buckingham explained, "it is not very strange that the
power of a party, guilty of such impolitic conduct should
be on the wane . " 45
Since his involvement in local politics, Josiah Quincy
proved sensitive to emerging middling class political
sensibilities. As an ambitious local politician rising to
a position of great power within the chaotic and highly
cynical urban political culture of Boston in the 1820s,
Quincy realized his past partisanship to the Federalist
party had to be abandoned. Quincy had, for many years
341
before 1823, set an independent course for himself. In the
process, he had helped spark a democratic fire among a
growing urban population that felt neglected and ostracized
from the corridors of power. Quincy had embraced these
concerns and answered them effectively. Whether
Quincy-
s
appeals to Boston's lower-to-middling electorate
were driven simply by ambitious pragmatism or a sincere
respect for ordinary Bostonians is not important. m the
end, what makes the story of Josiah Quincy significant is
the effective relationship he forged between himself and
the Boston electorate. By helping to build a temporary
third party in Boston that tore down the Federalist party's
viability, Quincy and his allies helped transform the
political culture of Boston. He helped alter the rules of
the game. Although Boston politics for years to come would
remain dominated by Brahmin elites, they could no longer
employ the political style of the old Federalist elite
leadership. Assumed guardianship no longer was
automatically conferred on an economic and cultural elite
without suspicion. In Boston, this dramatically altered
party structures and strategy. Indeed, for a time in the
1820s it destroyed them.
As Joseph T. Buckingham illustrates, "[o]ur
commonwealth and city politics are in a state
of ... confusion. Every tenth man are the leaders of a
party;—the blind leading the blind. Republicans and
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Federalists, Jacksonmen, Adamsmen, Linclonmen,
adminstrationmen, freebridgemen, antifreebridgemen,
antitariffmen, and woolen crusaders, are all are thrown
together into the political pot. The fire burns and the
caldron bubbles; and many are the weird sisters that are
practicing their incantations over the ingredients. Whether
any thing will rise from this solemn sorcery, except s^m,
we profess not to foresee." For Buckingham, Josiah
Quincy's strong leadership of Boston transcended this
political "state of
... confusion. " The influential editor
praised Quincy's brawny and clear sighted command of the
city as not only refreshing, but imperative to the
stability of the city. 46
By 1827, others in the city viewed Quincy's
dictatorial-like style differently and, inevitably, the
mayor's activism eventually would be challenged. Quincy
had operated as mayor without the support of any formal
party organization or structure backing him up. For most
of his duration as the city's chief executive, this had
provided the mayor with significant latitude to operate
freely—unentangled by partisan interests. Yet, after
winning the 1827 election, new forces emerged to dismantle
his administration which may have been stopped if Quincy
had been less independent and established a party-based,
partisan machine.
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When Quincy took on the last remaining independent
municipal board-the Boston School Committee in 1827,
hostile forces smelled vulnerability and jumped, converging
to destroy "the Great Mayor." Having placed himself as its
chairman, Quincy had used highly tenuous executive powers
to strong-arm the committee into abolishing Boston's only
public high school for girls. Quincy. s actions were an
effort to stem popular rumblings that accused the mayor of
spending to freely. The mayor was met by criticism from
both sides of the political spectrum. The once Federalist,
^mhi^L^n^lj^l, as well as the Republican, Jeffer.nn^
Republics
,
and the Boston Patriot, denounced the mayor for
overextending his executive powers on the school board.
Quincy 's various pet projects and municipal reforms had
proven expensive. Broadsides appeared in Boston attacking
Quincy for being "overbearing and imperious." 47
Although old Middling Interest spokesman, William
Sturgis tried to rally the mayor's traditional partisan
base, Francis Wayland had left the city to takeover the
presidency of Brown University, and Sturgis 's efforts were
in vain. Despite Buckingham's support, with Wayland 's
departure from Boston, Quincy had lost a vital spokesman.
According to Quincy-supporter
,
George Shattuck, the people
of Boston finally "have made the astonishing discovery that
[Quincy] is not perfect." During the mayoral election of
1828, Quincy faced a myriad of groups that opposed him.
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After three inconclusive balloting where his fragmented
opposition ran a number of candidates to deny him the
majority, Quincy withdrew his name as a candidate, opening
up the field for another to become Boston's third mayor.
One week after he had publicly declared he would refuse to
stand as a candidate, Quincy- s old nemesis, Harrison Gray
Otis, ironically, ran unopposed, quietly slipping into the
mayor's office to serve three uneventful years as mayor."
Eliza Quincy only hinted at the forces that brought down
her father's long reign as mayor. According to Eliza,
Quincy "was defeated by a combination of private interests
& political managements.- Surprisingly, otis's inaugural
speech sheds light on who was behind Quincy 's defeat.
Otis's inaugural speech first reprimanded the activism
of the Quincy administration. Harkening back to the more
"judicious" Phillips administration, Otis promised the
people of Boston that his would be a passive
administration, unlike his predecessor. The new mayor
promised »[t]o reconcile by gentle reform, not to revolt by
startling innovation," as Quincy had done. Claiming the
city had incurred an outstanding debt of over half a
million dollars during the Quincy years, Otis declared a
reversal of the past mayor's "radical reformation" of
Boston and promised his overriding policy would be based on
"strict economy.
.. [f] or the gradual extinguishment of this
debt." Reassuring his audience, Otis pledged to balance
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the city budget and follow John Phillips's example by
allowing the city to run a natural course without his
interference. 50
Secondly, Otis explained that he understood his
successful ascension to the mayor's office was largely the
result of support he had garnered from past political
enemies who remained highly skeptical of the man they had
just voted into office. This portion of the electorate had
not voted so much for Otis, as they had against Quincy.
Realizing his tenuous position, Otis understood his
appointment from the people was highly provisional. if he
stepped out of line, he would be banished and the old
Federalist chieftain knew it. As his speech indicates, the
once dominant political figure of Harrison Gray Otis, by
1828, was hobbled. "it is quite apparent to all our Fellow
Citizens that the honour of the chair which I now occupy is
not the fruit of any party struggle," Otis explained. "With
the friends of former days, whose constancy can never be
forgotten, others have been pleased to unite (and to honour
me with their suffrages,) who hold in high disapprobation
the part I formerly took in political affairs. Their
support of me on this occasion is no symptom of a change of
their sentiment in that particular," Otis confessed, but
did confirm only their frustration with Quincy'
s
dictatorial activism. "I... admit," concluded a humbled
Otis, "that I am not indifferent to the desire of removing
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doubts and giving satisfaction to the minds of any who by a
magnanimous pledge of kind feelings towards me, have a
claim upon me for every candid explanation and assurance in
my power to afford." Finally, stating that he hoped "our
beloved city prove an exception" to the partisan
"antipathies" and the "torch of discord [that] blazes while
the fire of patriotism expires" under the suffocating
weight of partisan warfare, Otis called for peace in
Boston. 51
In an editorial on the recent events in Boston,
Buckingham chastised the selection of Otis as mayor.
Providing insight to those Quincy supporters who remained
shocked by Boston's dismissal of its second mayor,
Buckingham explained the problem. "The old republican
party is divided, and all are acquainted with the inspired
maxim
'
A Kingdom divided against jMsU comp.l-h tn no^f^
The old federal party is declared to be defunct, and its
odor remaineth only as an offence to a few individuals, who
have survived its dissolution. If it be indeed so, we
derive some consolation from the hope that, phoenix-like, a
new party may arise from its ashes, possessing the wisdom,
the magnanimity, the prudence, the disinterestedness, the
patriotism, which rendered the original an object of
admiration and respect while in its vigor of manhood; but
without any of the weakness, meanness, or infidelity to
friends and benefactors, that disgraced its decline." Then
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in a thinly veiled attack on Harrison Gray Otis' s "phoenix-
like" reemergence in politics, Buckingham scolded Boston
for resurrecting what he believed to be the worst that
Federalism ever had to offer. "The dotage of the Sage and
the imbecility of the Giant may excite compassion; the
affected humility of an aristocrat in fetters, like the
morality of a superannuated libertine, produces only
disgust."- Certainly, Josiah Quincy would have agreed.
The year Quincy stepped down from office in 1828,
Buckingham stepped into the political fray running
successfully as a National Republican for the Massachusetts
General Court. From that position which he held for three
terms, Buckingham continued to be an advocate for emerging
urban entrepreneurs like himself. His hatred of an
economic "aristocracy" that confined the ambitions and
possibilities of an ascendent middling class, by 1828, had
been vanquished. Buckingham, thus, turned to a new enemy-
foreign manufacturers who could undercut and destroy
emerging American industrial inventiveness, production and
acquisition. 53
Harkening back to the founding principles of the
Middling Interest, but having expanded them into a much
more sophisticated, national political doctrine, Buckingham
pursued the interests of an acquisitive, urban middling
class by demanding protective federal policies. "We cannot
so libel the intelligence, sagacity, and god sense of the
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middling class,
-which includes seven eighths of the whole
population,
-as to give currency to a supposition that they
are ready to abandon the manufacturers of woolens and
cottons... the hatters, the tailors, the shoemakers, the
cabinet-makers, and those who are employed in almost every
trade which furnishes articles necessary for comfort,
convenience and luxury, to the mercy of Manchester and
Birmingham agent." Speaking to the insecurities of his
class, Buckingham called for a rational, regulated economy.
He embraced and defended the social transformation the
market economy inspired during the Jacksonian era. 54
In the 1830s, Buckingham followed Daniel Webster in
spurning the Workingman's party and adopting the Whig
agenda. Rejecting any leveling impulses, Buckingham
clearly saw great virtue in a form of capitalism tempered
by government regulation that insured an individual's rise
to wealth and security would be based on hard work,
ambition, and productive creativity, and nothing else. For
Buckingham, these ideas spawned from his past political
activism and experiences in Boston during the early-
1820s. 55
In sum, Middling Interest spokesmen who cut their
teeth in the stormy, depression politics of Boston between
1818 through 1824 provide insight into the painful
political, economic and social transformation that American
society went through during between the first and second
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party systems. The stories of elites like Harrison Gray
Otis and Josiah Quincy cannot be fully understood without
viewing them in stark contrast to the stories of Joseph T.
Buckingham and the middling class he represented. Neither
can those who represent an emerging, politically potent,
lower-to-middle class be fully imagined without some
conception of their profound relationship with established
political and economic elites. Each informed and often
challenged the other's conception of democracy. The season
of social and political disruption and insecurity that this
study investigates, set not only the landscape for the
formation of an established second party system, but also
exposes the changing values that urbanization and urban
political warfare provoked in the body politic.
Most everything changed in Boston between 1800 and
1828. it had gone from a provincial town predicated on an
organic notion of community to a burgeoning, teeming city.
Manufacturing interests took over a past economy based on
maritime trade. The urban transformation proved the death
knell of a dominant political party and signaled the rise
and fall of an incendiary third party that deeply
influenced the formation of the National Republicans and
Whigs in Boston. These years marked the decline of an
elitist based conception of cultural politics and the
emergence of perhaps the strongest mayoralty of the
nineteenth-century. The most important development can be
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found i„ the activism Qf a ngw generat . on Qf yoters
political energy was matched only by the intensity of
Boston's urban transformation. These Bostonians shoo* the
established political culture and forced a change in
political style. These activists challenged the
assumptions of their parents. Understanding that their
future hopes and dreams-their very security-would depend
upon a new economy, they challenged the political status
quo to insure their place within the market revolution.
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de Parti," New EnaTand n.i.vy April 15,1823, APSm icro . Also see, James Walker, "Memoir of JosiahQuincy," 112-114, which offers a brief description of Otispartisans discrediting Quincy before the mayoral election.Eliza Susan Quincy to Justin Winsor, July 7, 1880 WinsorPaPers ' QU-incymirco, for otis partisan's fury towardQuincy 's bid for the mayoralty.
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James Walker "mp^i >- t • *
that the author if "a Letter ^""n 9
uin<=y," 113. posits
by Harrison Gray Otis b..t ^= Quincy ' was not written
Enaian£L^ai^^^y ' 9^y 1|2fmb^ ?^he Su«°i* Bar,.- ^
"A
:
Letter to
. Quincy " and'atSftS^' ?ontains sections ofOtis, sr. autho? tte
y
;amphie?'
S
° lndlcates Harrison Gray
21. James Walker, "Memoir of Josiah Quincv " in ,„
England Salaxv April 25 ^^^^.l L*W ° f Libe l," Ne*
^ "A Citizen " "Reflection"! ' ^
1Ch rePrinted selections
fl eW England C7a 1a xy
,
May 2, 1823, APSmicro- "To -hkI ^i-f 'of the Galaxy,"New England S^f|^'l82°
co^ovlrsv a^nd^at ^ readLs'were
3
awaffof^he
"Esnr?t h!
Y
d S • ^
a lt: had become a campaign issue.
APSmicrn
6 Part1
' ^-^^±^1^, April 15/ 1823,
22. William Emmons, "Mr. Emmons' Speech Delivered at thp
Mayor or^ ' V" *Mmiil " >" "Who Sha^Be
ap^L S CltY ' New England Galaxy., March 29, 1822A^Sjillcj^ For insurgent opposition to section 30 in 1823
?T\o^tQ™™ ^ Panics Journal, April 12 and April
11 ill 3' ^v"!^ Elec^ion '" New England £aia*£ April
'
18
'
Clty Affairs," New England Galaxy, April 11,
23^JLaw of Peddling," New England Galaxy, April 25, 1823,
24 For Dunlap's political affiliation see, Arthur Darling,FOiltlOal Changes in Massachusetts
, 1824-1 fl 4 s , 42-43-Dunlap had arrived in Boston in 1820 from Salem and wouldbecome a Republican leader in the city as an editorial
contributor and founder of the Jacksonian Republican
?oo^S?nn '."LaW ° f Peddling/" New England galaxy,, April 25,1823, APSmicro .
25. "Law of Peddling," New Engla nd Galaxy
,
April 25, 1823,APSmicro .
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V
rnS BY Ward ComParison of the 182 3ernatorial and Mayor Contests in Boston:
1823 Governor's Race: Otis (Fed.) v. Eustis (Rep.
)
Wins by a
ward
ward
ward
ward
ward
ward
ward
ward
ward
ward
ward
ward
margin of
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Eustis 136 (Rep.)
Eustis 127 (Rep.)
Eustis 140 (Rep.)
°tis 15 (Fed.)
Eustis 12 (Rep.)
Eustis 67 (Rep.)
Otis 202 (Fed.)
Otis 180 (Fed.)
Otis 160 (Fed.)
Otis 48 (Fed.)
Otis 38 (Fed.)
Eustis 14 (Rep.)
votes
1823 Mayor's Race: Quincy (Fed. /M.I.) v. Blake (Rep. /M.I.)
Wins by a margin of:
ward 1: Blake 106 (Rep. /MI.) votes
ward 2: Blake 107 (Rep. /MI.)
ward 3: Blake no (Rep. /MI.)
ward 4: Quincy 4 5 (Fed. /MI.)
ward 5: Blake 2 (Rep. /MI.)
ward 6: Blake 44 (Rep. /MI.)
ward 7: Quincy 177 (Fed. /MI.)
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ward 8: Quincy
. . . . 177 (Fed. /MI )ward 9: Quincy.... 95 (Fed. /MI )ward 10: Quincy... 84 (Fed. /MI.)
ward 11: Quincy... 98 (Fed. /MI
ward 12: Quincy... 72 (Fed. /Ml!)
Source: Columhia n Cenl-jn oi Aoril q i«o-> * .
Centinel reports £he results i t' 218 ° ; Where as the
2179. I have followed the Centfnfi?^ 25 ° 4 ' Blake:
° f the Cgnt i nel 's breakdown of votes by ward desoit^
29
* Eton i an and Mech a n ic Jonrnm
, April 26, 1323, aas.
^"Esprit de Parti," New England Salaxy., April 15, 1823,
?«; Q
E1
w
Z\fUSan Quin°y to Robert C. Winthrop, Oct. 291879
' Winthrop Family Papprs, ouincvmir.m.
32 Josiah Quincy, A Municipal History nf,
, , p^^n 74 _77Editorial, independe'nrp^tojiian, July 22, IsL; a^
33 The credo of the volunteer firemen as quoted in RobertMcCaughey, The Last F^ral i st y 109. Josiah Quincy?'
Munic ipa l History of,
,
.
Boston , 263-265. Edmund Quincy, LifeOf Josiah Quinsy., 397-399.
34. Robert McCaughey, The Last Federalist
,
109. Josiah
S
Ulncy' Municipal History nf
.
, .pn^ , 263-265. EdmundQuincy, Life Of Josiah Quinsy, 397-399.
35. Robert McCaughey, The Last Federalist
,
127-128.
36.
1
"Inaugural Address, Josiah Quincy, Delivered May 1,823," in Boston, Inaugural Addresses of the. Mayors of
'
Boston
,
vol. 1, 10-12. Also see, Josiah Quincy, Municipal
HlStorv Of. . .Boston, 58-61.
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S
'
J
°? iah Quinc^ Slivered May 1
History of.. pA^W^0 see - J°s"h Quincy, mniziml
~-au^ es-66 .
toward maintaining a healthy c i „
he mayor
Municipal Hi,tory
g
nf ^ 'Ut ' J°Slah Quincy '
£rJ^Tnasho?ntLM=n^e '-"J°Siah Quincy ' The G"at Mayor,"gsasavSrSE ra 1sag^a 0sr 4 s
:
1900 (BoLo
- :
44. Josiah Quincy, Figure nf p^ rt 323 >
«L
F°5
o
Buc*in?ham 's explanations for Federalism 's decline
1823 »?he
S
T^}I? liberality/. New England Salary., May 3S?. T Legislature of Massachusetts," New England
^ffs ^24 23 .'.Re t l e V MThe E1rti0n ' HApril 9 182 . "R f ctions and Prospective. New EnglandGjLLaxy., April 16, 1824, all in, A£Smi5XQ. a x a
46. Joseph T. Buckingham, Personal M^j rC) vol . 2
,
13-14.
JZ; ?^ gQlgmbifln CPnti nPl, Jeffersonian RennhH^n andthe Boston Patriot
,
as well as the broadsides, as guotedin, Robert McCaughey, Last Fgrfpra ] j Pf , 129-131.
48. George Shattuck as guoted in, McCaughey, LastFederal i st
,
129-131. *'
49. Eliza Susan Quincy to Justin Winsor, July 7 1880
Winsor Family Papers, Ouincymiom.
50. Harrison Gray Otis, "An Address to the Board of
Aldermen, and the Members of the Common Council of Boston,"
in Boston, Inaugural Addresse s of the Mayors of Boston ,
vol. 1., 120-121.
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51. Harrison Gray Otis
BQSS&n, vol. 1, 126-128.
52. Joseph T. Buckingham, ^^l_tismlj^ f vol . 2#
and^5Ko™blith, "Becoming Joseph T. Buckingham!
and ^fy5
K°rnblith, "Becoming Joseph T. Buckingham,
55 Gary Kornblith, "Becoming Jo
and 12-15. seph T. Buckingham,
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